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This thesis examines whether regional competition law enforcement systems established 
under deep regional trade agreements (deep RTAs – i.e. customs unions or deeper forms 
of economic integration agreements) help to address the major problems faced by 
developing countries in relation to competition law enforcement. After conducting a 
comparative review of different kinds of regional competition agreement the thesis 
demonstrates that regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems under 
deep RTAs may result in far more significant improvements in competition law 
protection in developing countries than those under other kinds of regional competition 
agreement [i.e. stand-alone competition agreements (including both first and second 
generation agreements), competition provisions in shallow RTAs, and MLATs]. 
Regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs might, at 
least in theory, effectively deal with some of the main problems of the developing 
countries by, among other things, reducing the cost of enforcement, limiting the 
influence of vested interest groups, improving the ability of competition authorities to 
impose deterrent sanctions and engaging the bargaining power of the parties in 
international negotiation. In practice, however, all regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems established under a deep RTA concluded between developing 
countries suffer from instability, lack of implementation and/or stagnant development. 
This thesis explains the poor performance of existing regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems established by developing countries by the inadequacy of the 
broader regional economic (and social) integration design under the respective deep 
RTAs. Accordingly, the thesis argues that the success of a regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement system under a deep RTA is in practice depends on (a) the 
success of deep economic (as well as social) integration between the member states, (b) 
the coherence of regional competition policy with the broader regional integration 
arrangements, and (c) political will and adequate institutions in all member states. 
 
[Word count (incl. bibliography): 96,579]   
3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTACT………………………………………………………………………………2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... 7 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 8 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 11 
Section 1.1 The Research Question ...................................................................... 11 
Section 1.2 Significance of the Research Question .............................................. 12 
1.2.1 Traditional Remedies against the Poor State of Competition Law 
Protection in Developing Countries ........................................................................ 13 
1.2.2 The Current State of Law Concerning Regionally Integrated Competition 
Law Enforcement Systems ..................................................................................... 16 
1.2.3 Main Thesis & the Outline of the Research .............................................. 24 
Section 1.3 Method & The Limitations of the Research ...................................... 26 
CHAPTER 2  MAJOR PROBLEMS CONCERNING COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ............................................... 28 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 28 
Section 2.1 Socio-Economic Aspect .................................................................... 29 
2.1.1 Limited Domestic Demand and Poverty ................................................... 29 
2.1.2 Informal Economy .................................................................................... 35 
2.1.3 Limited Budget for Basic Public Services ................................................ 37 
2.1.4 Weak Consumer Groups and Low Awareness of Competition Policy ..... 39 
Section 2.2 Political Governance Aspect ............................................................. 40 
2.2.1 State-Owned Enterprises ........................................................................... 40 
2.2.2 Inappropriate Government Intervention ................................................... 43 
2.2.3 Political Instability and Corruption ........................................................... 45 
2.2.4 Lack of Political Will ................................................................................ 47 
4 
 
Section 2.3 Legal Environment ............................................................................ 49 
2.3.1 Inadequacy of Law .................................................................................... 50 
2.3.2 Institutional Challenges ............................................................................ 53 
Section 2.4 Comments and Conclusions .............................................................. 56 
CHAPTER 3EXAMINATION OF REGIONAL COMPETITION AGREEMENTS 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ........................... 58 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 58 
Section 3.1 Introduction to Regional Competition Agreements and the Two 
Taxonomies 59 
3.1.1 First Taxonomy: based on legal form and ultimate purpose of the 
cooperation between the parties .............................................................................. 61 
3.1.2 Second Taxonomy: based on depth of cooperation between the parties .. 70 
3.1.3 The distinction between regional integration and regional cooperation ... 77 
Section 3.2 Potential Benefits and Costs of Regional Competition Agreements . 79 
3.2.1 Benefits of Regional Competition Agreements ........................................ 80 
3.2.2 Costs of Regional Competition Enforcement ........................................... 91 
3.2.3 Assessment of the benefits and costs of regional competition agreements
 108 
Section 3.3 Meeting the Specific Needs of Developing Countries in Regional 
Competition Agreements .......................................................................................... 112 
Section 3.4 Conclusions: Cooperation versus Integration .................................. 114 
CHAPTER 4  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS & THE ROLE OF REGIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY 116 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 116 
Section 4.1 The Basic Rationale for Regional Integration ................................. 117 
Section 4.2 Evolution of Regional Economic Integrations ................................ 118 
5 
 
4.2.1 Historical review of the shift from ‘closed-economies’ to ‘free trade’ in 
Europe: regional integration through bilateral preferential trade agreements and 
early customs unions ............................................................................................. 118 
4.2.2 Three Waves of Regionalism in Developing Countries ......................... 121 
Section 4.3 Economic Motives for Regional Integration ................................... 125 
4.3.1 Trade Flows: Welfare implications of RTAs on the basis of trade creation 
and trade diversion ................................................................................................ 126 
4.3.2 Economies of scale and scope ................................................................ 145 
4.3.3 Attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs) and gaining credibility ..... 147 
4.3.4  Knowledge transfers due to regional integration .................................... 149 
4.3.5 Better trade preferences as a result of increased bargaining power ........ 150 
Section 4.4 Factors to Consider in Increasing Economic Gains from Regional 
Integration 151 
Section 4.5 Political Motives for Regional Integration ...................................... 156 
4.5.1 Intra-regional security concerns .............................................................. 156 
4.5.2 Extra-regional security concerns ............................................................ 161 
4.5.3 New security needs ................................................................................. 163 
4.5.4 Locking-in domestic reforms .................................................................. 165 
4.5.5 Increased bargaining power & getting noticed ....................................... 169 
4.5.6 Marginalisation Syndrome ...................................................................... 171 
4.5.7 Strong lobbies & individual voters ......................................................... 171 
Section 4.6 The Economic Focus of Regional Integration ................................. 172 
Section 4.7 The Role of Competition Policy in Regional Integrations .............. 174 
Section 4.8 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 182 
CHAPTER 5  THE INFLUENCE OF BROADER ECONOMIC (AND SOCIAL) 
INTEGRATION ON REGIONALLY INTEGRATED COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 184 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 184 
6 
 
Section 5.1 Increased Regional Inequalities as a Result of Deep RTAs ............ 187 
Section 5.2 Persistent Resource Constraints and Corruption ............................. 194 
Section 5.3 Preference for Intergovernmentalism over Supranationalism ......... 201 
Section 5.4 The Lack of Enforcement, the Complementary Role of Competition 
Policy in RTAs, and Conflicting Competition Policy Commitments under Multiple 
RTAs 207 
Section 5.5 Other Relevant Factors and Limitations of the Work ..................... 224 
Section 5.6 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 226 
CHAPTER 6  CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................. 228 
APPENDIX 1  CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS ............................................. 237 
Section 1 Definition of ‘Competition Policy’ and ‘Competition Law’ ............... 237 
Section 2  Definitions of ‘Developing Countries’ ................................................ 237 
Section 3 Definition of ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ and Different Levels of 
Regional Economic Integration ................................................................................ 240 






This thesis is written in four beautiful years throughout which I have received enormous 
support from so many people. Without their enthusiasm and patience my work and life 
could not be as complete. I am lucky that our ways have crossed. 
My biggest thanks are to Dr Chris Townley who has been a great supervisor. He was 
very supportive, realistic and helpful. His critical engagement with competition policy 
inspired my thinking and surely added new dimensions to this thesis. This research 
greatly benefitted from discussions I had with the following people: my second 
supervisor Alison Jones, Prof David Gerber, Dr Kusha Haraksingh, Hassan Qaqaya, 
Prof Richard Whish, Prof Michal Gal, Dr Mor Bakhoum, Dr Kerem Cem Sanli, Khatina 
Wan, and Prof Morten Hviid. I am particularly in debt to Dr Heba Shahein and David 
Elliott who read early drafts of parts of this research and provided invaluable advice; 
thank you! Special thanks are due to my two favourite lawyers, my dad and husband, 
who were regularly forced into long discussions on specific aspects of competition 
policy and international trade and gave me lots of good advice and ideas along the way. 
I might not have started to this project without the encouragement of Dr Lindsay Stirton 
to whom I simply cannot thank enough. I am also grateful to Zumrut Esin and Dr Ismail 
Esin for teaching me so much about practicing law and supporting me during this 
project both professionally and personally. Lastly heartfelt thanks to all my friends and 
family for sharing all the fun and fear, and for helping me to grow roots in very distinct 
geographies. 
Any remaining mistakes in the thesis are solely mine. 








LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 
ALBA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
ANZCERTA 
Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CACM Central American Common Market 
CAN Andean Community 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CARICOM Caribbean Community 
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association 
CCASG Cooperation Council for the Arab States of Gulf 
CCC CARICOM Competition Commission 
CEMAC (a.k.a. UEAC) Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CJEU Court of Justice of European Union 
CM Common Market 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
COTED 
CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic 
Development 
CSME CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
CU Customs Union 
CUTS Consumer Unity & Trust Society 
EAC East African Community 
ECN European Competition Network 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EEC European Economic Community 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EIA Economic Integration Agreement 




EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
EU European Union 
EVI Economic Vulnerability Index 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNI Gross National Income 
HAI Human Assets Index 
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 
ICN International Competition Network 
ILO International Labour Office 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
LDCs Least Developed Countries 
LLDCs Land Locked Developing Countries 
M&As Mergers and Acquisitions 
MERCOSUR 
Southern Common Market 
(Common Market of the South of America) 
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
MLATs Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NAFTA New Zealand –Australia Free Trade Agreement 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NCA National Competition Authority 
OECD 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECS Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States 
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement 
10 
 
R&D Research and Development 
RCAs Regional Competition Agreements 
ROW Rest of the World 
RTA Regional Trade Agreements 
RTC Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
SACU Southern African Customs Union 
SADC South African Development Community 
SADCC South African Development Coordination Conference 
SICA Central American Integration System 
SIDCs Small Island Developing Countries 
SMEs Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
TCA Turkish Competition Authority 
TNC Transnational Companies 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNASUR Union of South American Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCTAD 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
US United States of America 
USD US Dollars 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WAEMU (a.k.a. UEMOA) West African Economic and Monetary Union 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
11 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 1.1 The Research Question 
Can ‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement’ systems in deep regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) 1  help to address competition law enforcement problems of 
developing countries? This thesis will attempt to answer to this research question. In so 
doing the focus of analysis will be on economic and political dynamics in deep regional 
integrations, and the influence of these dynamics on regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement. 
Regional cooperation in competition law enforcement may take place at various levels 
under an RTA.2 This thesis defines the deepest level of regional cooperation in 
competition law enforcement under an RTA as ‘regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement’. In order to qualify as this deepest level an RTA should require (a) 
adaptation of a regional competition law that is binding on all member states, (b) 
harmonisation of the national competition legislation of member states, if any, in line 
with the regional competition law, and (c) establishment of a regional institution that 
will undertake, or at least coordinate, certain competition law enforcement activities and 
ensure compliance with the regional competition law across the regional bloc.  
Integration of competition law enforcement under an RTA presupposes the transfer of 
certain powers that would traditionally be exercised by national governments based on 
their sovereignty rights (such as adjudication on competition disputes, decision on the 
content of competition laws) to regional institutions. Moreover, adaptation of regional 
laws and institutions, as well as establishment of a new system for legal enforcement, 
entails significant financial investment. For these reasons regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems are in practice found only in deep RTAs. It 
appears that countries find the alignment of wider political, trade and economic interests 
necessary to agreeing on political and economic commitments required for establishing 
																																																								
1 For the purposes of this thesis deep RTAs include customs union agreements and deeper forms of 
regional economic integration agreements. Different levels of regional economic integration are explained 
in Appendix 1 – Conceptual Clarifications. Meanings of the key concepts used in this thesis (i.e. 
‘developing countries’, ‘competition policy’, and ‘competition law’) are also presented therein.  
2 Different forms and levels of regional cooperation in competition law enforcement will be examined in 
Chapter 3.  
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a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system. This is the starting point of 
the analysis of this thesis.  
Section 1.2 will explain why the above-mentioned research question is important, and 
then present the main thesis of this research. Section 1.3 will then explain the method 
and the limitations of the research. 
 
Section 1.2 Significance of the Research Question 
Inadequate legal design, dysfunctional institutions, political interference and severe 
resource constraints are among the common problems of many developing countries 
concerning competition policy and law enforcement.3  The resultant poor state of 
competition law protection often prevents developing countries from exploiting the full 
benefits of trade liberalisation, and makes the respective territories an easy target for 
international anti-competitive action.4  
Recent years have witnessed an increasing trend among developing countries towards 
establishing regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems, inter alia, for 
improving the poor state of the domestic competition law enforcement in the respective 
territories. Although the regional competition law enforcement concept has received 
some support from competition experts, in practice the implementation of such legal 
arrangements by developing countries has almost always faced serious obstacles and 
delays. So far none of the regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
established by developing countries has become fully operative and realised the 
anticipated improvements for the competition policy. Therefore the difficulties 
developing countries face on the way to establishing a fully operative regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system require further examination.  
This section will first provide brief information on traditional remedies against the poor 
state of competition law protection in developing countries. After recognising the 
insufficient improvement achieved by these traditional remedies, potential benefits of 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems will be presented. The 
																																																								
3 The main reasons for the poor state of competition law protection in many developing countries will be 
examined in Chapter 2. 
4  The lack of a workable competition law regime in developing countries may adversely affect 
international trade to the extent that the relevant jurisdictions accommodate anticompetitive business 




section will then outline the stagnancies and delays in the enforcement of the current 
regional competition law regimes found under RTAs concluded by developing 
countries, and then present the main thesis of this research on why these regional 
systems often fail to meet expectations. The way the remaining chapters of the thesis are 
organised will be explained thereafter.   
  
1.2.1 Traditional Remedies against the Poor State of Competition Law Protection 
in Developing Countries 
Various mechanisms have been developed in order to improve the effectiveness of 
competition law protection in developing countries. Unilateral solutions sought by 
countries can be examined in two categories: (a) inclusion of special provisions in 
domestic competition legislation which aims at achieving certain (economic or social) 
development related targets, and (b) extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws.  
Over the last two decades a great number of developing countries have adopted a 
national competition law regime either on their own initiative or in order to comply with 
their commitments to multinational financial institutions.5 As a way of addressing the 
economic, institutional and political drawbacks of their domestic legal systems many 
developing countries have given broader policy objectives [such as achieving economic 
development, protection of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and (most 
popularly in South Africa) protection of historically disadvantaged social groups] to 
their competition legislation. For the same purposes, developing countries have 
excluded or exempted various business groups or actions from the application of their 
domestic competition legislation. The effect of these competition policy adjustments on 
market competitiveness and economic development, however, is at least questionable, 
primarily because they overlook case-specific market dynamics. Such policy 
arrangements, on the other hand, might have been useful for gathering the support of 
politicians and the public to competition law enforcement. Nevertheless, despite such 
efforts, competition law enforcement has remained inefficient or largely inactive in 
many developing jurisdictions.  
																																																								
5 ‘More than 120 jurisdictions have enacted competition laws, and roughly 90 of these have come into 
being since 1990’ (Hyman & Kovacic, 2013a). For an insightful historical review of the evolution of 
national competition law regimes, see (Bhattacharjea, 2013). 
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Extraterritorial application of competition law in jurisdictions with established 
competition law regimes might be seen as an alternative remedy against severe 
difficulties developing countries face with respect to competition law enforcement. 
Extraterritoriality may indeed lead to punishment of certain anticompetitive actions that 
take place within the territory of countries that lack a workable competition law regime. 
In this respect extraterritorial enforcement of competition law may reduce 
anticompetitive behaviour in international markets. On the down side, however, 
extraterritoriality solution would be silent against the restriction of competition in 
national markets of countries that have no workable competition law regime. Likewise, 
extraterritorial enforcement of law is likely to lead to political tensions, especially when 
domestic interests of jurisdictions that are affected by an anticompetitive conduct 
conflict with one another.6 
At the international level, besides provision of financial support, there are mainly three 
methods employed by advanced economies and multinational organisations in 
contributing to the improvement of competition law enforcement in developing 
																																																								
6 Extraterritorial application of national competition laws was first exercised by the US in the late 1940s, 
which led to the development of the ‘effects principle’. In the United States v Aluminium Co of America 
(Alcoa) decision Judge Learned Hand ruled that the US courts are authorised to impose liabilities on 
conduct occurring outside the US, but having consequences within the US [148 F 2d 416 (2nd Cir.,1945)]. 
Initially the judgment received criticism of other jurisdictions blaming the US for jurisdictional 
assertiveness. However, mainly due to the organisational difficulties that the Second World War brought 
and the strong economic and military power of the US in the post-war world, the dissenting responses of 
other jurisdictions to the enforcement of the ‘effects principle’ by the US were delayed, and this prepared 
the ground for claiming de facto acceptance of the respective US practice under the principles of 
international law [(D. J. Gerber, 2010) p. 66-67. Gerber explains that ‘[u]nder international law, rejection 
of a newly asserted principle by a large number of states precludes it from being considered a valid legal 
principle’ (p. 67). This was not the case for the extraterritorial application of the US anti-trust law]. 
Today many jurisdictions have adopted the ‘effects principle’ or a comparable rule that allows 
extraterritorial application of their domestic competition laws. [For detailed examination of 
extraterritorial application of national competition laws of US, EU, Canada, Brazil, Japan, Israel, China, 
Singapore and Australia, see (Guzman, 2010). For a comparative review of the US’s ‘effects principle’ 
and the EU’s corresponding ‘implementation principle’, see (Wagner-von Papp, 2012).] 
Despite explicit regulations on extraterritorial competition law enforcement, in practice the respective 
provisions are, for several reasons, invoked only rarely. Firstly, extraterritorial application of domestic 
laws always receives a degree of animosity and resentment from other jurisdictions. This is mainly 
because jurisdictions that exercise extraterritoriality make their decisions unilaterally and based on their 
own interests. Gerber explains that ‘[f]oreign interests are taken into account at the discretion of the 
decisional state, and the extent to which they are taken into account, if at all, depends on the type of 
domestic institution making the relevant decisions. Where a court is applying legal principles, it is not 
likely to take such potential foreign impacts into consideration.’ [(D. J. Gerber, 2010), p. 75.] Secondly, 
the prevailing reciprocity principle of international law arguably sets a limit on extraterritorial 
enforcement. Lastly, difficult conflicts may occur in cases of parallel extraterritorial legal enforcement of 
multiple jurisdictions.  
Due to the above-mentioned challenges, in practice only jurisdictions with sufficient economic leverage 
and political power (i.e. mainly the US and then the EU) enjoy any notable outcome of extraterritorial 
applications. [For a detailed assessment of the US’ ‘effects doctrine’ see also: (Mitschke, 2008), p. 22-25 
and the references therein.] 
15 
 
countries.7 These methods are (a) provision of technical assistance to developing 
countries on competition law enforcement, (b) inter-jurisdictional cooperation in actual 
enforcement cases (most importantly, in the form of exchange of information and 
cooperation in collection of evidence), and (c) establishment of international forums 
(which gather the representatives of different jurisdictions together) for the discussion 
of best competition policy designs and enforcement practices and, thereby, 
encouragement of legal harmonisation through (non-binding) soft law mechanisms. 
International support is often indispensable to developing countries, especially the least 
developed, in establishment of their own national competition law regime. Although the 
support of multinational donors and advisory bodies is vital for many developing 
countries, external financial and technical assistance is unlikely to be constant or 
permanent. 8  Cooperation between developing and developed countries in actual 
competition law enforcement cases, on the other hand, is often hindered by differences 
in the perception of competition law, different procedural stages and different 
sensitivities concerning protection of confidential information. Likewise, soft law 
mechanisms may inspire more cooperation and legal convergence, but they are unlikely 
to be able to address concerns that may raise conflicting interests between independent 
jurisdictions.9 
																																																								
7 Different forms and depths of international cooperation in competition law enforcement, together with 
their potential benefits and limitations, will be examined in Chapter 3.  
8 Gerber observes that the support given by multinational organisations to adoption of a competition law 
tends to be more significant than the support given to the enforcement of the same law [(Gerber, 2012), p. 
269]. 
9 Limitations of soft convergence of laws and enforcement practices might be summarised in five items 
[for a detailed assessment of the ‘soft law’ concept, see (Jiang, 2009)]. Firstly, in competition law 
reviews, countries are likely to make a cost and benefit assessment (not only in the pure economic sense, 
but also in terms of industrial policies, international relations, etc.) for individual cases, and avoid 
implementation of the soft law if they believe that the benefits of compliance do not outweigh its costs. 
Secondly, soft law is completely silent against the lack of domestic enforcement capacity (lack of 
financial and human resources, political motivation, technical information, etc.) of partner countries. 
Thirdly, substantive issues, which create a clash of interest between countries, cannot always be regulated 
on a voluntary basis. Fourthly, soft law provisions can be too broad, too vague or imprecise, which would 
make the rules open to different interpretations within the extent of country-specific policy priorities [see, 
(Ana María  Alvarez, 2006) - slide no. 37]. Finally, from a political perspective, it has been argued that 
the negotiations towards soft convergence often reflect the interests of advanced economies rather than 
those of developing countries, since the former group offers more resistance against changing their 
domestic laws [see (Gal, 2010a), p. 118]. Moreover, there is a strong argument that the optimal 
procedural and substantive competition rules for developing countries need to be different from those of 
developed countries [(Singh, 1999)333999, (Singh, 2002), (Elenor M. Fox, 2011), (Gal, 2009b), (Gal, 
2010a). Proposals made by Gal and Singh on divergent goals of competition law in developing countries 
are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1]. Accordingly, due to superior economic power and negotiation 
pressure of developed countries, any soft convergence rule on competition is likely to be similar or at 
least not contrary to the regulations of the prominent jurisdictions in competition law enforcement 
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Moreover, several attempts have been made at elaboration of an international 
convention on competition law [e.g. World Economic Conference held in Geneva (4-23 
May 1927), the Havana Charter, the Draft International Antitrust Code (unofficially 
known as the ‘Munich Draft Code’), efforts within the WTO]. 10  Although an 
international convention on competition policy would increase legal certainty, facilitate 
greater international cooperation in law enforcement and reduce the cost of enforcement 
and compliance, negotiations on the subject have so far been unfruitful.11 
 
1.2.2 The Current State of Law Concerning Regionally Integrated Competition 
Law Enforcement Systems 
In light of the above one may legitimately conclude that neither amicable 
regional/international cooperation arrangements nor special design of national 
competition laws have offered an easy or immediate solution against the weaknesses of 
competition law enforcement in developing countries.  
There is a growing body of research examining the potential benefits of regional 
competition law enforcement in improving competition law protection in developing 
countries.12 Based on this research, one key feature of regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems is that they bear the potential significantly to reduce the cost 
of legal enforcement for the participating countries (e.g. by providing a forum for 
																																																																																																																																																																		
(particularly, the US and the EU). In this context voluntary efforts towards soft convergence can even be 
against to the interests of developing countries [see, (Elenor M. Fox, 2011)]. 
10 For an historical review of the efforts aimed at establishing an international convention on competition 
law, see (D. J. Gerber, 2010).  For a discussion of the primary grounds and emerging principles of 
international competition law, see (Noonan, 2008). 
11 Primary reasons for the failure of the relevant negotiations include the different approaches to the 
objectives and substantive rules of competition law across different jurisdictions, the difficulty in 
coordinating the individual procedures applied by national competition authorities (NCAs), and the 
challenges concerning the timing and private content of information exchange between NCAs. Sokol 
suggests that the potential cross-border obstacles regarding an international convention on competition 
law can be examined under two categories: procedural and substantive matters. According to the author, 
the procedural aspect concerns coordination problems such as information sharing and coordination of 
national competition authorities, whereas the substantive aspect relates to possible divergence of opinion 
on both legal and economic assessment of substantive competition law provisions [(D. Daniel Sokol, 
2010), p. 188]. In addition, negotiation on international competition law has faced strong opposition of 
some prominent jurisdictions, in particular the US, which were reluctant to agree on an international 
convention requiring them to change their established practices [(D. J. Gerber, 2010), p. 205]. Likewise, 
developing countries also opposed an international convention as they were concerned at being unable to 
comply with such convention, and therefore, at being subject to significant remedies for incompliance. 
Moreover, developing countries requested special and differential treatment on grounds of their financial, 
institutional and economic disadvantages in transnational trading. [For an economic perspective on the 
difficulties of negotiating a competition agreement between developed and developing countries, see 
(Guzman, 1998),  p. 1546-1547.] 
12 See, among others, (Gal, 2010b), (UNCTAD, 2005), (Heimler & Jenny, 2013) and (Drexl, 2012). 
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pooling resources or by removing duplicated efforts in the collection of evidence of 
anticompetitive behaviour). This potential could be especially useful for countries with 
very significant resource constraints, such as island states with micro economies, which 
cannot reasonably afford a fully functioning national competition law regime.  
Another at least equally important promise of regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems is that they may reduce the influence of powerful politicians and 
business leaders on competition policy and law enforcement. Accordingly, the transfer 
of certain policy-making and law enforcement powers from national institutions to one 
or more regional institution(s) may considerably restrict the influence of the national 
vested interest groups over competition law and policy related decisions. 
Moreover, regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems might be 
politically more preferable to developing country governments since such systems 
ultimately aim at forming a self-sufficient regional competition law regime, and thereby 
reducing the dependency of the participating countries on external cooperation.13  
Table 1 below shows regional competition law regimes under major RTAs concluded 
by and between developing countries. It demonstrates that the scope of cooperation in 
competition policy and law enforcement differs significantly across the respective 
regional blocs. Although all examined RTAs aim at promoting regional cooperation in 
law enforcement and ensuring coherence between domestic competition policies of their 
member states, some RTAs embrace purely intergovernmental and voluntary methods 
to reinforce regional cooperation (e.g. SADC and AFTA/ASEAN), whereas others 
adopt binding rules for deeper cooperation and regional integration of the competition 
enforcement practice (e.g. COMESA, CARICOM and WAEMU).  
Despite the potential benefits of regionally integrated competition law enforcement, 
Table 1 below also shows that such arrangements between developing countries have 
either failed  (e.g. MERCOSUR) or led to very ambitious regional competition law 
regimes with very limited or no actual legal enforcement.14 The slow or stagnant 
development of the regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems, and 
very limited actual enforcement undertaken by regional competition authorities raise 
																																																								
13 Potential benefits and limitations of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 3 and 5.  
14 (Ana María Alvarez, Clarke, & Silva, 2005) – Notes significant enforcement problems of CARICOM, 
MERCOSUR, Andean Community, COMESA and SADC. On WAEMU see (UNCTAD, 2007), p.9.  
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major concerns about the feasibility of the use of RTAs to improve competition law 
enforcement in developing countries. Moreover, the necessity of region-wide legal 
reform and establishment of new institutions under regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems inherently requires significant financial investment. 
Multinational advisory bodies and prominent competition law jurisdictions (in 
particular the EU) are among the primary donors of the projects towards formation of 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in developing countries. 
More research on the problems of the existing regional competition law regimes is 
required to be able to assess the worthiness of the financing provided by the EU and 
other institutions and jurisdictions.  
TABLE 1:  Regional Competition Law Regimes under RTAs concluded by and 
between Developing Countries  
RTA Type & Date of 
Entry into Force 
Cooperation in Competition Policy 
CEMAC Customs Union 
(1999) 
Regional competition regime is governed by the 
following two texts: the ‘Regulations on Anti-
Competitive Business Practices’ (1999 – as amended 
in 2005)15 and the ‘Regulations On State Practices 
Affecting Trade Between Member States’ (1999)16. 
These laws prohibit abuse of dominance and 
restrictive practices, and include provisions on 
merger control.  
‘CEMAC Competition Commission’ is the 
responsible authority for the implementation of the 
regional competition law and for imposing sanctions. 
On the other hand, ‘CEMAC Regional Council of 
Competition’ acts mainly as an advisory body. 17 
Regional laws do not exclude the adoption of 
national competition legislation. Three out of six 
CEMAC member states (i.e. Cameroon, Gabon and 
Central African Republic) have adopted a national 
																																																								
15 Regulation No. 1/99-UEAC-CM-639 of 25 June 1999 – and amendments by Regulation No. 12/05-
UEAC-639 U-CM-SE of 25 June 2005. 
16 Regulation No. 4/99-UEAC-CM-639 of 18 August 1999. 
17 Before 2005 the Council was the main body competent for the enforcement of the regional competition 
laws. The 2005 amendments (Regulation No. 12/05) gave this authority to the CEMAC Competition 
Commission. However, the CEMAC Council, which is composed of people from various professional 
bodies and civil society, retained some of its powers concerning competition investigation. This has led to 
criticism in the literature. See, (Mouaffo, 2014). Gal and Wassmer-Faibish note that the CEMAC 
Competition Council is a ‘temporary rather than permanent’ body. The authors warn that the current 
institutional design of CEMAC creates ‘instability and lack of confidence in the new regional 
institutions’. [(Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012), p. 311].  
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competition law; but of these three member states, 
only one, Cameroon, has an operative NCA.18  
By March 2014 there had not been any competition 






The core competition law principles of the WAEMU 
are found in Articles 88-90 of the WAEMU 
Agreement (1994). The regional competition regime 
is complemented by various regulations and 
guidance papers.21  
According to the interpretation of the law by the 
WAEMU Court of Justice, ‘the WAEMU 
Competition Commission’ has exclusive competence 
to decide on all legal disputes concerning 
anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance and 
state aid. Although binding on WAEMU member 
states, the Court’s interpretation has not been 
welcomed by all members. Disagreements in the 
region on the division of power between national and 
regional bodies have led to serious disruptions in the 
enforcement of the regional competition law.22 
Consequently the WAEMU Competition 
Commission is currently working on a substantial 
reform plan for the competition regime of the 
region.23 
By March 2014, there had not been any competition 
law cases decided by the WAEMU Competition 
Commission.24 
COMESA Customs Union 
(1994)25 
Competition laws of the region are compromised in 
the ‘COMESA Competition Regulations’ (2004) and 
																																																								
18 (WTO, 2013), p. 47. 
19 (Mouaffo, 2014) 
20  The WAEMU Agreement is defined as a ‘customs union agreement’ by the WTO 
[http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?rtaid=97 (accessed on July 23, 2014)]. The 
WAEMU member states, however, share a common currency, benefit from a common central bank and 
coordinate most of their macro-economic policies.  
21 These include Regulation No 2/2002/CM/UEMOA of 23.5.2002 concerning anti-competitive practice, 
Regulation No 3/2002/CM/UEMOA of 23.5.2002 concerning procedures applicable to restrictive 
agreements and abuse of dominant position; Regulation No 4/2002/CM/UEMOA of 23.5.2002 on state 
aid; and 02/2002/CM/WAEMU of 23.5.2002 on cooperation between the Commission and national 
competition authorities of the Member States for the application of Articles 88, 89 and 90 of the 
WAEMU Treaty. Legal texts of the Union can be found at: http://www.uemoa.int.  
22 As a result of such disagreements ‘[a]fter the advent of the community rules, Senegal identified six 
suspected cartels and abuse-of-dominance cases which were tackled neither by the community body nor 
by the national competition authority’ [See (UNCTAD, 2011), p. 10]. This clearly demonstrates that 
incoherence between the design of regional and national policies may make adoption of a regional 
competition regime a backward rather than forward move towards promotion of competition law 
protection.  
23(Bakhoum & Molestina, 2012), p. 111. The problems of the WAEMU competition law regime will be 
examined in more detail in the following chapters. 
24 (Mouaffo, 2014). (Bakhoum & Molestina, 2012), however, note that there are ongoing cases on abuse 
of dominance (p. 101). 
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the ‘COMESA Competition Rules’ (2004). 
The ‘COMESA Competition Commission’ is the 
regional body authorised to enforce the regional 
competition laws. The Commission commenced to 
its operations on 14 January 2013.  
Since becoming operational the COMESA 
Commission has given weight to the secondary 
competition legislation, as a result of which various 
regulations and guidance notes have been drafted.26  
Regional laws encourage member states to adopt a 
national competition law regime, and anticipate 
active cooperation between the NCAs of member 
states and the COMESA Competition Commission. 
Currently, however, not all member states have a 
domestic competition law regime in place.27 
EAC Common Market 
(2000)28 
‘EAC Competition Act’ (2006) and ‘EAC 
Competition Regulations’ (2010) are the main 
legislation governing the regional competition law 
regime. 
Section 37 of the EAC Competition Act establishes a 
regional institution, the EAC Competition Authority, 
authorised to review and decide all competition law 
disputes with a ‘community dimension’ (i.e. cases 
concerning acts with a cross-border effect within the 
region).  
However, by July 2014 neither the EAC Competition 
Act nor the EAC Competition Authority had become 
operational. 
SACU Customs Union 
(2002 – ratified in 
2004) 
Article 40 of the SACU Treaty requires member 
states to have a national competition policy29 and to 
cooperate with each other in the enforcement of the 
competition laws.  
The SACU Treaty, however, does not provide for a 
common and binding regional competition law 
																																																																																																																																																																		
25 Parties aim to become an economic union by 2018. See: 
http://programmes.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85&Itemid=139 
(accessed on July 21, 2014). 
26 For recently adopted laws and draft legislation: http://www.comesacompetition.org/documents 
(accessed on July 21, 2014). 
27 See (Dini & Gilfillan, 2014). 
28 The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC was signed in 2000. The customs union between the EAC 
member states became operational on January 1, 2005. Five years later, on 1 July 2010, the Protocol on 
the Establishment of the EAC Common Market entered into force following ratification by all member 
states. Most recently EAC member states signed the Protocol for the Establishment of the EAC Monetary 
Union (on 30 November 2013), which is expected to enter into force in the near future. 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54&limitstart=1 
(accessed on July 21, 2014). The ultimate aim of the regional bloc is the formation of a political union 
[see, Article 5(2) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC]. 





SADC Free Trade 
Agreement (2000) 
Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition 
and Consumer Policies (2009)30 sets the main frame 
for regional cooperation.  
The Competition and Consumer Policy and Law 
Committee (established in 2009) works to foster 
cooperation and convergence of laws across the 
SADC region. The Committee, however, meets only 
once a year, and does not facilitate pre-investigation 
stage cooperation between the NCAs of the parties.31 
In 2012 the parties established an online database for 
sharing the decisions of their NCAs with one 
another.32 
The parties do not anticipate any competition law 
enforcement activity at the regional level.33 
ECOWAS Customs Union 
(1993) 
Major texts governing the regional competition law 
regime34 are the ‘ECOWAS Regional Competition 
Policy Framework’ (2007) and, ‘Community 
Competition Rules and the Modalities of their 
Application within ECOWAS’35 (2008). 
The ECOWAS Competition Authority (established in 
2008)36 is the regional body responsible for the 
enforcement of the ECOWAS competition laws. The 
ECOWAS Competition Authority is competent to 
decide competition law cases with a ‘Community 
dimension’. In parallel to this the ECOWAS regime 
allows its member states to have domestic 
competition law regimes.   
By July 2014 ECOWAS member states were at the 
stage of ensuring the compliance of their domestic 
laws with the ECOWAS competition legislation. So 
far there has not been any case decided by the 






Cooperation in competition policy is currently based 
on soft law mechanisms.  
Major documents concerning regional competition 
																																																								
30Available at: http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/SADC_Declaration_on_Competition_and_Consumer_Policies.pdf (accessed on 
July18, 2014). 
31 (SADC, 2013), pp. 2-3. 
32 Ibid. p. 4.  
33 (Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012), p. 293. 
34  Available at: http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/stand.php?id=i_i1_act_add (accessed on July 22, 
2014). 
35 Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08. 
36 See Supplementary Act A/SA.2/06/08 on the Establishment, Function of Regional Competition 
Authority for ECOWAS of December 19, 2008.  
37 The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations entered into force on December 15, 2008. 
Its signatories are ten ASEAN member states that aim to create a customs union. 
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 policy are ‘ASEAN Regional Guidelines on 
Competition Policy’ (2010), ‘Guidelines on 
Developing Core Competencies in Competition 
Policy and Law for ASEAN’ (2012), and ‘Handbook 
on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for 
Business 2013’.  
The main regional body authorised to promote 
regional cooperation and convergence of laws is the 
ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (founded in 
2007). 





Articles 173 and 174 of the ‘Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas’ (RTC – came into force in 2001) 
provides the basic rules of the CARICOM 
competition regime. 
The body responsible for the enforcement of regional 
competition law is the ‘CARICOM Competition 
Commission’.  
The CARICOM Competition regime is still at the 
developmental stage,39 and the CARICOM 
Competition Commission initially focuses on 
competition advocacy, capacity building and 
promoting coherence of the competition laws of 
CARICOM member states. 





The Fortaleza Protocol (1997) was the first text 
aimed at adopting a regional regime of competition 
in Mercosur.40 Although the Protocol anticipated 
enforcement of the regional competition rules by 
regional institutions, four member states did not 
ratify it. As a result, Decision 43/10 of December 
2010 abrogated the Fortaleza Protocol and instead 
established a system that simply aims to increase 
cooperation between the NCAs of the member states 
in competition law enforcement.41  
Currently there is no immediate action plan for 
reformation of the present system into a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system. 
ANDEAN 
Community 
Customs Union Regional competition laws of the CAN are adopted 
by the ‘Decision 608’ in 2005.42 The ‘CAN General 
																																																																																																																																																																		
38 Parties, however, aim to become a common market (by the establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community) in 2015. 
39 Currently the CARICOM Commission is working on the revision of the Competition Commission 
Rules of Procedure 2011, a draft guideline on its investigations procedure, and another draft guideline on 
imposition of fines and other penalties against competition infringement. Recently the CARICOM 
Commission has also submitted a proposal to the political institutions of the regional bloc for the 
amendment of the core competition law provisions in the RTC. See (CARICOM, 2014a),  pp. 6-7. 
40 Officially, the ‘Protocolo de Defensa de la Competencia del Mercosur’ (Protocol on the Protection of 
Competition in Mercosur’).  
41 For more information on this process, see (Botta, 2011). 
42 The official title is the ‘Decision 608 on the Rules for the Protection and Promotion of Competition in 
the Andean Community’. 
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(CAN) (1988) Secretariat’ is responsible for the enforcement of the 
regional laws on competition, and when 
anticompetitive conduct has an effect on intra-
regional trade the CAN General Secretariat is 
competent to take a decision and impose sanctions.43 
However, compliance with such sanctions is to be 
ensured by the NCAs of respective member states. 
Moreover, the ‘CAN Committee for the Defence of 
Competition’ was found to assist the CAN General 
Secretariat and to advise on competition cases.44 The 
CAN Tribunal of Justice has recognised that CAN 
legislation has priority over the legal systems of 
CAN member states.45  
The regional competition regime anticipates close 
cooperation between NCAs of member states and the 
CAN General Secretariat during legal investigation.46 
The author could not find any case on putative 
anticompetitive conduct decided by the CAN 
General Secretariat.47 Cortázar (2012) explains that 
‘the Decision [608] was the outcome of a project 
with European backing that took 3 years and cost €2 
million (…) Not one competition authority brought a 
single case before the Secretariat, which itself has 
not initiated even a single case.’ 48 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that all examined regional blocs formed by developing countries 
face serious difficulties in establishing workable regional competition policies. Despite 
these difficulties, developing countries still show notable efforts and make important 
investments for developing workable regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems. Although there are a few studies on examining regional competition 
																																																								
43  For more information see http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/competencia/competition.htm 
(accessed on July 22, 2014). 
44  Conclusions or recommendations of the CAN Committee for the Defence of Competition on 
competition cases are not binding on the CAN General Secretariat. According to Article 22 of the 
Decision 608, however, the Secretariat must expressly state the reasons of any departure from the 
recommendations of the Committee. See (IADB, 2013), p. 10. 
45 CAN Tribunal of Justice, judgement no. 491/1987, Sociedad Aktiebolaget Volvo v. Superintendencia 
de Industria y Comercio (0001-IP-1987). See also, (Botta, 2011),  pp. 17-20. 
46 When Decision 608 was adopted not all member states had a domestic competition law regime. 
Therefore Ecuador and Bolivia were allowed to enforce Decision 608 directly until they establish an own 
domestic competition law regime [Article 50 of the Decision 608 authorised Bolivia; and Decision 616 
(of July 2005) extended this authorisation to Ecuador]. Both of the member states enacted a national 
competition law in 2008 [(Jenny, 2014),  p. 11 – lists the 78 new competition law regimes since 1998]. 
47 The lack of enforcement is also observed by (IADB, 2013), p.11.  
48 (Cortázar, 2012), p 150. [The author, however, notes that one complaint concerning the regional law on 
competition advocacy was brought before the CAN General Secretariat by an individual. Cortázar 
suggests that the reason for the lack of implementation of the regional competition rules might concern 
the combination of a general scepticism, unawareness of the law, lack of competition culture and 
budgetary constraints (pp. 150-2).] 
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agreements, these studies do not adequately explain the reasons for the poor 
performance of the existing regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
arrangements.49 Moreover, most studies on the subject focus solely on competition 
policy, and competition law provisions, and disregard the economic and political 
environment in which regional competition law enforcement is supposed to take place.  
The novelty of this thesis is that it brings economic theories on regional integration and 
political governance literature together in order to gain a better understanding of the 
prerequisites to establishing a successful regional competition law regime among 
developing countries. Accordingly, the thesis attempts to explain the functioning of 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in the light of the internal 
dynamics of broader regional economic (and social) integration arrangements under a 
deep RTA. It is hoped that in this way the thesis will be able to present a more realistic 
picture of the suitability of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
for improving competition law protection in developing countries.  
 
1.2.3 Main Thesis & the Outline of the Research  
The main thesis of this research defends the following: ‘the establishment of a workable 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system under a deep RTA is 
conditional on the design and success of the broader regional economic (and social) 
integration anticipated by the same RTA’. If this thesis is true, then the broader 
economic (and social) integration aspect of an RTA need to be considered, if not 
prioritized, in the assessment of the needs of a common regional competition law 
regime under the same agreement. Accordingly, the answer to the core research 
question would be heavily reliant on individual characteristics of cooperation under 
every deep RTA. It is believed that most regional competition law regimes established 
by developing countries have achieved limited or no success not only because of the 
design of the relevant regional competition policies and institutions, but also because of 
the weaknesses of the broader regional integrations between the parties.  
The research, which led to the above proposition, is organised into six chapters. Chapter 
2 will survey major problems developing countries face in competition law enforcement 
under three main categories: (i) socio-economic obstacles, (ii) political governance 
																																																								
49 A valuable contribution in the Latin American RTAs context is (D Daniel Sokol, 2008). 
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problems, and (iii) difficulties deriving from legal traditions and institutions. In light of 
these identified problems, Chapter 3 will examine different forms of 
regional/international cooperation arrangement on competition law enforcement. It will 
demonstrate distinctive features of ‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems’ as compared with other regional cooperation arrangements addressing the 
common problems of developing countries, and economic and political costs of regional 
cooperation. This chapter will demonstrate that deep economic integration itself may 
have a positive influence on regional competition law enforcement. Moreover, the main 
thesis of this study (i.e. the dependency of the success of a regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement system on broader regional integration design) will be 
established on the significance of the economic and political commitments regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems entail. In line with this main thesis, 
Chapter 4 will examine the economic and political motives for the conclusion of deep 
RTAs. The chapter will then assess the role of the competition policy in deep RTAs 
within the broader perspective of economic and political dynamics in regional 
integrations. The research will suggest that competition policy is not among the core 
objectives of deep regional integrations. In line with this complementary role of the 
competition policy in regional integrations, Chapter 5 will examine major limitations a 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system may face due to its 
conditionality on the broader economic (and social) policy arrangements under the 
relevant deep RTA. The chapter demonstrates that when regional economic (and social) 
integration policies under a deep RTA are generally dysfunctional, even finding the 
optimal policy design for the regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
will not be sufficient to making the system operational. It is therefore suggested that 
regional competition law should be designed and implemented upon consideration of 
wider economic and political interests of all member states of a deep RTA. Moreover, it 
is argued that a level of advancement in regional economic (and social) integration 
might be necessary for member states of a deep RTA to honour their economic and 
political commitments to establishing a workable regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system. Moreover, these dynamics should ideally be considered in 
competition advocacy campaigns at the early stages of regionalisation. Chapter 6 will 




Section 1.3 Method & The Limitations of the Research 
This research is an interdisciplinary study. The legal analysis is informed by economic 
theories on regionalisation and political governance literature.  
The main reason for preparing this study in an interdisciplinary manner is that 
‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems’ examined in this thesis are 
found only in deep RTAs. The most likely explanation for this occurrence is that 
alignment of wider political, trade and economic interests is considered to be necessary 
for countries to agree on political and economic commitments required for establishing 
a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system. If true, then it needs to be 
recognised that competition provisions in an RTA do not operate fully independently of 
other economic and political arrangements under the same agreement. From this 
perspective, examination of the economic theories on regionalisation and political 
dynamics concerning the negotiation and implementation of RTAs is considered to be 
indispensable to understanding the de facto limits of regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems, and to answering the core research question of this thesis.  
A potential weakness of the thesis, however, is that it includes limited empirical data 
from existing regional blocs formed by developing countries. There are two reasons for 
this limitation. Firstly, the author believes that a deep understanding of the theoretical 
grounds of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems is the initial 
requirement of a healthy assessment of the actual regional competition law enforcement 
practices of developing countries. Secondly, regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems in the existing regional blocs formed by developing countries are 
either not yet fully operable or have produced only a very limited number of 
competition law judgments.50 Due to the primitive stage of regional competition law 
enforcement in regional blocs formed by developing countries, an empirical study of the 
effectiveness of the respective legal arrangements would unlikely to be statistically 
																																																								
50 For instance, the COMESA Competition Commission became operational only in 2013 (although the 
COMESA Competition Regulations were adopted in 2004). Similarly, although the CARICOM 
Competition Commission (CCC) was inaugurated in 2008, there are only two judgments concerning the 
same case published in the CCC’s official website as of September 2014 - Trinidad Cement Limited v The 
Competition Commission  [2012] CCJ 2 and 4 (OJ).  
[See, http://www.caricomcompetitioncommission.com/en/registry/notices-and-decisions (accessed on 
September 4, 2014).] Likewise, the regional competition law of the WAEMU entered into force in 2003, 
but the provisions of the act have raised serious concerns among the NCAs of the member states, in 
particular of Senegal. Therefore, currently WAEMU member states are negotiating a substantial change 
to the respective regional competition laws and institutional arrangements. 
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significant and robust. Therefore, this thesis did not prefer to focus on collecting 
empirical data on the current practice of regional blocs formed by developing countries.  
The research method of this thesis is mainly based on the review of primary and 
secondary documentary material. Several RTAs have been examined in the assessment 
of the conceptual grounds of regional integration. Access to the English texts of most 
RTAs has been provided from the databases of the World Bank and the WTO. 51 
Policy statements, future project reports, and annual reports of regional blocs formed by 
developing countries have been helpful in understanding the anticipated level of 
regional cooperation under respective RTAs.  
Studies of international organisations, particularly the UNCTAD, WTO and OECD 
have been useful, especially in obtaining statistical data. 
Academic studies in the areas of economics, political governance and competition law 
comprise the secondary documentary material.   
																																																								
51 See, http://wits.worldbank.org/gptad/library.php, and 
 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed on April 29, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 2 MAJOR PROBLEMS CONCERNING 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
Strikingly, between 1990 and 2013 the number of jurisdictions that have their own 
national competition law regime had risen from 161 to 1202. Proliferation of national 
competition law regimes usually indicates a wider acknowledgement of the role of 
competition policy in availing the benefits from free market economies. In this regard, 
competition advocacy work of multinational donors and advisory bodies (such as the 
IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD, OECD, WTO, EU and ICN) has played a key role in the 
dissemination of new competition legislations across developing countries. As a part of 
their advocacy work, these bodies have been supporting the policy-making process in 
developing countries mainly by providing financial aid, and technical assistance on core 
competition principles and their enforcement. Furthermore, certain multinational donors 
have obliged developing countries to pass national competition legislation by making 
their debt repayments conditional on such legal reform.3 In addition to the active role of 
multinational donors and advisory bodies, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
have also played a role in raising awareness of competition policy across developing 
countries. Today, competition policy provisions have become a common feature of most 
RTAs.  
Despite this increasing attention to the necessity of having a national competition law 
regime, in many developing countries the enforcement of competition law is still at the 
primitive stage. The reasons for this under-enforcement can be found in different facets 
of socio-economic traditions and political governance in the respective countries.  
This chapter aims to explain the dynamics of market competitiveness in developing 
countries, and to demonstrate the major problems developing countries face in relation 
to competition law and enforcement. The core research question of this thesis is whether 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs can help to 
address competition law and enforcement related problems of developing countries. 
																																																								
1 (Singh, 2002), p.6. 
2 (Hyman & Kovacic, 2013a). 
3 (Dabbah, 2010), pp. 460-1. 
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Examination of the major competition law enforcement problems of developing 
countries will set the scene for the analysis of the extent that regional competition law 
regimes adopted under deep RTAs and other forms of regional competition law 
arrangements can help improving competition law protection in developing countries. 
There is a broad literature examining distinctive features of market competition in 
developing countries. 4  Based on this literature, factors that may influence 
competitiveness of developing countries and the major problems faced by the respective 
countries in relation to competition law and enforcement will be examined below under 
three core categories: socio-economic factors (Section 2.1), problems deriving from 
political governance (Section 2.2), and difficulties related to legal environment (Section 
2.3). Findings will then be stated and assessed, particularly on the inter-related nature of 
the identified socio-economic, political and legal/institutional struggles, and conclusions 
drawn (Section 2.4).     
 
 
Section 2.1 Socio-Economic Aspect 
The influence of socio-economic factors on competition law and enforcement will be 
examined below under four headings: (i) limited domestic demand and poverty, (ii) 
informal economy, (iii) limited budget for the basic public services, and (iv) weak 
consumer groups and low awareness of competition policy.  
 
2.1.1 Limited Domestic Demand and Poverty 
Most developing countries struggle with limited domestic demand in their markets. 
Limited domestic demand is often a result of (a) small geographical size, (b) low 
population density and weak transport infrastructure, and/or (c) the poverty of 
consumers. When there are significant barriers to international trade, low demand in 
domestic markets of a developing country may result in lack of competition in the 
respective markets. Accordingly, low demand may allow only one or few firm(s) to 
operate profitably in the local industries and therefore lead to high market 
																																																								
4 Among others: (Kovacic, 2001), (Kovacic, 1997), (Gal, 2009a), (Gal, 2002b) p. 605, (Gal, 2002a) p. 
303, (Gal, 2009b), (Gal, 2009c) p. 417, (Dabbah, 2010), (Laffont, 1998), (Matheus, 2010) p. 275-300, 
(Matheus, 2013), (UNCTAD, 2004), (UNCTAD, 2002). 
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concentration. For this reason, most industries in developing countries are characterised 
by oligopolistic or monopolistic market structures.5   
A highly concentrated market structure in developing countries invites two questions. 
Firstly, what are the broader social and economic consequences of high concentration in 
markets? Secondly, do socio-economic and political endowments of developing 
countries require any special adjustment in competition policy, and more specifically in 
substantive law of competition? 
The answer to the first question primarily depends on how far a country has opened its 
markets to foreign trade and investment. If a country preserves high barriers to 
international trade and investment (as in many developing countries), then limited 
domestic demand will lead to production below minimum efficient scale in many 
sectors. Due to low domestic demand most local firms will not grow, and thereby offer 
limited employment opportunities to the public. This in turn will harm the overall 
wealth of consumers, and may, ceteris paribus, stabilize low domestic demand.6  
Even when developing countries largely eliminate barriers to free trade, coordination 
failures in the production process may significantly increase the cost of doing business.7 
For example, the cost of establishing a successful processed food business may require 
additional investments both to upstream (to ensure steady, reliable and quality supply of 
raw materials) and downstream markets (to ensure efficient and reliable delivery to 
																																																								
5 Gal reaches to the same conclusion from the overlapping perspective of small economies [see (Gal, 
2002a), p. 6]. According to Gal, ‘a small economy is an independent sovereign economy that can support 
only a small number of competitors in most of its industries.’ Therefore, the main characteristic of a small 
market economy is the highly concentrated nature of most of its industries due to smallness. Similarly, 
most developing countries also suffer from high concentration in their local industries. However, lack of 
competition in local markets of developing countries is a result of not only the small size of the respective 
economies but also other economic and non-economic factors (such as low GDP per capita, institutional 
difficulties and political corruption). Therefore, small economies concept as defined by Gal is not always 
suitable to evaluate the economies of developing countries. In another study, Gal also makes a clear 
distinction between ‘small economies’, ‘developing economies’ and ‘transition economies’, in terms of 
scarcity of resources. She notes that while developing economies endure scarce financial and human 
resources, due to their lower level of development, the main struggle of small economies lies in the lack 
of financial resources rather than human endowments. Gal indicates that small market economies do not 
face any significant human resources restriction, with respect to the educational level and capacity of 
competition professionals; that said, restricted financial resources affect the quantity of skilled 
professionals employed by the small economies. She also notes that transition economies usually suffer 
from the lack of adequate human resources since professionals in transition economies are typically 
educated for a planned economy instead of a market economy system. See (Gal, 2009c),  p. 421. 
6 The link between low domestic demand, inefficient firms and limited employment opportunities may be 
seen as a vicious circle in closed economies.  
7 (Rodrik, 2013), p. 30. 
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domestic and foreign markets).8 This may not only complicate the operation of the 
business, but also significantly increase the cost of production and thereby hinder 
market entry. 
In addition, when low demand leads to sub-optimal levels of production an economy 
may become dependent on imports from other jurisdictions. Moreover, under-
production in certain markets may also create a dependency on imports of intermediary 
products in the relevant downstream markets. The resultant external dependencies may 
render the domestic economy more vulnerable to crises, price fluctuation and anti-
competitive behaviour beyond its borders.  
Lastly, inefficient production is less likely to trigger technological development, which 
deteriorates the disadvantageous position of local firms in global markets. Even when 
the laws of a developing country encourage cross-border trade, low domestic demand 
and inferior technology and machinery used by developing country firms may give 
these a competitive disadvantage in accessing global markets, and thereby reduce the 
volume of exports. By contrast, there is economic evidence that exports may provide a 
means of achieving economic development both at company and national level in 
developing countries.9 Accessing international markets might gain developing country 
firms the demand required for producing on efficient scale, and stimulating learning and 
innovation. It is suggested in the literature that ‘export promotion’ is a surer source of 
dynamic efficiency than ‘import liberalisation’.10 Even when open trade restrictions on 
imports and exports are abolished, developing country firms may find accessing foreign 
markets very costly and challenging. In this regard the difficulties developing country 
firms often encounter may include inter alia high transport costs (including those 
derived from being land-locked, lack of necessary infrastructure, not reaching scale 
economies in shipment, packing and storage in order to preserve the good condition of 
the products), language barriers, and the presence of more established firms in the 
																																																								
8 Ibid. 
9 For an assessment of the successful Korean example, see (Hur, 2004). According to Hur, ‘[t]hroughout 
the 1960s and the 1970s, the Korean government pursued the so-called unbalanced growth strategy that 
strategically concentrated its financial and tax support on export-oriented industries. As a result, Korea 
achieved remarkable economic development, thereby increasing its GDP by 30-fold (US$ 21 billion in 
1961, US$ 616 billion in 1979) and GDP per capita by 20-fold (US$ 81 in 1961, US$ 1647 in 1979) in 
less than 20 years’ (ibid., p. 228). With respect to the  majority of developing countries with low 
industrial capacity (particularly in Africa and Latin America), the growth of exports of manufacturers was 
small or moderate; see (Shafaeddin, 2005). For empirical studies of positive effects of export-growth 
orientated policies on economic development see, inter alia, (Balassa, 1978), p. 181-189; (Balassa, 1985), 
p. 23-35 and; (Fosu, 1990), p. 831-835. 
10 (Mytelka, 1999) as quoted in (UNCTAD, 2002), p. 14. 
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markets. Furthermore, most countries legally require additional investments as a 
precondition of allowing exports into their national territories. 11  Companies from 
developing countries which produce at inefficient scale or with older technologies are 
often unable to meet such investment requirements.12  
The orthodox answer to the second question (i.e. whether the above market 
characteristics require any special adjustment in competition law and policy) is 
negative.13 Accordingly, competition law should only focus on the economic dynamics 
in defined relevant markets, rather than considering the broader economic policy 
objectives of the respective jurisdictions. Therefore general trade and investment policy 
concerns should be addressed outside competition legislation. In practice, however, 
developing countries usually tailor various policy tools to intervene in market failures 
and to improve their disadvantageous position in integrating into international markets.  
The most obvious way to address market failures deriving from limited domestic 
demand is to embrace open trade policies and create a legal and institutional 
environment that stimulates FDI. In this way goods and services of foreign firms would 
promote competition in domestic markets of the host country, while at the same time 
foreign trade may help disseminate new technologies from foreign to local firms, and 
encourage innovation.  
Elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment, however, might not be always 
possible or desirable for political reasons. For example, a country may wish, for 
strategic purposes, to be largely self-sufficient in certain key industries. In the Cold War 
period the protectionist policies of the EU member states in the agricultural sector might 
be explained by such political motives.14 Moreover, internal and external lobbies or 
																																																								
11 (G. K. Lipimile, 2004). 
12 See also, (World Bank, 2001). 
13 See the results of an ICN survey on competition law in small economies. The survey demonstrates the 
contributions of 25 jurisdictions across the world with different market sizes and different levels of 
economic development. A great majority of the respective jurisdictions suggest that the small size of an 
economy should not influence substantive rules on competition. (Instead of providing quantitative data, 
the report summarises the opinions of all jurisdictions on the subject. Accordingly, although some 
jurisdictions defend the need for special adjustments in terms of efficiency considerations and the level of 
concentration required for optimal operation of certain individual markets, the common view is that the 
basic principles of competition law should have universal application. The report does not discuss the 
ways of reflecting the proposed ‘special adjustments’ in competition laws of small economies in any 
detail.) See (Swiss Competition Commission and Israeli Antitrust Authority, 2009), pp. 5-11. 
14 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU dates back to the Treaty of Rome, establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957. According to Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, the 
initial aim of the CAP was to increase agricultural production and thereby ensure food security within 
Europe. Over time the policy has been reformed many times, and today it aims to strengthen the 
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vested interest groups may insist on trade concessions. A level of protectionism, on the 
other hand, might be reasonable when the presence of foreign firms in the host country 
is limited to readily imported products, and when cross-border trade is not realised in 
the context of a deep regional integration. In this case imported goods of foreign firms 
might replace inefficient production of domestic firms in the host country. Although 
this is desirable from the perspective of competition policy, the jobs lost as a result of 
the removal of inefficient domestic firms might not be easily replaceable when the 
activity of foreign firms is limited to supply of goods that are produced elsewhere. On 
the other hand, when such cross-border trade occurs in the context of a deep regional 
integration, free movement of workers and capital in particular might in the long term 
help offset the damage caused by the removal of jobs in the host country.15  
In her thoughtful study on competition law in small-sized economies, Michal Gal 
suggests that the ‘first-best solution’, to promote competition in small-sized economies, 
is to reduce barriers to trade.16 The author, however, argues that competition law and 
policy can be functional where trade barriers could not be completely removed or when 
unrestricted trade access is not sufficient to solve a small economy’s efficiency 
problems.17 Gal explains that competition agencies in small-sized economies should 
then recognise the high concentration levels as a ‘necessary evil’ in achieving 
productive efficiency. In line with this, she suggests that small-sized economies should 
adopt more flexible merger control laws, and allow certain cooperative agreements 
between firms which have the potential to increase productive or dynamic efficiencies. 
In addition the author recognises that small-sized economies may need to regulate 
natural or non-natural monopolies more often than do larger economies, as the effect of 
dominance tends to be higher while the self-correcting tendencies of the markets are 
less specific in smaller economies.18 Gal’s proposals are well informed by economics of 
competition, and likely to improve competitiveness in small economies when applied 
correctly. On the downside, however, both increased market regulation and permission 
to concentration of the markets subject to increased efficiencies are likely to complicate 
competition law enforcement. Moreover, from the perspective of developing countries, 
																																																																																																																																																																		
competitiveness and sustainability of agriculture and rural areas in the EU. See, (European Commission, 
2012). 
15 This point will be elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5. 
16 (Gal, 2002a), pp. 306-7. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., pp. 317-25, 333-4. 
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essential market data for the relevant assessments may not be accessible, and 
competition agencies as well as courts may lack the required technical skills, at least in 
the initial stage. In addition, in the absence of adequately designed and financed 
institutions and clear and unambiguous laws, giving extensive weight to efficiencies 
may increase rent seeking in competition law enforcement.  
As a response to market failures that are common in many developing countries Singh 
proposes a far more protectionist policy design. According to Singh, ‘the purpose of 
competition policy [in developing countries] cannot simply be the promotion of 
competition as a good thing per se, but to foster economic development’.19 In this 
regard, he defends the concept of ‘optimal degree of competition’ on the ground that too 
much competition would lead to price wars and sharp falls in profits, which would be a 
disincentive to private investment. Singh also suggests that governments of developing 
countries need to coordinate investment in order to prevent over capacity and falling 
profits. In objecting to the application of the ‘national treatment’ principle20 promoted 
by the WTO for international trade agreements, he suggests that: “(…) it is necessary 
for developing country governments to control (a) the timing of the FDI; (b) the total 
amount of FDI; as well as (c) the selection of large projects by multinationals.” 21 
Singh’s proposals do not extend to application of different substantive laws of 
competition in developing countries, although he clearly defends careful economic 
planning of governments and positive discrimination for domestic firms of developing 
countries.  
Two criticisms might be levelled against Singh’s proposals. On the one hand, the 
potential influence of such an approach on FDI has not been discovered. Even on the 
assumption that developed countries have officially accepted discriminatory policies of 
developing countries, such policies may nevertheless discourage investment of private 
investors. Given the importance of FDI for economic development and technological 
improvement of developing countries, the risks attached to the abolition of ‘national 
treatment principle’ need to be assessed cautiously.  
On the other hand, Singh’s proposals, like Gal’s, require a strong state that is equipped 
with the necessary technical, financial and human resources to conduct complex policy 
																																																								
19 (Singh, 2002), p. 15. 
20 The national treatment principle requires equal treatment of imported and locally-produced goods and 
services. 
21 Ibid. p. 20. 
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analyses. However, due to the lack of necessary resources, influence of vested interest 
groups over the governments and asymmetric information inflows to developing 
countries, it is believed that the beneficial outcome of the coordination of investment by 
developing country governments cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, when a 
country suffers from a high level of corruption, direct governmental control of 
investment may increase rent seeking behaviour, and lead to more inequitable income 
distribution. Arguably, in the presence of practices that significantly overshadow good 
governance, adoption of less complex competition policies and fully transparent 
procedures might be more desirable for developing countries.  
In light of the above it may be concluded that limited demand and poverty may 
significantly reduce competitiveness of production in developing countries. Although 
the literature suggests that completion law and policy might help to address these issues, 
so far there has been no consensus on how best to secure the proposed competition law 
and policy outcomes. Likewise, deficiencies in legal enforcement and administrative 
governance in many developing countries make potential benefits of such legal 
adjustments obscure.  
Other modes of government intervention in markets and relevant competition policy 
concerns will be examined in the following sections.  
 
2.1.2 Informal Economy 
In broad terms informal economy refers to ‘economic activities or income that are 
partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation, and observation.’22 Although 
there is uncertainty about the boundaries of the ‘informal economy’ concept, it is clear 
that informal economic activity has some negative implications for society.23 Most 
evidently, businesses operating outside government regulation evade taxation and social 
contributions, which in turn creates a loss in government revenue. Reduced social 
security and tax contributions, on the other hand, often lead to higher tax burdens on 
registered workers.  
																																																								
22 The above definition is used by the World Bank at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTLM/0,,cont
entMDK:20224904~menuPK:584866~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html 
(accessed on April 10, 2014). 
23 See, (Godfrey, 2011), pp. 236-42. (Godfrey discusses different definitions of the ‘informal economy’ 
concept under various disciplines.) 
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From a social security perspective, noncompliance with government regulation often 
means less job security, lower wage, and absent or limited social benefits for workers.24 
On the positive side, however, informal economy might be a source of job creation and 
a safety net for the poor, especially in developing countries.25 
Lastly, from a legal point of view, ubiquitous noncompliance to government laws and 
regulations may risk undermining the rule of law and the credibility of governments in 
the eyes of the public. 
An informal economy accounts for a significant part of the economic activity in most 
developing countries.26 In addition, local businesses established in developing countries 
are often of very small size.27 The reasons for the sheer size of the informal economy in 
most developing countries might be explained by two factors. Firstly, economic 
activities outside the government regulation might be attributable to limited education 
and skills of the operators of small firms who might not be aware of the regulations and 
official procedures for compliance. Secondly, small firms that suffer major resource 
constraints might be unable to afford compliance with government regulations.28 
A large informal economy in developing countries might obstruct the efficiency of 
implementation of competition law and policy. Because informal economic activities 
are off the official records and unobserved both competition agencies and firms might 
not be able to make a healthy estimation of the level of competition in their markets, 
individual market shares of incumbent firms, and potential for future competition and 
market entry. Besides, when the informal economy is large noncompliance with 
government regulations might gain public acceptance despite being unlawful. This 
																																																								
24 (Bacchetta, Ernst, & Bustamante, 2009), p. 38. Authors note that ‘[f]or example, in Colombia’… 
workers in certain segments of the informal economy received only half of the income of a formal worker, 
even when controlling for job and worker characteristics.’ 
25 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTLM/0,,co
ntentMDK:20224904~menuPK:584866~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html 
(accessed on April 10, 2014). (Bacchetta et al., 2009), however, estimates that developing countries lose 
up to 2 percentage points of average growth due to their informal labour markets.  
26 According to the International Labour Office (ILO), “[i]nformal employment comprises one half to 
three-quarters of non-agricultural employment in developing countries: specifically, 48 per cent of non-
agricultural employment in North Africa; 51 per cent in Latin America; 65 per cent in Asia; and 72 per 
cent in Sub-Saharan Africa.” (Chen et al., 2002), p. 7. For the years 1999-2000 Schneider estimated that 
the informal economy within the official GDP’s of developing countries in Africa was 42 per cent; in 
South and Latin America 41 per cent; and in Asia 26 per cent. See, (Schneider, 2002), pp. 4-10.  
27 (Canagarajah & Sethuraman, 2001), p. 4. 
28 Ibid. Noncompliance with law might be a bigger challenge for competition law, as public awareness of 
it tends to be lower than of many other legal areas. 
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might make ensuring compliance with competition law and raising awareness of 
competition regulations among consumers and businesses a daunting task. 
 
2.1.3 Limited Budget for Basic Public Services 
Poverty of consumers, small market size and massive informal economic activity all 
adversely influence the budget and, accordingly, the regulatory abilities of developing 
country governments. One result of limited financial resources of developing country 
governments is the inability to make the required investments in basic public services. 
In this regard, as noted above, poor condition of physical infrastructure (e.g. in 
transport, communication, water, electricity) increases production and distribution costs 
for companies, reduces their competitiveness and hinders integration of developing 
countries into global markets.  
Limited government resources often lead to poor education levels, in particular in the 
periphery of developing countries.29 As a result of the poor education system the 
majority of the working population in developing countries usually consists of low-
waged, unskilled workers. In addition, developing countries with deficient education 
systems often face a lack of skilled workers to undertake complex governmental tasks 
and judicial duties. Likewise low education levels adversely affect technological 
development and the capacity of developing country firms to absorb new 
technologies.30 During the process of technological learning firms need to contact 
various agents, collect information, seek relevant experience, be involved in continual 
upgrading, deepen intellectual knowledge and, more importantly, allocate certain funds 
only to the technological learning itself. Due to human and financial constraints 
transmission of technological knowledge from TNC’s to developing country firms 
might not be easily achieved. 
Developing countries usually struggle to allocate necessary resources to enforcement by 
their competition agencies. As a result new competition agencies in developing 
																																																								
29 Despite resource constraints developing country governments can prioritize investment in the education 
system. Prioritization of education policy is seen as one of the key factors that has led to the speedy 
technological development and economic growth of some East Asian countries. (The most prominent 
example is the policies pursued in the Republic of Korea between 1973-90.) Even today East Asian 
countries are among the highest achievers in world education rankings [see e.g. the results of the 
comprehensive 2012 PISA Survey of the OECD in 65 participating jurisdictions – available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ (accessed on March 02, 2014)].  
30 (UNCTAD, 1999) – Shows that transfer of new technology from advanced transnational companies 
depends on the technological and absorptive capacity of local companies in developing countries. 
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countries often depend on financial aid of foreign donors even for acquiring suitable 
office space and basic office equipment.31 In addition, the greatest operational challenge 
for most competition agencies is the recruitment and retention of skilled professionals 
(e.g. economists and lawyers) especially when private sector salaries greatly exceed 
public sector compensation scales.32 Furthermore, miniscule wages of competition 
agency staff may create temptations to accept bribes in return for relaxing nominal 
regulatory requirements.33  
In his research on the efficiency of competition law enforcement across the world, 
Mateus demonstrated that thirty-eight out of a sample of 101 countries had either no 
NCA or an NCA with extremely limited resources.34 The author explained that these 
countries could hardly be considered to have a real competition law regime. According 
to Mateus, the rule of thumb is that a competition agency should have about five to 
seven professionals per 1 million of population.35 Based on this estimation, one may 
safely conclude that developing countries generally do not have sufficient resources for 
effective competition law enforcement.36  
Several institutional solutions are proposed in the literature to overcome human 
resource constraints in competition agencies. These include improving the education 
system (especially in university departments of business administration, economics, 
law, and public administration) 37 , offering competition agency staff training 
programmes on procedural, methodological and substantive matters, offering 
internships for staff to gain practical experience, international cooperation in technical 
issues and exchange of information38, making the competition agency positions more 
attractive by offering the staff lifestyle benefits, making the staff’s extensive training or 
further education abroad conditional on compulsory work for a defined period (where 
																																																								
31 (Kovacic, 1997), pp. 418-9. 
32 (Kovacic & Eversley, 2007), p. 11. 
33 (Kovacic, 2001), pp. 307-8. 
34 (Matheus, 2013), Kindle Edition location: 2545-56 of 7565. The data set used by Mateus was centered 
on the year 2006 for each examined jurisdiction.   
35 Ibid. The author, however, recognizes that the required number of professional staff might be 
considerably less (four to five professionals per 1 million people) in countries with high population levels 
(e.g. 30 to 40 million people) due to economies of scale in enforcement.  
36 According to (Matheus, 2013) ‘[n]o country with a GDP per capita below 13,570 USD has a 
competition authority that is well resourced.’ Ibid. 
37(Kovacic, 2001), p. 313. 




noncompliance would require the repayment of all expenses plus a fine), and improving 
the reputation of competition agencies in the eyes of the public.39  
Although the proposed solutions would contribute to recruitment and retention of 
skilled professionals in competition agencies, they are not free of cost. Competition 
agencies in developing countries might struggle with funding such solutions from the 
limited resources provided by their governments, and therefore may need to rely on the 
money and technical assistance of multinational donors and advisory bodies. 
Contributions of these multinational bodies, however, are usually focussed on short 
time spans, and in this respect their attention to implementation of new competition 
laws and policies is unpredictable.40 Therefore developing countries seek to develop 
relationships with a wide array of more advanced competition agencies and 
multinational donors and advisory bodies.41  
 
2.1.4 Weak Consumer Groups and Low Awareness of Competition Policy 
Legal enforcement would be better and more efficient when the subjects of the law are 
aware of their rights and responsibilities. Awareness of law would encourage both real 
and legal persons in self-discipline and assertion of their rights before courts and 
government agencies.  
Although the number of developing countries with their own national competition law 
regime has proliferated in recent years, core objectives and dynamics of competition 
law have still not gained wide acknowledgement in their respective societies. Moreover, 
consumer groups in developing countries are usually not well organised to offer 
dispersed consumers a platform from which collectively to manage and defend their 
common interests.  
As a result of weak consumer groups and low public awareness of competition law 
cooperation between the public and competition agencies on competition law matters is 
often very limited in developing countries. This means detection and inspection of anti-
																																																								
39 (Gal, 2009c), pp. 426-7, (Kovacic & Eversley, 2007),  p. 11. 
40 (Kovacic, 1997), p. 428. Likewise Gerber observes that multinational advisory bodies, such as the 
UNCTAD and the ICN, often pay significantly more attention to the establishment of a regional 
competition law system than its enforcement [(Gerber, 2012) p. 269]. 
41(Kovacic, 1997), pp. 437-8.  
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competitive conduct rests almost solely on competition agencies, which in turn usually 
lengthen the decision-making process and increase the cost of legal enforcement.  
Establishing a relationship between competition agencies and professional associations, 
such as chambers of commerce and bars, could provide a valuable service in 
disseminating information on competition law and enforcement practices across firms 
and consumers.42  
 
Section 2.2 Political Governance Aspect 
Political influences on competition law enforcement in developing countries will be 
examined below under four headings: (i) state-owned enterprises, (ii) inappropriate 
government intervention, (iii) unstable governments and corruption, and (iv) lack of 
political will to promote efficient competition law enforcement. 
 
2.2.1 State-Owned Enterprises 
Today, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still undertake an important share of the 
economic activity of developing countries.43 As discussed in Section 2.1.1 above, low 
domestic demand and the resulting naturally concentrated market structures in 
developing countries often require more monitoring by governments, which may prefer 
to control market dynamics through SOEs rather than observe and regulate the activities 
of private market players. SOEs, which are usually legal or natural monopolies, 
however, seem to operate significantly less efficiently than private firms, especially in 
developing countries.44 
The reasons for the establishment of strong SOEs in developing countries are multiple. 
From an historical perspective, the colonial past of some developing countries created a 
strong desire to achieve greater national control of their economies. As a result, during 
																																																								
42 Ibid., pp. 410-1. 
43 ‘Although the weight of SOEs in economic activity varies from country to country, data collected by the 
World Bank just over a decade ago suggest that SOEs accounted for close to 20% of the total non-
agricultural economic activities in an average low-income developing country. In certain economies that 
have transited from a formerly state-socialist economic model this share remains above a third.’ 
(Balbuena, 2014), p. 7. 
44 After an extensive review of the literature on SOEs Shirley and Walsh examine and compare the 
findings of 52 empirical studies on the performance of SOEs relative to private enterprises, and conclude 
that the performance of ‘private and privatized firms are significantly superior to that of public firms.’ 
(Shirley & Walsh, 2000), pp. 48-52. 
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the 1960s and 1970s developing countries nationalised numerous private firms, 
especially in strategically important sectors of the economy such as petroleum and 
mining. 45  In this period import substitution became a popular trade policy, and 
developing countries started to establish regional blocs in order to reduce their 
economic dependency on industrialised economies.46 Besides, promotion of regional 
development was another purpose of SOEs.47 In addition, during the Cold War period 
some developing countries embraced socialist ideology, which comfortably 
accommodated the policy of building strong SOEs.48  
More generally, the primary reason for building SOEs in developing countries appears 
to be ensuring capital investment, and in particular investment in infrastructure.49 
Under-development and deficiencies in basic public services such as communication 
and transport may prevent or reduce the value of certain economic activities in 
developing countries. Unlike the case in industrialised economies, doing business in 
developing countries may require additional investment in the physical infrastructure 
and/or neighbouring goods and services. Moreover, political instability, weak 
institutions and ill-suited financial mechanisms and legal framework in developing 
countries may increase uncertainties in business forecasts and therefore discourage FDI. 
Domestic firms in developing countries, on the other hand, might be short of funds with 
which to undertake major investment. Against this background SOEs might be 
beneficial for improving the sectors that private investors find not sufficiently lucrative 
to do business. Likewise, sectors that are related to public security might justify public 
management.50 In this regard, with the hand of an SOE, governments can invest in and 
control the relevant sectors and secure a reliable supply of goods and/or services. 
Moreover, SOEs may also serve to achieve distributive objectives. Accordingly, 
governments may ensure that SOEs provide goods and services that are primarily 
consumed by the poor (e.g. basic nutrition and health services) at below-cost prices and 
thereby increase their accessibility.51 Furthermore, SOEs may be used to bolster labour 
policies of governments, for example by hiring excess labour input and paying above-
																																																								
45 (European Commission, 2003), p. 5. 
46 Three waves of regionalization are examined under Chapter 4 below.  




51 (Kowalski, Büge, Sztajerowska, & Egeland, 2013), pp. 11-3. 
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market wages.52 In small island states and microstates, in particular, government might 
be the largest employer, and government revenue and spending might be the main 
drivers of the economy.53   
In light of the above a key problem concerning SOEs is suggested to be the pursuance 
of multiple, ambitious and conflicting objectives.54 Unlike privately owned businesses, 
SOEs may be operated with an objective of achieving not only economic efficiency and 
profitability but also certain social and political goals of the respective governments.55 
As mentioned above, these goals may concern, among other things, reducing 
inequalities in wealth distribution or promotion of employment. Moreover, depending 
on the level of political capture and deficiencies in the legal system of a country, SOEs 
might be used to strengthen the power and connections of high-ranking state servants or 
politicians.56 Pursuance of multiple objectives, however, would be likely to require 
some sacrifices from economic efficiency of SOEs. 
SOEs in developing countries usually face problems of capacity and financial resources. 
Lack of skilled personnel, inability to afford the newest technologies, and inadequate 
funding are among the reasons that lead to lower efficiency of SOEs in developing 
countries.57   
More generally, SOEs in developing countries and elsewhere tend to operate less 
efficiently for two reasons: (i) lack of incentive for good internal management, and (ii) 
lack of competition in the relevant markets. SOEs are usually sought in sectors where 
market competition is weak. Concessions granted to SOEs usually further reduce 
market competition and tend to create state-owned natural or legal monopolies. Absence 
of competition, on the other hand, diminishes incentives to improve the efficiency of 
production. From the perspective of efficient management, the literature has shown that 
managers of SOEs in developing countries are often not given enough autonomy and 
																																																								
52 (Shirley & Walsh, 2000), p. 26. 
53(Asian Development Bank, 2012), p. 1.  
54 (Nellis, 2005), pp. 19-22.  
55 (Shirley & Walsh, 2000), p. 7. 
56 (Nellis, 2005) observes that ‘[m]any African (and European, Asian and Latin American) politicians 
and public officials have reaped material and prestige benefits from SOEs, in the form of loans, gifts, 
transport, housing, board membership, future jobs for themselves, present jobs for friends, relatives and 
supporters, procurement kick-backs, and much else’ (ibid., p. 21). This problem could be particularly 
acute in small island states and microstates. For example, in a recent review of the SOEs in Kiribati and 
Tuvalu the ADB demonstrated the decisive role of having extended family ties to the responsible minister 
for appointments to directorships in SOEs. It is noted that this made redundancy of incompetent officers 
de facto impossible. See, (Asian Development Bank, 2012), pp. 1-2.  
57(European Commission, 2003), pp. 6-7. 
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resources to lead.58  Likewise, schemes for rewarding achievement and punishing 
mistakes, which would have helped to improve incentives for good management, are 
also very rare in most SOEs, particularly in those of developing countries.59 Combined 
with often-cumbersome redundancy procedures of SOEs, developing country SOEs 
usually operate with high x-inefficiencies.     
Although inefficient operation of SOEs in developing countries is largely acknowledged 
in the literature, so far there is no consensus on the right path to their reform. 
Privatisation has been the traditional response for the removal of inefficient SOEs. In 
developing countries, however, a successful privatisation might not be possible due to 
broader problems in the political and economic environment, such as unstable 
government, frequently amended and conflicting trade policies, inadequate legal 
framework and institutional structure, corruption, and perhaps most importantly, an 
under-developed private sector.60 Other reform proposals include (i) making the internal 
operation rules of SOEs more commercially orientated and ensuring greater 
transparency in decision-making; (ii) where possible, promoting competition of SOEs 
with private firms (e.g. by price liberalisation, removal of barriers to market entry); (iii) 
establishing public private partnerships (PPPs) for transferring operational control of 
SOEs to private providers while maintaining ownership in public hands; (iv) 
mutualisation (where assets are owned by a non-profit company funded by bond issues 
rather than shares, and any profit is then reinvested in the company which could allow 
pursuance of public interest objectives besides commercial objectives).61 So far it is 
difficult to comment on the relative success of these proposed solutions as further 
testing and research is required.62 Nevertheless, any reform of SOEs in developing 
countries is likely to require an extensive economic and legal planning, as well as strong 
political vision and dedication.   
 
2.2.2 Inappropriate Government Intervention 
Open markets and free competition do not always guarantee significant economic 
returns from improved efficiencies. When the level of competition in markets is low and 
																																																								
58(Nellis, 2005), pp. 21-2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 (D. A. C. Smith & Trebilcock, 2001), pp. 217-8. 




economic activity is hindered by factors such as poor physical infrastructure, small size 
of the economy and geographical remoteness, governmental intervention might be 
necessary in order to correct market failure.63 For instance, market liberalisation would 
normally enable firms that suffer from limited domestic demand to produce at efficient 
levels by raising exportation. However, when domestic firms of a developing country 
cannot make the necessary initial investment in exportation due to information 
asymmetries in the condition of export markets (unlike TNCs, these domestic firms may 
not be informed about consumer preferences in markets abroad, and costs and 
profitability of exportation), a government initiative for training firms and providing 
information might help domestic firms to overcome this initial difficulty of expanding 
to markets abroad, and contribute to long-term economic development in the respective 
country.64 Likewise, when limited financial resources are the primary obstacles to 
exportation by domestic firms in a developing country, a policy intervention ensuring 
the availability of long-term credit to private businesses might prove beneficial.65  
Government intervention in the economy often takes the form of subsidies, state aid or 
tolerance of cartels and monopolies.66 Likewise, developing country governments may 
focus on achieving industrialisation through SOEs or by granting exclusive privileges to 
domestic companies (such as offering procurement preferences, introducing public 
restraints on market entry and FDIs, and granting exclusive rights for provision of 
certain goods and services).67 Another common industrial policy consideration of 
developing countries is embracing weak patent protection regimes for disseminating 
new technologies within their borders.68 Developing country governments may also 
consider social objectives such as promotion of employment (see the previous sub-
section on SOEs) or protection of certain social groups (e.g. special treatment for the 
historically disadvantaged population in South African competition law) in their 
economic interventions. 
																																																								
63(B. Hoekman & Javorcik, 2004) – the paper includes a review of previous empirical studies on the 
economic effect of government intervention in the process of economic liberalization.   
64 Ibid., p. 462. 
65 Ibid., pp. 470-1. 
66 Examples of certain interventions can also be found in developed countries’ competition legislation. 
For example, export cartels, which have no influence on domestic markets, are legal or tolerated in most 
jurisdictions. [See, (Martyniszyn, 2012), pp. 183-4.] Likewise, in Germany, the Act Against Restraints on 
Competition (GWB) includes a special provision on ‘rationalisation cartels’ and ‘structural crisis cartels’ 
aiming to protect local German industries. 
67 See also, (Maskus & Lahouel, 2000),  pp. 598-9 
68 Ibid., p. 596. However, the use of new technologies depends on the absorptive capacity of recipient 
country businesses.   
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In sum developing countries may interfere to ‘free markets’ in order to address market 
failures, to ‘accelerate’ industrialisation and to achieve social objectives.69 Yet such 
interference may limit competition, avoid the desirable elimination of inefficient firms 
from markets and thereby hinder sustainable economic development. Governments need 
to calculate the potential welfare implications of any policy intervention that they may 
consider, and to ensure that the benefits will outweigh the costs of adjustment.70 This 
would, however, require governments equipped with necessary technical skills and 
market observation capacity, as well as the right political motive. Transparency and 
accountability are critical to good governance. The absence of transparent 
administrative procedures, as well as public and legal scrutiny of policy decisions, may 
make it easier to exercise discretion and to use policy intervention as a tool for rent-
seeking and inducing personal benefits.71 Moreover, in developing countries that suffer 
from unstable governments, bad corporate governance, corruption, a large informal 
economy and/or lack of resources, assessment of the long-term effects of a policy 
intervention might not be easily achievable. Besides, pro-markets economic policy 
intervention may receive opposition from dominant private and public enterprises, 
particularly from SOEs and government institutions that oversee SOEs, which might not 
be willing to lose their significant economic leverage in the respective domestic 
economies.72 
 
2.2.3 Political Instability and Corruption  
Another key difficulty concerning economic growth and promoting market competition 
in developing countries is unstable governments and the resultant volatile economic 
policies.  
																																																								
69 For a detailed account of political influences on competition law enforcement and the ways to address 
their adverse effects, see (Gal, 2002b). 
70(B. Hoekman & Javorcik, 2004), p. 458. As a general note, however, the authors indicate that 
‘[government interventions] are second order relative to ensuring a stable macro-economic environment 
and an institutional infrastructure that supports the functioning of modern markets in general.’ Likewise, 
(Rodrik, 2013) explains that ‘Without some semblance of macroeconomic stability and property rights 
protection, new industries cannot emerge. (…) [However] fostering new industries often requires second-
best, unconventional policies that are in tension with fundamentals. When successful, heterodox policies 
work precisely because they compensate for weaknesses in those fundamentals’ (ibid., p. 5, see also pp. 
29-35).   
71(Kovacic, 2001), pp. 271-2. 
72(Kovacic, 1997), pp. 421-2. 
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There are plenty of econometric studies that examine the relationship between unstable 
governments and economic development. Although the factors considered in assessing 
the instability of governments varies across the respective studies, there seems to be a 
broad consensus on the negative influence of political instability (including government 
change and other factors that lead to exorbitant changes in political tendencies) on 
economic growth.73  This adverse influence may partly be explained by dramatic 
economic policy amendments that often follow government replacements. When 
political instability leads to extreme economic policy change it is likely to have a cost 
on the credibility of the investment environment in the respective country for private 
investors. Depending on historical and contemporary political tendencies within a 
(developing) country, instability of government may trigger private investors’ fears of 
facing expropriation, significant market access restrictions or other kinds of extreme 
measure, and thereby losing the value of their investments. In addition, unstable 
government and resultant volatile economic policies may obstruct the continuance of 
previously scheduled large investments in public services such as infrastructural 
improvements, when a newly appointed government decides its public policy priorities 
differently. The inability of governments to pursue long-term projects may also disrupt 
economic development, and discourage private investment.74 
Reluctance of private investors to establish their businesses in an instable political 
environment may clearly result in reduced competition in domestic markets of the 
respective economy.75  
																																																								
73 (Aisen & Veiga, 2013) – After a literature review the authors note that their own findings are 
‘strikingly conclusive: in line with the results previously documented, political instability reduces GDP 
growth rates significantly’ ( ibid., p. 153 – emphasis added).  
74 In addition, political instability is found adversely to affect growth by reducing the rate of physical and 
human accumulation. This is because accumulation normally takes place after a level of development in 
economic activity. See, ibid., pp. 162-6. 
75 Another relevant and widely discussed topic regarding economic development and political stability is 
the effect of embracing a democratic regime. The literature, however, is divided on the influence of 
democracy [(Gurgul & Lach, 2013), pp. 190-1]. For example, after conducting an extensive review of 
economic history of various countries across the world, (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) make a very 
strong case for the necessity of democracy to a sustainable economic development (especially after 
reaching  a certain economic advancement level). By contrast, (Gerring, Bond, Barndt, & Moreno, 2005) 
state that ‘the econometric evidence from the literature suggests […] that the net effect of democracy on 
growth performance cross-nationally over the last five decades is negative or null’ (ibid., p. 323). See 
also, (Aisen & Veiga, 2013) who also reach to a similar conclusion. In this regard, according to Posner 
‘[i]n general, (…) the simpler the economy (…), the more adaptive a dictatorial political system; the 
more complex the economy, the more adaptive democracy is. (…) Dictatorship will often [be] optimal for 
very poor countries. Such countries tend not only to have simple economies but also to lack the cultural 
and institutional preconditions to democracy. Dictatorship is much less likely to be optimal for advanced 
economies. This pattern seems to be broadly observed’ [see (Postner, 2010)]. 
47 
 
Similarly, corruption of politicians or government officers may prevent enactment of 
adequate laws and policies, as well as legal enforcement, in any policy areas, and 
competition law/policy is no exception. The 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
measures the perceived level of public sector corruption in 177 countries, demonstrates 
that the corruption problem is far more severe among developing countries.76 As 
Kovacic (2001) explains, ‘[i]n countries with a deep-seated culture of rent-seeking and 
weak or corrupt systems of public administration, well-established political and 
economic interests may readily subvert the competition policy system to protect the 
existing distribution of wealth and privilege in society.’77  
In addition, business lobbies and other vested interest groups are often very strong in 
most developing countries, and this might set back competition law enforcement.78 For 
example, the presence of strong vested interest groups was suggested to be among the 
main reasons for inactivity of NCAs, especially in controversial and difficult cases, in 
India and Sri Lanka.79 
 
2.2.4 Lack of Political Will   
Socio-economic dynamics and political environment may hinder the emergence and 
evolution of efficient competition law enforcement in a developing country.  
Competition law and policy has to be recognised to operate within the context of a 
broader palette of social and economic policy arrangements with the aim ultimately of 
serving a higher public policy objective. Accordingly, socio-economic dynamics and 
political priorities of governments may require compromises in the core purposes of 
competition policy which are often seen as promoting and protecting the competitive 
process and attaining greater economic efficiency.80 Accordingly, perception of the role 
																																																								
76 See, (Transparency International, 2013). Likewise, (World Bank, 2013)  report confirms that the lower 
the income level of a country, the weaker is its control of corruption.  
77 (Kovacic, 2001), p. 288. A level of corruption, however, is suggested to be beneficial to economic 
growth. See (Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006) – The latter paper examines data collected from over 100 free 
countries (i.e. countries in which people enjoy a defined degree of political rights and civil liberties). 
Méndez and Sepúlveda find that in the long run growth maximization occurs at a corruption level that is 
‘significantly greater than zero’.  
78The stronger position of vested interest groups in developing countries may be explained, in part, by the 
existence of often very close personal ties between business and political elites.  
79 (CUTS, 2003), p. 69. 
80 OECD’s findings on the perception of the core competition policy objectives by various OECD and 
non-OECD countries confirm the above statement. See (OECD, 2003a),  pp. 9-10. 
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of competition law and policy by developing country governments is vital to an 
effective administration and enforcement. 
As mentioned earlier, competition law enforcement is at a fairly primitive stage in many 
developing countries. While a great number of developing countries have already 
adopted a national competition law regime, and few are in the process of doing so (e.g. 
Ghana, Nigeria), the respective laws are often implemented only to a limited degree or 
completely disregarded. A key reason for weak implementation is low priority of 
competition policy as compared with more pressing development needs (such as 
ensuring access to basic nutrients and clean water) faced by poorer developing 
countries.81 In least developed countries and microstates, in particular, a national 
competition law regime may not be economically feasible.82 Another reason might 
concern lack of experience and technical skills in conducting complex competition law 
analysis. As a result competition agencies in developing countries may refrain from 
handing cases that require complex economic judgment.83 In addition, when the socio-
economic culture in a developing country strives to gain control of the national 
economy through excessive government intervention or the drive of strong SOEs, 
responsible ministries, agencies and courts may design and interpret competition rules 
in such a way as to accommodate this prevailing socio-economic culture. Gal provides a 
striking example of the transformational role of the socio-economic perspectives on 
enforcement of competition law in Israel. She demonstrates that changes to the 
economic policies embraced by the Israeli government produced parallel changes in the 
interpretation of competition law by Israeli competition agencies.84 Gal explains that in 
the 1960s and 1970s when the Israeli government pursued more protectionist policies 
aimed at strengthening domestic firms and encouraging exportation, competition 
agencies were more tolerant of market restrictions which were found to be necessary to 
																																																								
81(Papadopoulos, 2010), p. 254. 
82 When resource restrictions objectively prevent emergence of a workable national competition law 
regime respective countries may be obliged to search for alternative institutional solutions, such as 
combining competition law enforcement with the management of certain regulated services under the 
roof of a single authority, or embracing a regional competition law enforcement system. Under both 
options, however, the authorized body may find itself in the struggle of balancing conflicting objectives 
of different policy areas and as a result its decisions might be seen as having significant political 
conclusions. Therefore coherence between combined policy areas must be observed. Besides, when a 
single institution is authorized to safeguard multiple policies, depending on the breadth and diversity of 
its duties, it may become a more elusive target for any single vested interest group. In this regard, having 
regulatory authority over a broad array of industries and firms might serve as a protective shield against 
capture. See, (Kovacic & Hyman, 2012),  p. 533. 
83 (APEC, 1999), p. 8 - § 2.9.16. 
84 (Gal, 2004), pp. 23-6. 
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increasing exports. According to the author, from the mid-1980s the Israeli government 
changed its economic orientation towards a more free-market policy and as a result 
competition agencies began to attach more weight to competitive considerations and 
applied long-term, dynamic economic analysis.85 
Economic priorities and public policy objectives pursued by governments may also be 
reflected in the attachment of different goals to competition policy and law. As will be 
seen in Section 2.3.1 below, consideration of broader public policy objectives, such as 
promotion of employment, improvement of access to basic services or protection of 
certain social groups in competition law review is common in developing countries.  
Although political will and ability to establish a workable competition law enforcement 
system might be fairly limited especially in less developed countries, a well-planned 
competition advocacy campaign may make a significant difference in the way 
competition law and policy is understood by politicians, businesses, media reporters, 
and consumers. Likewise, legal and institutional reform that increase transparency in 
administrative procedures may restrict the scope for discretionary action of public 
officers and reduce the influence of vested interest groups. Accordingly, reduced gains 
from private lobbies and privately motivated government intervention may, in part, 
remove the disincentives for competition law enforcement. Likewise, international 
cooperation on competition law enforcement, and in this context opening domestic 
competition law practices to the scrutiny of multinational advisory bodies in addition to 
domestic and international consumer groups may help eliminating ill-purposed political 
obstacles.  
  
Section 2.3 Legal Environment 
Carefully designed competition legislation and a well-functioning judiciary can play a 
significant role in protection of competition in the marketplace and encouragement of 
private investment. In developing countries, however, domestic law and institutional 
arrangements are often not well suited to securing the emergence of an effective 
competition law regime. Legal environment issues that may restrict or prevent the 
success of competition law enforcement in developing countries will be examined 





2.3.1 Inadequacy of Law 
As a general rule, law needs to be designed to reflect economic and political realities of 
any given jurisdiction. In accordance with this purpose, pressing development needs of 
a developing country may result in pursuance of unconventional goals in competition 
legislation. These unconventional goals may concern economic or non-economic public 
policy objectives. In some developing countries inclusion of non-efficiency based 
policy goals, no matter how distant from actual operation of markets and 
competitiveness, might be a precondition of obtaining the necessary political support for 
the establishment of a domestic competition law regime.86  
Competition policy is expected to contribute to economic development in most 
developing countries. Thus subordination of competition law enforcement to other 
economic policies, such as trade or foreign investment policies, which are believed to be 
more conducive to economic development, is deemed to be justifiable.87 Explicit 
reference to one or more of the following goals are found in domestic competition laws 
of some developing countries: protection of consumers (India, Tanzania, Zambia, Peru), 
ensuring freedom of trade (Zambia, India), regulation of internal trade (Sri Lanka), 
protection of labour (South Africa), protection of SMEs88 (South Africa), expansion of 
entrepreneurship base (Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe) and the promotion of the 
ownership of particular racial or ethnic groups (South Africa).89  
Even in the absence of specific reference to broader public policy goals in competition 
legislation, such goals might de facto be considered in the judgments of competition law 
																																																								
86 (Hyman & Kovacic, 2013b), p. 2167. The authors note that South Africa could not have established a 
new competition law regime in 1990s if the enhancement of economic opportunities for non-white 
population was not among the goals of the new law. However, so far the respective goal has played only a 
very limited role in practice. 
87 (Fels & Ng, 2013), Kindle Edition, location 3639 of 7565. 
88 Protection of SMEs is often considered to be crucial to economic growth in developing countries for 
several reasons. Firstly, SMEs tend to be widely disseminated in developing countries, as a result of 
which they operate as important vehicles for increasing employment opportunities at relatively low 
capital cost. Secondly, through geographically far reaching employment opportunities SMEs may serve to 
ensure more equitable income distribution among the population. Thirdly, increased employment via 
SMEs may help dissemination of management and technical skills across the population.  SMEs may 
improve technical capacity of developing countries related to adoption and/or development of new and 
better technologies. Fourthly, SMEs with their broad geographical reach, are ascribed a further role of 
socially, economically and geographically linking diverse sectors of the economy. Lastly, SMEs may 
strengthen market competition in developing country markets, by subcontracting and being ancillary to 
large-scale enterprises.  See, (G. K. Lipimile, 2004), p. 182. 
89 Compiled from (CUTS, 2003), p. 98; (G. K. Lipimile, 2004), p. 181 and; (Boza, 2003). 
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enforcement bodies.90 The legal ground of such judgments might be found in the 
difficulty of establishing precise and definite methods for assessing the core 
competition policy objectives such as promoting economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare.  
Although pursuance of broader public policy goals in competition law enforcement 
might present itself as an economic or political necessity, too widely defined goals may 
become problematic to enforce for at least four reasons. Firstly, they may create a 
wrong impression of what competition law and policy is able to achieve. For example, a 
competition agency might not be authorised directly to interfere in price increases, even 
though it might be under pressure to set price limits for dominant firms due to the 
previous experience of central planning in a transition economy.91  
Secondly, broadly defined rules might politicise the decisions of competition agencies 
or courts when they require balancing competing economic policies, or economic and 
non-economic policies.92 For instance, a competition agency might be required to assess 
the possible long-term benefits of improved export capacity against the immediate 
negative effect of increased concentration. Besides being politically delicate, such 
balancing exercises might require comparison of unquantifiable policy outcomes. Such 
a difficult case might be a merger in a developing country, which leads to job losses 
while at the same time creating a national champion with an ability to compete in 
international markets. When balancing competing public policies is left to the broad 
discretion of a competition agency the agency may become vulnerable to the opposition 
of political groups as well as private businesses.  
Thirdly, attachment of various public policy goals to competition law may pave the way 
for government intervention in markets. As set forth in Section 2.2.2 above, a level of 
government intervention is widely accepted as necessary, in particular in developing 
countries, in order to remedy market failure. Finding the right balance between 
competing public policies, however, is an elusive goal for all governments. When 
government intervention is exercised through competition law enforcement, different 
																																																								
90 Such interventions might be explained by the reflection of socio-economic ideology rooted in the entire 
administrative governance structure of a country. On this, see the Israeli example in Section 2.2.4 above. 
91(Kovacic, 1997), pp. 423-4. 
92 A major criticism is the absence of ‘workable legal standards’ for balancing economic and non-
economic public policies see, (Areeda & Turner, 1978), para. 105. By contrast, Townley suggests that the 
difficulty of balancing non-economic objectives should not automatically render such practices 
unjustifiable. Moreover, he rightfully argues that courts regularly make political decisions of similar 
nature [see (Townley, 2009),  pp. 38-9].  
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opinions on the required level of intervention may remove the debate on competition 
policy from promotion of economic efficiency, which is often considered to be the core 
objective of market competition. This would also affect the reputation of institutions 
undertaking competition law enforcement in the eyes of other government institutions, 
businesses and consumers.  
Lastly, since broadly defined competition policy goals complicate competition law 
analysis, they may harm legal certainty and predictability of decisions, which may in 
turn undermine investment. In order to alleviate the abovementioned policy deficits, 
states could be advised to clarify the goals of their competition law and decide on the 
procedures that will be followed for the pursuance of the respective goals in actual case 
reviews to the extent that it is possible.  
Competition law protection in developing countries may also be restricted by limited 
scope of substantive laws. Due to political concerns or resource constrains certain 
potentially anticompetitive conduct might be kept outside the scope of competition 
legislation. For example, some developing countries delay merger control due to the 
high workload and expense merger review may create.93 Moreover, special exceptions 
and exclusions from competition law enforcement might be granted to certain business 
groups, enterprises or industrial sectors for public policy reasons. In practice the 
following activities or business groups are found to be exempted or excluded from the 
application of competition law in some developing countries: (i) export cartels94 (India, 
South Africa, Pakistan), (ii) exercise of intellectual property rights (South Africa, 
Zambia), (iii) operation of professional associations (Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Kenya), (iv) activities promoting SMEs, collective bargaining of labourers and/or 
																																																								
93 For example, the national competition law of Senegal does not include merger control provisions. 
However, being a member of the WAEMU, Senegal is subject to merger laws of the WAEMU. In line 
with the requirements of the WAEMU laws Senegal is currently working on a draft reform bill 
concerning merger control. See, (Diallo, 2014). Another reason for exclusion of merger control 
provisions from competition legislation of some developing countries might be the proneness of merger 
control to political influence. 
94 Exemption of export cartels from competition law enforcement might be justifiable in developing 
countries mainly on two grounds. Firstly, export cartels might be a necessary requirement to ensuring 
exports by developing country firms which are, due to the smaller size of their home markets, often at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to TNCs. Usually exports are permitted to countries conditional on 
exporter firms’ additional investment into the recipient economy. Firms from developing countries might 
be able to meet such minimum investment requirements only when they are allowed to combine their 
resources. In such cases, export cartels might be beneficial in enabling the inclusion of developing 
country firms in the global trade mechanism. Secondly, export cartels among developing country firms 
might be less detrimental than those among developed country firms due to relatively higher buyer power 
of importers from developed countries. See, (Stewart, 2004a). [Steward therefore suggests that export 
cartels should be legitimate only in developing countries. For a similar conclusion see (Adhikari, 2004).] 
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particular racial or ethnic groups (South Africa), and (v) economic activities in certain 
vulnerable sectors (Tanzania, India, Zambia).95 Besides, competition law of developing 
countries (such as India, Zambia, and Thailand) may include a draw-back provision 
which enables the government to exempt any businesses or groups of enterprises from 
competition law enforcement.96  
An additional problem that usually affects the effectiveness of competition law 
enforcement in developing countries is the absence of clearly stated investigation and 
decision-making procedure and authorisation for collection of data required for 
competition analysis. 97  Enactment of clearly defined rules on the authority of 
competition agencies and courts is crucial to healthy market analysis, especially when 
limitations on readily available market data due to a large informal economy in most 
developing countries is considered. Competition law enforcement officers should be 
given the authority to collect evidence from business premises, to have access to 
commercially sensitive information, to interview employees and managers and to obtain 
the opinion of rival firms, civil society organisations and customers during 
investigation.98 
Lastly, as will be examined in the next Chapter in more detail, vaguely defined 
competition provisions, dysfunctional institutions, incoherent procedural stages, and 
long time periods required for decision-making are among the primary reasons for 
limited international cooperation between developed and developing countries during 
actual competition law investigation and case review.  
 
2.3.2 Institutional Challenges 
Institutional design is one of the key factors that determine the workability and 
effectiveness of any competition law regime. The right institutional design needs to be 
tailored in coherence with legal endowment and administrative traditions of any given 
jurisdiction. There are mainly two alternative systems concerning institutional designs: 
(a) judicial system (i.e. enforcement of competition law by generalist or specialised 
courts) and, (b) administrative system (i.e. enforcement of competition law by an 
																																																								
95 (CUTS, 2003), pp. 133-4. 
96 Ibid.; (Nkikomborirak, 2004). 




autonomous competition agency, decisions of which should be open to appeal to courts 
and/or a specialist tribunal). 
A vital challenge for developing countries that embrace a judicial system for 
competition law enforcement is to overcome the insufficient technical knowledge of 
courts. Judges (and juries) in developing countries are usually neither trained to 
examine competition law cases, nor experienced in assessing econometric evidence. 
Although training and foreign assistance is often indispensable to overcoming this 
difficulty advanced skills are more likely to be developed over time by enforcement 
experience. 
Enhancing knowledge and technical skills of judges, however, might not be sufficient 
for the effectiveness of competition law enforcement. For establishing a reliable 
competition law regime, developing countries need to ensure independence of the 
judiciary and transparency in legal procedures. When the existing judicial system of a 
developing country is hindered by political interference and deep-rooted corruption, 
establishment of an autonomous administrative body for competition law enforcement 
might be more preferable than reforming the entire judiciary. Likewise, pre-existing 
excessive workload of the judiciary, its inefficient operation and long delays in judicial 
decision-making may also create a tendency towards establishing independently 
operating administrative institutions.99 
In developing countries that embrace the administrative system for competition law 
enforcement, the level of autonomy of competition agency from government influence 
varies across jurisdictions. At one extreme competition agencies may constitute an 
integrally bound and directly controlled unit of a relevant ministry (e.g. China), while at 
the other extreme competition agencies might to a very large degree be independent in 
their day-to-day operations and decision-making. The following are determining factors 
of the level of autonomy of a competition agency: (i) the mechanism that determines the 
agency’s budget; (ii) procedure for appointment, tenure and removal of the agency’s 
board and key employees; (iii) compulsory procedures that the agency has to comply 
																																																								
99 The above-mentioned problem of lack of judges trained in competition law and economics would also 
affect the competition analysis in appeal review of decisions by autonomous competition agencies. For 
example, in Chile competition law cases are decided by an administrative institution in the first instance, 
and appeals from first instance decisions are made to a specialised court. According to a recent ICN 
survey, despite being a court specialised in competition law, the Appeal Court in Chile lacks familiarity 
with economic concepts involved in competition analysis to an extent which may cause some distortion 
of competition policy. See, (ICN, 2007a),  p. 17. 
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with in initiating an investigation, and in decision-making; and (iv) accountability100 of 
the agency’s decisions. Competition agencies that are under the control of a ministry are 
usually more prone to intervention guided by the short-term political or private interest 
of politicians. A degree of independence from political influence in day-to-day 
operations, however, is vital to observation of market principles in the decisions of a 
competition agency.  
In most jurisdictions the authority of competition agencies includes a degree of 
autonomy in determination of enforcement priorities and internal working procedures. 
In addition, most competition agencies are authorised to develop secondary laws and 
technical regulations as well as policy recommendations for clarification of the primary 
competition legislation. Due to these competences, adjustments to competition policy 
might be made faster and more efficiently under an administrative system than 
adjudicative system (the latter of which may well require the involvement of the 
legislature - in parliamentary systems, the parliament). For the same reasons, an 
autonomous competition agency might be able to decide on the skills-set required from 
new staff, and impose measures to ensure procedural fairness and transparency. 
Moreover, competition agencies, unlike courts, may organise competition advocacy 
campaigns for raising public awareness of competition and strengthening their 
autonomy from political interference. Independent from the distinction between 
administrative and judiciary institutions, lack of human and financial resources 
constitute another drawback to the operations of competition law enforcement bodies in 
most developing countries. Poor resources may hinder not only enforcement capability 
of an institution, but also negatively influence its reputation in the eyes of businesses, 
other public institutions and consumers.   
																																																								
100 Measures taken to ensure accountability of a competition authority may at times limit the authority’s 
autonomy. Accountability is often established by giving the government or legislature direct control over 
the agency’s budget. It may also be ensured by obliging the competition authority to publish or in other 
ways disclose its activities and operations, and to respond to queries of the public. In all legal systems a 
tension can be observed between the measures taken to ensure the accountability and autonomy of 
administrative bodies. Accordingly, complete freedom from political interference may diminish 
accountability and effectiveness of a competition agency. By contrast, however, too detailed procedures 
for ensuring accountability may be time-consuming, ineffective and expensive. Nevertheless, depending 
on the degree and the success of advocacy activities of a competition authority, its competence often 
remains vulnerable to significant amendments to the competition policy by the government or legislator. 
On the nexus between accountability and autonomy, see (Kovacic, 2011),  pp. 291-308.  
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The literature suggests several remedies for improving institutional difficulties faced by 
developing countries. 101 The creation of a competition culture through advocacy, 
improving transparency of administrative procedures by publishing comprehensive 
guidelines, embedding competition law and economics in university training 
programmes, creating a collective institutional memory102, improving international 
cooperation by establishing close ties with international advisory bodies and other 
competition authorities, and training the judiciary are among the measures that may help 
increasing the accuracy and efficiency of competition law enforcement in developing 
countries.  
 
Section 2.4 Comments and Conclusions 
This chapter has examined major obstacles to emergence of an effective competition 
law regime in developing countries under three categories: socio-economic matters, 
political governance-related problems, and deficiencies in legal environment.  
A noteworthy aspect of the above-listed problematic areas is their vertically and 
horizontally intertwined operation. Not only are all identified points in each category 
connected and mutually deteriorating, but also adverse effects may arise from the 
interplay of the three main categories. For example, a dysfunctional legal system may 
fail to punish corruption and undue political interference in markets. The resultant 
market failure can in turn harm the economy and increase poverty of consumers.  
Secondly, the above analysis proves that an important part of the competition policy-
related problems of developing countries actually stem from low development level and 
poor political governance. As a result reforms in competition law and policy alone are 
very unlikely to lead to a significant improvement of competition law enforcement in 
developing countries. 
																																																								
101 Among others, (Kovacic, 1997; Kovacic, 2001), (Gal, 2009c), (Matheus, 2013). 
102 Collective institutional memory could be formed by ensuring that the institutional know-how is not 
totally dependent on specific people but rather accumulated at the competition authority [see (Gal, 
2009c), p. 427]. In this regard, organization-wide training and regularly updated manuals concerning the 
relevant law, regulations, organizational data, policy statements and operational protocols may help 





Lastly, although the literature and the experience of industrialised countries suggest 
various possibilities for the improvement of the above problems, any wide-ranging 
reform will inevitably require financial, technical and human resources, and even more 
importantly, a high level of political motivation. Resource constraints might partly be 
overcome by external assistance. In the absence of political will, however, no action 
plan to achieve significant improvements can be implemented. Political motivation of 
governments, on the other hand, is receptive of complex economic, social and political 
dynamics formed both within and outside the respective territories.   
The rest of this thesis will focus on regional competition law arrangements. The next 
chapter will first examine different kinds of regional competition agreements, and 
illustrate the distinctive features of regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems found in deep RTAs. It will then provide a comparative analysis of potential 
costs and benefits of regional cooperation under all kinds of regional competition 
agreements. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on whether a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system developed within the broader palette of 
economic (and social) policy arrangements under a deep RTA can adequately address 
the above-mentioned common competition law and policy challenges faced by 
























CHAPTER 3 EXAMINATION OF REGIONAL COMPETITION 
AGREEMENTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown that competition law enforcement in many 
developing countries is weak due to various economic and non-economic drawbacks, 
such as small economy, financial restraints, lack of skilled workers, poor basic 
infrastructure, weak governance, dysfunctional institutions, incoherent public policies 
and low competition awareness. Regional cooperation in competition law enforcement 
might be useful in reducing the adverse effects of some of these drawbacks, and 
improving competition law protection.  
This chapter will provide an overview of a variety of regional cooperation mechanisms 
on competition law enforcement, and assess the suitability of regional competition 
agreements to addressing the difficulties faced by developing countries in competition 
law enforcement. For this purpose the chapter will first introduce different types of 
regional competition agreements without limiting itself to agreements concluded 
between developing countries (Section 3.1). Regional competition agreements will be 
examined using two taxonomies. The first taxonomy will be based on the legal 
instruments regional competition agreements employ. The second taxonomy will be 
based on the depth of regional cooperation that the agreements envisage.  
The existence of different legal instruments and levels of cooperation implies that not 
all regional competition agreements pursue the same goals. A primary distinction will 
be made between ‘regional cooperation agreements’ (agreements which aim solely to 
achieve inter-agency cooperation for the inspection and deterrence of anti-competitive 
actions within a region), and ‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems in deep RTAs’ [agreements aimed, in addition, at facilitating regional 
cooperation in competition law enforcement, and strengthening the broader economic 
(and social) integration between the parties].  
Secondly, this chapter will conduct a comparative review of potential benefits and costs 
of different types of regional competition agreement mainly from the perspective of 
developing countries (Section 3.2). This review will demonstrate that the positive 
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outcomes of a fully functional regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
system can, in theory, be far more significant than those of a mere regional cooperation 
agreement. However, the main determinants of the efficacy of all regional competition 
agreements will be found to be  (a) the presence of sufficient political will for the 
enforcement of the agreement, (b) coherence in the domestic legislation of the parties, 
and (c) adequate resources and legal enforcement capacity in all jurisdictions.   
The chapter will then focus on competition law enforcement problems of developing 
countries and discuss whether regional competition agreements can help to remedy 
these problems (Section 3.3). After recognising the relatively superior but hard to obtain 
benefits of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system under a deep 
RTA than other regional competition agreements, the chapter will demonstrate the 
intrinsic link between the regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
and the broader economic (and social) integration plan under a deep RTA.  The research 
will suggest that the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
system under a deep RTA is dependent on the workability of the broader regional 
economic (and social) integration scheme under the same deep RTA.  
The chapter will then conclude with a brief summary of findings (Section 3.4). 
 
Section 3.1 Introduction to Regional Competition Agreements and the Two 
Taxonomies 
As mentioned earlier, despite the speedy globalisation of trade and the increase in 
international anti-competitive activities, so far there is no international convention on 
competition law. International cooperation in competition policy is carried out mainly 
under the auspices of a few specialised multinational organisations such as the ICN, 
UNCTAD and OECD. Since international collaboration is indispensable to obtaining 
evidence and implementing effective sanctions against transnational anti-competitive 
conduct, the last few decades have seen a rapid increase in the number of smaller-scaled 
(bilateral or multilateral) competition agreements.  
International cooperation in competition law enforcement most frequently takes place 
via unofficial correspondence between the competition enforcement officers of 
independent jurisdictions. Even in the presence of a regional competition agreement, 
however, realisation of cooperation often depends on the development of a professional 
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relationship and mutual trust between the competition enforcement officers of the 
parties. The ICN and similar multinational platforms play a complementary role to 
regional competition agreements by offering competition enforcement officers a forum 
for discussion and cooperation. Despite their relevance, soft cooperation mechanisms 
facilitated by multinational institutions remain outside the scope of this chapter, as the 
scope of cooperation under these arrangements is often less ambitious and primarily 
aimed at legal harmonisation rather than cooperation in actual law enforcement. 
Accordingly, the focus of the following sections is on regional cooperation on the basis 
of bilateral or multilateral competition agreements.  
Notably, all types of regional competition agreement include the same basic techniques 
for facilitating regional cooperation in competition law enforcement. The cooperation 
mechanisms suggested in an OECD recommendations paper (first published in 1967, 
and most recently revised in 1995)1 are embraced by most of the existing regional 
competition agreement. 2  According to the OECD’s recommendations, cooperation 
under regional competition agreements may mainly revolve around (i) notification of 
certain activities (as a trigger to cooperation), (ii) exchange of information, (iii) 
coordination of action, and (iv) consultation and conciliation between the NCAs of 
independent jurisdictions. 
Information exchange is the main facilitator of inter-jurisdictional cooperation under 
any regional competition agreement. Accordingly, the frequency and the content of 
information exchanged between the parties are the primary determinants of the actual 
depth and efficiency of regional cooperation in competition law enforcement. With 
regard to information exchange, the benefit one party gets from the regional cooperation 
depends on the presence of evidence required for its competition analysis to be located 
in the territory of the other signatory parties. Therefore the bigger the trade between the 
parties of an agreement the more likely that the NCAs of the parties will require 
evidence available in one another’s territory. Consequently, the level of trade between 
two jurisdictions is often an important determinant of the depth of cooperation in 
information exchange between the parties.  
																																																								
1 (OECD, 1995).  
2  (Holmes, Papadopoulos, & Sydorak, 2006), pp. 41-42. Also on the effect of the OECD 
Recommendations on international cooperation, see (Zanettin, 2002), pp. 53-6. Zanettin notes that the 
revised versions of the OECD recommendations were inspired from then existing major regional 
competition agreements (in particular from the 1991 EC/US Agreement).  
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In non-binding competition agreements information exchange is in effect dependent on 
the willingness of the parties to cooperate. In such agreements parties assess their 
national interests in sharing the requested information on every single occasion.  
The protection of confidential information, when applicable, is often the chief concern 
of regional cooperation in specific enforcement cases. Another major concern on 
regional cooperation in competition law enforcement is the possible differences in 
domestic competition laws and enforcement procedures of the parties. These factors 
will be examined in detail in the following sections. 
Regional competition agreements will be examined below using two taxonomies. The 
first is based on the legal form and ultimate purpose of regional competition 
agreements. Accordingly, a distinction is made between stand-alone competition 
agreements, mutual legal assistance treaties, competition provisions in RTAs, and 
unilaterally initiated efforts at achieving regional cooperation.3 The second taxonomy 
focuses on the depth of cooperation in competition law enforcement under regional 
competition agreements. 
 
3.1.1 First Taxonomy: based on legal form and ultimate purpose of the 
cooperation between the parties 
 
																																																								
3 (ICN, 2007b), pp. 7-8; (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005),  p. 191. 
Regional Competition 
Agreements (RCAs)  
Stand-Alone Competition 
Agreements 
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Stand-Alone Competition Agreements: 
As the name implies, stand-alone competition agreements are dedicated to competition 
policy matters only. These agreements may be executed between the governments or the 
NCAs of sovereign jurisdictions. Alternatively, they can take the form of a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by and between NCAs.4 
Cooperation under this group of agreements is often in the form of exchange of non-
confidential information, notification of activities that may affect partner jurisdictions, 
coordination of enforcement activities, and joint research and education programmes. In 
addition there are a small number of stand-alone cooperation agreements that facilitate 
deep cooperation by exchange of confidential information (e.g. 2004 US/Canada 
agreement5, 2013 EU/Switzerland Agreement6). 
Independent of the depth of cooperation they envisage, stand-alone competition 
agreements have essentially no binding effect7, and therefore their enforcement is 
largely free from political tension. Likewise, given that cooperation under stand-alone 
competition agreements is voluntary, actual cooperation inevitably depends on the 
willingness of the parties to share information or to initiate an investigation requested 
by partner jurisdictions. 
Stand-alone competition agreements aim at increasing the efficiency of domestic 
competition law enforcement of signatory jurisdictions. Even when an agreement 
envisages highly developed and close regional cooperation, legal enforcement by the 
parties remains to be administered domestically.  
 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
An alternative mechanism facilitating cooperation between independent jurisdictions on 
legal enforcement is mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). The primary purpose of 
																																																								
4 As stand-alone competition agreements are essentially non-binding the use of a MoU or an agreement 
does not make any substantial difference.  
5 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on 
the Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws; signed on 
October 5, 2004. 
6 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation on the 
Application of Their Competition Laws; entered into force on February 5, 2014. 
7 (Marsden & Whelan, 2005), p. 10. See also,(Petrie, 2012), p. 18. After examining 51 stand-alone 
regional competition agreements among NCAs of independent jurisdictions, and 41 RTAs that contain 
competition policy related provisions, Petrie develops a 7-level taxonomy for covering different forms of 
regional cooperation in competition. According to Petrie’s data-set none of the stand-alone regional 
competition agreements is of a binding character. 
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MLATs is to define processes and timelines for cooperation in legal enforcement.8 
Unlike stand-alone competition agreements, MLATs cover cooperation in the legal 
enforcement of various policies, and they have been traditionally restricted to criminal 
law matters.9  
MLATs impose legal obligations on the parties to assist each other and to share 
confidential information concerning specific enforcement cases. A typical MLAT 
would oblige the parties to assist each other in:  
i. “taking testimony and statements in the requested jurisdiction; 
ii. serving process; 
iii. providing documents or records located in the requested jurisdiction; 
iv. executing requests for searches and seizure; 
v. in some cases, giving any other form of assistance ‘not prohibited by the 
law of the requested jurisdiction’ or ‘consistent with the objects of the 
treaty’.”10 
However, parties may refuse to cooperate (a) when the provision of assistance impairs 
their essential (national) interests or important public policies, or (b) when the 
investigated offence is political in nature, or (c) when the request cannot be investigated 
under domestic laws and procedural regulations of the parties.11  
Although there are a significant number of bilateral (and a few multilateral) MLATs, 
not all of these agreements can be used for cooperation in competition law 
enforcement.12 In this regard MLATs may explicitly exclude cooperation in competition 
law enforcement. Alternatively, they may limit the scope of cooperation to criminal 
matters and therefore require at least the requesting party, if not both  parties, to have 
criminal jurisdiction in regard to competition legislation.13 That not all jurisdictions give 
competition law criminal status limits the applicability of MLATs to competition law 
matters. Likewise, although MLATs are powerful legal instruments in creating legal 
obligations and facilitating exchange of confidential information, in practice their 
																																																								
8 (International Chamber of Commerce, 2012).  
9 (OECD, 2013), p. 37. 
10(ICN, 2007b), p. 15. 
11 Ibid., p. 16. 
12 Ibid., pp. 15-17. 
13 Ibid.;(OECD, 2013), p. 37. (Holmes et al., 2006) notes that the use of MLATs ‘has recently been 
extended from classical criminal matters to criminalised antitrust offences’ (pp. 52-3).   
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positive effect is reduced due to the jurisdictional differences in the rules on the 
investigation processes and confidentiality requirements, as well as  differences in 
enforcement timelines.14 Furthermore, it is reported that NCAs find cooperation via 
MLATs complex and time-consuming since cooperation often requires the involvement 
of courts or foreign affairs officers.15  
It is known that MLATs are used in competition law enforcement by some developed 
jurisdictions, especially by the US.16 However, no evidence could be  found on the 
active use of MLATs by developing countries for competition law enforcement.17 
However, due to the concerns on procedural fairness and respect for the rule of law, 
MLATs are less likely to be signed by or enforced in developing countries. 
 
Competition-Related Provisions in RTAs: 
The main difference between stand-alone competition agreements and competition 
related-provisions in RTAs is that in the latter group of agreements competition policy 
is not the primary focus of the cooperation between the signatory jurisdictions. 
Especially in deep RTAs, competition policy is only one component of a very broad set 
of regional economic (and social) integration arrangements. RTAs are also distinct from 
MLATs as the former group of agreements entails not only cooperation in law 
enforcement but also regional coordination of substantive policies. 
In the literature there is an on-going debate on the goals of competition policy 
provisions in RTAs. After examining 86 RTAs notified to the WTO from 2001 to July 
2005, Solano and Sennekamp (2006) concluded that ‘trade is the overriding principle’ 
of RTAs,18 and accordingly, competition policy has a rather complementary role in 
realising the trade objectives of respective agreements. Gerber (2010) made a similar 
observation on the competition policy in the early times of the European Union (EU).19 
																																																								
14(ICN, 2007b), p. 16. 
15(OECD, 2013), p. 43. 
16 See, (Holmes et al., 2006), p. 51-53. (ICN, 2007b) notes that ‘the USA alone has well over 50 MLATs 
with other jurisdictions’ (p. 15). However, the authors do not discuss the applicability of these MLATs to 
competition law enforcement.   
17 A recent OECD/ICN survey that examines a data set collected from 57 jurisdictions (of which 58% 
OECD members, 22% OECD observers, and 20% only ICN members) concludes that MLATs and 
Letters of Rogatory (see below) are among the least available legal instruments for non-OECD countries. 
See (OECD, 2013), table 8, p. 38.    
18 (Solano & Sennekamp, 2006), p. 9.  
19(Gerber, 2001), pp. 332-391. 
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By contrast, Anderson and Evenett (2006) criticised Solano and Sennekamp for making 
an unclear suggestion, and argued that ‘there is no evidence whatsoever of a 
subordination of competition policy principles to trade "tests" or concerns. On the 
contrary, the agreements typically treat the subject of competition law and policy on its 
own terms.’20 A similar assessment is made by Teh (2009), who examined competition-
related provisions in 74 RTAs and concluded that a ‘…large proportion of RTAs (42 per 
cent of the sample) see the promotion and advancement of “conditions of fair 
competition” between the RTA partners as one of the principal objectives of the trade 
agreement. (…) many RTAs place an intrinsic or independent value on the promotion of 
competition and do not consider it as necessarily subordinate to the trade goals of the 
agreement.’ 21  
This paper argues that the goals of regional competition law and enforcement under an 
RTA should be considered in the context of the role given to the competition policy in 
the broader integration objective of the respective RTA. When the purpose of 
competition provisions in an RTA is to ensure the presence of a national competition 
enforcement regime in all member states, then these provisions often have no direct 
influence on the goals and implementation priorities of national competition policies of 
the signatory jurisdictions.22 The main purpose of competition provisions in such RTAs 
appears to be to ensure that the trade agreement between the parties shall be subject to 
the national competition enforcement regime of each member state. It is believed that 
this may offer an explanation why competition policy provisions in RTAs are treated 
separately, and expected to function in a vacuum, on their own terms. On the other 
hand, however, if competition policy plays a more significant role in achieving deep 
integration, this may imply a change in the goals of regional competition policy. These 
points are further investigated below. 
In his insightful study on the role of competition and anti-dumping policies in RTA the 
starting point for Hoekman (1998) was the distinction between shallow and deep RTAs. 
According to him, shallow integration aims to achieve free trade by eliminating 
(national) trade policies. This implies that shallow integration concerns ‘zero tariffs and 
																																																								
20 (Anderson & Evenett, 2006), pp. 25-26. 
21 (Teh, 2009), p. 464.  
22 An exception to this might be agreements that require one or more parties to adopt or revise their 
national competition laws in a specified way. However, even in such agreements the goals and 
enforcement priorities of the parties in relation to competition law are decided domestically. 
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quotas’ and ‘the abolition of contingent protection’ only.23 On the other hand, deep 
integration ‘consists of explicit actions by governments to reduce the market 
segmenting effect of differences in national regulatory policies that pertain to 
products, producers and natural resources.’ 24  In practice deep integration often 
translates into policy harmonisation and mutual recognition of certain national standards 
across a regional bloc.25 Hoekman submits that ‘the economic impact of shallow RTAs 
may far exceed that of deep RTAs’.26 In other words, achieving economic gain from free 
trade is not necessarily linked to deep integration of regulatory policies, including the 
competition policy. Accordingly, Hoekman concludes that competition policy in deep 
RTAs is driven by a broader integration objective, rather than being seen as a necessary 
condition for giving up (national) trade policy instruments.27 
In line with Hoekman’s suggestion this paper argues that competition provisions in 
RTAs can have different aims depending on the form and the extent of cooperation 
between the signatory jurisdictions. Therefore the role of regional competition policy 
must be examined in the context of broader (economic and social) integration objectives 
of any individual RTA. With regard to a shallow RTA, which aims solely at reduction 
of tariffs and other duties for goods, the role of the competition provisions is likely to be 
limited to the prevention of disturbances to internal trading of goods and/or services by 
anti-competitive activities without seeking extensive policy harmonisation. This is 
because the superior -if not the sole- motive of the parties in entering into a shallow 
RTA is to achieve economic gains from elimination of tariff and other duties. In this 
regard such anti-competitive disturbances might be avoidable when member states have 
workable national competition law regimes. Although globalised markets and 
internationally organised anti-competitive behaviour often require cooperation between 
NCAs in gathering and analysing evidence, as seen above, this requirement can be met 
by simpler forms of regional competition agreement, such as stand-alone competition 
agreements. Then the question that arises is why countries prefer to include competition 
provisions in RTAs, rather than deal with competition policy separately. One 
explanation is that countries may prefer to get an additional commitment from their 
regional partners to ensuring the enforcement of the national competition laws of the 
																																																								
23 (B. Hoekman, 1998), pp. 3-5. 
24 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 36. 
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parties to intra-regional trade. This seems to apply to a vast number of shallow RTAs 
which include only simple provisions intended to ensure the existence and 
responsibility of national competition enforcement bodies in the signatory 
jurisdictions.28  
Alternatively, governments might see competition policy provisions in RTAs as a 
substitute for stand-alone competition agreements. However, this might mean that the 
parties agree to cooperate on competition matters only when a case can be linked to the 
RTA. If so, then the aptness of the RTA for the exchange of information will be 
problematic when an NCA of a member state seeks information located in the territory 
of another member state for purposes of an investigation concerning its domestic 
markets only, or concerning an extra-regional transaction with a third state firm. Thus 
RTAs might not be a good substitute for stand-alone competition agreements unless the 
scope of application of the competition provisions in the former are explicitly extended 
beyond the subject-matter of the RTA. No RTA could be identified to confirm the latter 
scenario. 
Another reason for inclusion of competition provisions in RTAs might be to promote 
intra-regional free trade and ensure a level playing field for the market players. Even 
today, despite the clear prohibition in the Article XXIV:8a of GATT, not all RTAs are 
successful in eliminating barriers to ‘substantially all trade between the constituent 
territories’. In many RTAs parties prefer to exclude certain sectors from regional 
economic integration or to preserve some of their regulatory policies. Although 
competition policy, and in particular state aid provisions, might be used to address some 
of these issues, they often have limited effect on self-interested interventions of national 
governments in trade.29 Deeper integration in broader economic and social policies may 
reduce restrictive national trade policies in two main ways. Firstly, deep RTAs may ban 
certain regulatory tools used by governments for intervening in trade. Secondly, deep 
RTAs may boost the joint trade interests of the parties and therefore reduce the 
incentives for national interference. Moreover, if an RTA envisages deep integration of 
various policy areas in the absence of a common competition policy, the differences in 
																																																								
28 Some RTAs between developing and developed countries include provisions for establishment of a 
national competition law and enforcement system in the developing partner (e.g. EU – Mediterranean 
Agreements). These agreements can be instructive on the content of the competition legislation in the 
respective developing countries at the beginning. However in the longer term competition enforcement in 
the parties will be national.  
29 (B. Hoekman, 1998), p. 40. 
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domestic competition law of the parties may create inequalities for the market players 
across the region. More strict competition law enforcement in one member state might 
put the local firms, and indirectly the economy, of that member state at a disadvantage 
in the respective regional bloc. Presumably such disadvantages are likely to increase the 
more inter-linked national economies of member states. If so, then achieving a common 
understanding of the competition policy might be necessary especially for member 
states of a deep RTA. In practice a common understanding of competition law and 
enforcement priorities may develop automatically over time between jurisdictions, 
especially between major trade partners. Alternatively, such commonality may be 
achieved by inclusion of common regional competition rules in deep RTAs and by 
coordination of competition law enforcement in member states from a regional centre. 
This issue will be discussed further in Section 3.2.3 below.    
Lastly, some developing countries may expect further competition-specific efficiencies 
from RTAs. Developing countries with small-or-micro-sized economies in particular 
may not be able to afford a national competition law enforcement regime, and therefore, 
consider an integrated competition law enforcement system under a deep RTA a 
solution.  
The above suggests that a dual role might be given to competition provisions in RTAs. 
Accordingly, regional competition policy might be expected  (a) to strengthen intra-
regional free trade and/or economic integration, and (b) realise the conventional 
competition policy objectives such as protection of free competition and promotion of 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare. There is also some evidence that the 
additional intra-regional free trade objective may affect the goals of regional 
competition law enforcement when parties pursue a deeper level of economic (and 
social) integration under an RTA.30  
Returning to the distinction between stand-alone competition agreements, MLATs and 
competition provisions in RTAs, it is observed that competition provisions in RTAs 
may either be dispersed among different chapters or regulated under a dedicated 
competition policy chapter. Furthermore, unlike stand-alone competition agreements, 
there are a small number of RTAs that entail binding provisions on competition policy. 
As will be explained in the next section, binding competition provisions are found only 
																																																								
30 (G. Lipimile & Gachuiri, 2005), p. 366-8; (Solano & Sennekamp, 2006), p. 9; (Teh, 2009), p.  472. See 
also, (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005), p. 204-5. 
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in deep RTAs. Nevertheless, the majority of RTAs exclude competition provisions from 
the scope of existing dispute resolution mechanisms, and therefore give a non-binding 
character to the respective competition law provisions. Although both deep RTAs and 
MLATs may create obligations binding on the signatory jurisdictions, unlike MLATs, 
cooperation under RTAs is not bound to the criminal status of the competition 
legislation in the respective jurisdictions. In addition, as stated above, strengthening the 
intra-regional free trade function of competition provisions in deep RTAs distinguishes 
these agreements from MLATs. 
 
Unilaterally Initiated Efforts towards Strengthening Regional Cooperation 
Besides formal bilateral or multilateral competition agreements there are certain 
initiatives unilaterally undertaken by some jurisdictions in order to facilitate regional 
cooperation in competition law enforcement. Since such unilateral actions are taken in 
the absence of a formal agreement, they are technically outside the scope of regional 
competition agreements that constitute the focus this chapter. However, brief 
explanation will be offered below for the sake of completeness.  
There are three major legal instruments that can be used by independent jurisdictions to 
facilitate or strengthen regional cooperation in competition law enforcement. These are 
domestic competition law, confidentiality waivers, and letters of rogation.  
Domestic competition laws can be drafted to make inter-NCAs cooperation easier.  § 
50(b) of the German competition law, which authorises the German Federal Cartel 
Office (i.e. Bundeskartellamt) to cooperate with the NCAs of other jurisdictions, also in 
the absence of a formal agreement, is an example.  
In addition, domestic competition law enforcement bodies may strengthen and speed 
regional cooperation in competition law enforcement by requesting confidentiality 
waivers from the parties subject to their investigation in order to address the statutory 
limitations preventing them from sharing confidential information. Although such a 
waiver can be obtained following an official request from other NCAs under a regional 
competition agreement, a prior unilateral action of an NCA can speed regional 
cooperation and may also contribute to developing a cooperative culture between the 
competition enforcement officers of different NCAs.  
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Lastly, letters of rogation can be used to obtain information from other jurisdictions on 
competition law enforcement. In the US, letters of rogation are defined as ‘the 
customary method of obtaining assistance from abroad in the absence of a treaty or 
executive agreement.’ 31  Letters of rogation can be issued by courts to request 
investigatory assistance from a foreign court in a pending action. Fulfilment of the 
requests depends on the comity of courts towards each other. Although they can be used 
to obtain specific evidence, letters of rogatory are likewise MLATs, customarily 
transmitted via the diplomatic channel and therefore constitute a time-consuming and 
complex means of cooperation.32  
Although all three legal instruments described in this sub-section can be helpful in 
strengthening regional cooperation in competition law enforcement, their use is on the 
initiative of the domestic courts or competition agencies. Therefore these mechanisms 
can be effectively used only when the courts/agencies trust the enforcement capacity of 
one another, and the reciprocal benefits of cooperation.    
 
3.1.2 Second Taxonomy: based on depth of cooperation between the parties 
There is a broad spectrum of legal arrangements and informal practices regarding 
regional cooperation in competition policy between independent jurisdictions. A good 
overview is offered by Petrie (2012), who developed one of the most detailed 
taxonomies on the levels of regional cooperation on competition law enforcement. The 
taxonomy is based upon a dataset which compromises 51 stand-alone regional 
competition agreements and 41 RTAs with competition policy chapters.33 According to 
Petrie, his dataset represents 61% to 71% of all agreements dealing with regional 
cooperation in competition policy.34    
Petrie (2012) breaks down regional competition agreements into seven groups 
according to depth of cooperation. Petrie’s taxonomy –which he names the EJI 
(enforcement jurisdictional integration) Index– may be summarised as follows: 
																																																								
31  United States Attorney’s Manual, Criminal Source Manual 275, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00275.htm (accessed on July 1, 
2013).  
32 Ibid.; (ICN, 2007b), pp. 16-17; and (OECD, 2013), p. 43. 
33 (Petrie, 2012), p. 8. 
34 Ibid. p. 9. 
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Level Title Description 
1 Informal 
Cooperation 
Cooperation in the absence of a formal agreement. 
2 Cooperation Short of 
Notification 
Cooperation in general issues excluding support in 
individual case reviews. This may include general 
discussions, joint research, technical assistance, 
exchange of staff, etc. 
3 Basic Notification 
Basic notification requirement concerning an NCA’s 
enforcement actions that may have an impact on the 






Agreements that contain one or more of the 
following: 
‘Some specification of the circumstances 
surrounding when or how notification should 
take place. 
Assistance with gathering of voluntary evidence 
on behalf of a foreign [NCA]. 
Seeking waivers for the release of confidential 
information.  
A reference to possible coordination of parallel 
investigations, with at least some fleshing out of 
what this might entail.  
Notification when one authority becomes aware 
that anticompetitive activities themselves are 
taking place that may affect the other party's 
interests.’ 
 
5 Positive Comity35 
Agreements that allow an NCA to request another 
(cooperating) NCA to open or expand an 
investigation. However, the requested NCA is only 
required to consider such a request, but not obliged to 





Agreements that contain one or more of the 
following: 
‘In addition to the basic positive comity clause, 
identification of the circumstances when an 
[NCA] requesting another [NCA] to initiate an 
investigation may defer or suspend its own 
investigation in the meantime. 
																																																								
35 A relevant term, ‘negative comity’ concerns a lighter form of cooperation. According to Petrie, 
‘traditional [negative] comity refers to a country considering avoiding taking an action because it may 
harm another country’s interest…’ Petrie also notes that negative comity is included in levels 3 or 4. 
(Petrie, 2012), p. 6. 
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The use of compulsory powers to obtain evidence 
for a foreign [NCA]. 
Sharing of confidential information without 
waiver for its release from those who provided it. 
An agreement to provide assistance on whether 
or not the conduct being investigated is an 





Agreements that establish a supra-national 
competition authority to enforce competition law. 
Source: Compiled from Petrie (2012), pp. 5-7. 
Although the above taxonomy demonstrates the different levels of cooperation in 
competition law enforcement, as acknowledged by Petrie himself, it does not indicate 
anything about implementation and effectiveness of actual competition agreements at 
each level.36 Nor does Petrie’s dataset include investigatory assistance on the basis of 
MLATs.37 
One interesting finding of Petrie’s study is that, apart from the seventh level, 
competition provisions in none of the regional competition agreements are legally 
binding.38 In other words regional cooperation in competition policy seems to occur 
solely on voluntary grounds except when jurisdictions are dedicated to integrate their 
competition law enforcement activities under the supervision of a regional authority. In 
line with this, the respective study shows that all of the level seven competition 
agreements are RTAs rather than stand-alone competition agreements.39  
Nevertheless, a minor correction is due with respect to the above definition of the 
seventh level of cooperation by Petrie. In his paper Petrie requires establishment of a 
‘supra-national’ competition authority for qualification for the seventh level; and he 
refers to CARICOM, Andean Community, WAEMU, and CEMAC as the relevant 
examples.40 It is believed that the emphasis on the ‘supra-national’ character of regional 
																																																								
36 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
37 In terms of the means of cooperation, it is believed that a typical MLAT would fall under Level 6 of 
Petrie’s index. 
38(Petrie, 2012), pp. 20-21. 
39 Ibid., p. 10. In the seventh level of Petrie’s index the agreement on the European Competition Network 
(ECN) is classified as a stand-alone competition agreement. However, it is believed that this cannot 
constitute an exception to the above statement given that the ECN is a clear extension of the EU’s 
integration agreements. 
40 Ibid., p. 7. 
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competition authorities does not accurately represent the group of agreements Petrie 
considers for the seventh level of regional cooperation in competition.41 Some of the 
respective regional blocs embrace inter-governmental cooperation, and thereby restrict 
the power of their regional competition authorities accordingly.  
Most RTAs do not include explicit provisions on the supranational nature of their 
regional laws. In practice the supranational power of regional legislation might derive 
from the decisions of regional courts that are exclusively authorised to interpret the 
regional integration treaties (e.g. the EU and WAEMU). As a general rule, however, 
national governments like to preserve the power within their countries, and therefore 
prefer inter-governmental cooperation to transfer of power to a supra-national 
institution.  
The unwillingness of national governments to relinquish power can be reflected in the 
wording of RTAs in several ways. A known example is the approval requirement 
brought on the decisions of regional competition authorities. An RTA can explicitly rule 
that the decisions of the regional competition authority will gain legal force only after 
the representatives of all member state governments grant an approval. Alternatively, 
the supranational character of a regional competition authority might be diminished by 
drafting the law in such a way as to make the operations of the regional competition 
authority highly dependent on the cooperation of the NCAs of the participating 
jurisdictions. Both of these cases indicate the absence of a genuine supra-national 
authority.  
The CARICOM Competition Commission can be cited as an example of a regional 
competition authority that currently lacks a genuine supra-national power. According to 
Articles 175-176 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, operations of the CARICOM 
Competition Commission are largely dependent on the cooperation of the NCAs of the 
CARICOM member states, and in some cases on the approval of the CARICOM 
																																																								
41 The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘supra-national’ as ‘having power or influence that transcends national 
boundaries or governments’ - 
 [http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/supranational?q=supranational (accessed on July 27, 
2012)]. In this respect, policies as well as decisions adopted by a supra-national body are deemed to be 
superior to those of national authorities of the participating jurisdictions, given that the supra-national 
body acts within the limits of its legally defined areas of authority. However, not all RTAs under which 
participating jurisdictions agree on establishing an integrated regional competition law enforcement 
mechanism aim to establish a regional competition authority with supra-national powers.  
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Council for Trade and Economic Development, the latter of which is a regional 
institution formed by political agents of the CARICOM member states.42  
On the other hand, in some cases supra-national authority might be significantly 
restricted by crucial implementation difficulties created by institutional design problems 
and/or by political disagreements between the member states. The WAEMU is an 
example of such regional blocs. The WAEMU member states reject the exclusive 
decision-making power of the WAEMU Competition Commission concerning anti-
competitive practices despite the explicit ruling of the WAEMU Court of Justice in this 
direction; thus the West African Competition Commission fails to discharge its 
decision-making authority.43 
In light of the above it is believed that a more appropriate definition of the seventh level 
of the Petrie’s EJI Index would be ‘the agreements establishing a regional competition 
law enforcement body, and anticipating the (partial or full) integration of the 
competition law enforcement activity within the region’. This definition corresponds to 
the ‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement’ concept, which is the focus of 
this thesis.  
Undoubtedly Petrie’s EJI Index gives an important insight into the different levels of 
regional cooperation in competition policy. However, given the voluntary character of 
cooperation in the first six levels and the lack of data on implementation as well as 
effectiveness of competition agreements under each level, it is not clear whether the 
practical implications of these seven levels are appreciably different from one another.44 
Unlike Petrie’s Index a taxonomy widely cited in the literature examines the depth of 
regional competition agreements at only two levels. Accordingly, competition 
agreements are categorised on the basis of a single determinant, that is, whether they 
entail exchange of confidential information.45 Regional competition agreements under 
which cooperation is strictly limited to exchange of non-confidential (publicly-
available) information are called ‘first generation agreements’. On the other hand, 
regional competition agreements that entail exchange of confidential information are 
																																																								
42 (Stewart, 2012), pp. 180-1.  
43 (Bakhoum & Molestina, 2012), pp. 89-100.  
44 Probably due to this difficulty, under the respective paper, Petrie conducted his own analysis of the 
depth of regional cooperation by only differentiating between high cooperation (level five and higher) and 
low cooperation (levels one to four); see (Petrie, 2012), p. 12-8. 
45 (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005), pp. 192-3 
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called ‘second generation agreements’. Second generation agreements may also involve 
provisions on cooperation between the NCAs on evidence gathering on behalf of one 
another (i.e. positive comity and beyond).  
The most significant implication of the distinction between first and second generation 
agreements is that the latter can facilitate exchange of sensitive evidence concerning 
specific enforcement cases among the participating jurisdictions. Although it is certain 
that information exchange on specific enforcement cases can significantly improve the 
potential benefits of regional cooperation, in reality this distinction is still not very 
informative since cooperation under the great majority of the regional competition 
agreements is voluntary, and governments consider the interest of their own 
jurisdictions pertaining to information exchange on a case-specific basis. In this respect, 
the depth of cooperation under a deep RTA obliging member states to harmonise and 
coordinate their competition laws and enforcement is clearly distinguishable.  
In practice regional competition agreements between jurisdictions with different levels 
of economic development and different competition cultures are generally less 
ambitious.46  Such agreements allow exchange of limited types of information and focus 
more on voluntary technical assistance given by the more developed party to its less 
developed partner. On the other hand, high level of cooperation in competition demands 
similarities in national legal frameworks and enforcement capabilities.47   
Deeper-cooperation under second generation agreements facilitates exchange of 
sensitive information about domestic firms of, and commercial transactions taking place 
in, the signatory jurisdictions. Exchange of sensitive information under these 
agreements can raise confidentiality issues and political tensions; and in the extreme 
case of misapplication, the exchanged information might be prejudicial to the individual 
economies of the respective parties (through an influence on the profitability of their 
domestic firms). Therefore second generation agreements are signed only when there is 
convincing evidence of the mutually beneficial nature of the cooperation. In this respect 
similarities in domestic competition policies, legal enforcement capabilities as well as 
institutional set-up of all signatory parties gain importance. The level of internal trade 
between the signatory parties is also taken into account, since, as noted earlier on, the 
																																																								
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., pp. 2012-3; (Petrie, 2012), p. 10. In this regard, see the strong emphasis on the similarities 
between the EU’s and Switzerland’s competition policies and the resultant 2013 EU/Switzerland 
Agreement which envisages exchange of confidential information as well (see fn. 6 above). 
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potential benefits of deep cooperation in competition will increase, ceteris paribus, in 
parallel with an increase in the volume of internal trade between the parties. 
In line with the above, empirical data available in the literature indicates that most 
second generation agreements are entered into by advanced jurisdictions with 
established legal frameworks and enforcement capacities.48 With respect to developing 
countries, arrangements for exchange of confidential information are generally found in 
connection with deep RTAs that aim to integrate competition law enforcement within 
the respective regions (i.e. the 7th level of Petrie’s Index).49  
In light of the above two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, cooperation under second 
generation agreements ideally requires a degree of advancement in competition law 
enforcement, and more generally in legal enforcement, in all cooperating parties. In line 
with this requirement, the agreements used in Petrie’s dataset suggest that similarities in 
domestic competition law of the parties and high intra-regional trade potential increase 
the incentives of the national governments to enter into second generation agreements.  
Secondly, the agreements examined in Petrie’s dataset also suggest that developed and 
developing countries approach the above-mentioned pre-conditions of deep cooperation 
in competition policy differently. With the exception of the competition enforcement 
within the EU, developed countries with advanced national competition regimes prefer 
voluntary cooperation under a stand-alone second generation competition agreement to 
a deep RTA. The reason developed jurisdictions can cooperate under more flexible legal 
mechanisms is likely to be related to the mutual trust of the parties in one another’s 
legal system, procedural fairness and institutional structure. The situation of developing 
countries, however, is substantially different. As lower level of development usually 
comes along with deficiencies in legal enforcement and procedural fairness, developing 
countries seem to favour binding agreements and deep RTAs.50 In this respect deep 
RTAs not only anticipate regional cooperation in competition law enforcement, but also 
																																																								
48 (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005), pp. 192-3 and 201-3; (Petrie, 2012), p. 10. 
49 The data-set used in (Petrie, 2012) supports the absence of a stand-alone second generation agreement 
concluded between developing countries (p.10). 
50 Although the above suggestion is counterintuitive developing countries seem to be less anxious about 
noncompliance with the provisions of deep RTAs they conclude with other developing countries than 
with any other binding legal arrangement they make with developed countries. This might be justifiable 
on the ground that deep RTAs between developing countries are arguably enforced on more flexible 




aim at achieving the minimum standards concerning institutions and policy coherence 
required for facilitating actual regional cooperation.  
Unlike stand-alone competition agreements and competition provisions in RTAs, there 
is little in the literature on the availability and effectiveness of MLATs concerning 
regional cooperation on competition law enforcement. However, as noted earlier, few 
studies suggest that MLATs are not widely applied to competition law matters, 
especially by developing countries. Moreover, since judicial assistance under an MLAT 
is often complex and involves courts and the diplomatic channels, MLATs are likely to 
be a less preferable alternative to other types of regional competition agreement. 
Furthermore, as noted above, MLATs are traditionally restricted to criminal matters, 
and therefore, in many jurisdictions, some or all aspects of competition investigations 
are excluded from the scope of MLATs. Due to limited use of MLATs by developing 
countries, discussion in the following sections concerns only stand-alone competition 
agreements and competition provisions in RTAs. 
 
3.1.3 The distinction between regional integration and regional cooperation  
This thesis discusses the question whether regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems under deep RTAs can help to address competition law 
enforcement problems of developing countries. The focus of the thesis is on regional 
competition agreements at the deepest cooperation level in Petrie’s EJI Index. 
It is believed that the agreements that anticipate the integration of competition law 
enforcement within a regional bloc (i.e. agreements establishing a regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement system) are distinguished from other regional competition 
agreements mainly on five grounds. Firstly, from a technical point of view and with no 
exception, all existing agreements entailing adoption of regional competition law and an 
integrated legal enforcement system are formed as a part of a deep RTA which aims at 
achieving a common market or a deeper form of economic integration.51 Therefore, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1 above, competition policy in a deep RTA is mainly driven by 
the broader economic (and social) integration motive. In line with this, regional 
																																																								
51 The agreements that are listed in the seventh level of Petrie’s index are EC(1957), EFTA (1960), 
ANDEAN Group Decision 285 (1991), EEA (1994), WAEMU (1994), CEMAC Reg. 1/99 (1999), 
CARICOM Protocol VIII (2000), and COMESA Regs. (2004)  – The index also lists the European 
Competition Network as a stand-alone competition agreement; however, for the purposes of this research 
it is not possible to consider the respective platform separate from the EU. (Petrie, 2012), p. 10. 
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competition policy in such deep RTAs is usually intended to serve free trade (and 
possibly other core) objectives of the respective regional integration besides achieving 
traditional competition policy goals.  
Secondly, the regional competition policy under a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system needs to be designed with an attempt to reconcile the interests of 
the regional bloc as a whole with the individual interests of the signatory parties.  
Thirdly, such deep RTAs typically require the parties substantially to harmonise their 
law on competition policy, and more generally on trade policy, and constantly to 
coordinate their national competition policies, if any. Moreover, the establishment of a 
regional competition authority, which partially or fully undertakes competition law 
enforcement in the region, may further strengthen the integration of competition law 
enforcement under a deep RTA. Legal coherence cannot be achieved at the same pace 
through cooperation under the other types of regional competition agreement. By 
contrast, in all other regional competition agreements, the goal is to facilitate 
cooperation between fully independent national competition regimes. This means 
competition policies of the parties are governed and the objectives and priorities of 
competition enforcement are decided domestically in each participating jurisdiction.    
Fourthly, some developing countries with small or micro economies may not be able to 
afford a domestic competition law regime. For these countries in particular a deep RTA 
may be seen as the only way to ensure the protection of competition within their 
territories. If so, then one purpose of a deep RTA between such countries would be to 
establish a joint competition law enforcement system, which clearly cannot be 
replicated by a simple cooperation agreement on competition policy. Although in 
theory a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system can be regulated 
under a stand-alone agreement, as mentioned above, so far there has been no such 
stand-alone competition agreement. This might be explained by the high economic and 
political costs of establishing such a system, low priority of competition policy in the 
face of more urgent development needs, and the potential influence of the competition 
policy on market players and, in line with this, on the economic activity in the 
respective markets.    
Lastly, efficiencies parties can achieve by establishing a regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement system can be far more significant than those can be 
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achieved by a mere regional cooperation agreement on competition policy. This is 
mainly due to the positive influence of the formation of a common market on 
competition law enforcement. The next section explores this claim further by examining 
the potential benefits and costs of regional competition agreements with the aim of 
giving a comparative account of different levels of regional cooperation.  
  
In the next section a distinction will be made between regional cooperation agreements 
and deep RTAs that aim to establish a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system. A further distinction will be made between shallow and deep 
regional cooperation agreements. Accordingly, regional cooperation agreements, which 
entail exchange of non-confidential information, will be considered first-generation 
agreements; and regional cooperation agreements, which entail exchange of confidential 
information, will be considered second -generation agreements. Due to limited literature 
on the subject and the limited use of MLATs by developing countries MLATs will not 
be examined in the following sections.   
 
Section 3.2 Potential Benefits and Costs of Regional Competition 
Agreements 
Numerous factors may affect the convenience and effectiveness of cooperation under a 
regional competition agreement. Factors such as the depth of cooperation envisaged in 























in the relevant region, and similarities in legal and institutional traditions of the 
signatory parties may determine the success of regional cooperation. These factors may 
also interplay with one another. For instance, as mentioned above, enforcement capacity 
and the volume of internal trade usually play a decisive role in the parties’ choice of 
level of cooperation under a regional competition agreement. Even when these factors 
are not considered by the signatory jurisdictions prior to the execution of a regional 
competition agreement, any dissimilarity between the parties concerning the above 
points will inevitably affect the actual use of the cooperation mechanisms, and the 
benefits the parties can gather from regional cooperation in competition. 
The following sections examine the potential benefits and costs of regional competition 
agreements. In so doing, the analysis heavily relies on the existing literature except in 
two respects.52 Firstly, this study adopts a novel classification of the respective benefits 
and costs in an attempt to compile all relevant studies. Secondly, the cost-benefit 
analysis below is made with a comparative account of different types of regional 
competition agreement. In line with the requirements of main research question, the 
assessments are made mainly from the perspective of developing countries.  
 
3.2.1 Benefits of Regional Competition Agreements 
In light of the above, potential benefits of regional cooperation on competition are 
examined below under six headings: (i) ease of gathering evidence, (ii) cost efficiencies 
in legal enforcement, (iii) countering anti-competitive conduct, (iv) increased deterrence 
of international anticompetitive conduct, (v) increased bargaining power, and (vi) 
reduced influence of national vested interest groups and daily national politics. 
 
Ease of Gathering Evidence 
As mentioned in the previous section, most regional competition agreements include 
provisions on exchange of information and technical assistance. Although the amount of 
exchanged information varies depending on the depth of an agreement, even loose 
arrangements for regional cooperation may be helpful in relieving the difficulties of 
gathering cross-border evidence. As the amount of information exchange on specific 
																																																								
52 Relevant studies include (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005), (Guzman, 2007), (Gal, 2010b), (Gal, 
2011), (Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012). 
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enforcement cases increases, the potential advantages in terms of evidence gathering are 
likely to increase as well. In practice the influence of first generation agreements, 
however, is generally limited to the development of skills in the technical aspect of 
evidence gathering.  
Concerning regional cooperation in evidence gathering, confidentiality constitutes the 
principal issue, which may block the actual cooperation between the parties. 
Jurisdictions may have different standards on deciding what is confidential and how to 
protect it. Due to different national attitudes towards confidentiality, countries may 
avoid entering into a second generation agreement, or when they enter into one, they 
may refrain from active cooperation. A cartel investigation by the Turkish Competition 
Authority in the seized coal market may be cited as an example.53 In its investigation 
the Turkish Competition Authority sought the cooperation of the NCAs of one EU 
member state and one EFTA member state (i.e. Austria and Switzerland, respectively) 
for the collection of evidence on the operations of two suspected firms that had offices 
in the territories of the two states. Although the customs union agreement between 
Turkey and the EU54, as well as the FTA between Turkey and EFTA55, envisages 
cooperation in competition law enforcement by way of positive comity, the respective 
NCAs refused to provide information on the basis of confidentiality concerns.56  
By contrast a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system under a deep 
RTA may be capable of significantly reducing confidentiality concerns in relation to 
information exchange. The main issue regarding confidentiality has at least three 
dimensions: the wish of a competition agency to communicate confidential information 
with other agencies in order better to examine and duly punish anticompetitive conduct; 
the anxiety of the business community to protect business secrets; and protection of the 
legal right of those who stand to be adversely affected by the putative anti-competitive 
conduct. Obliging competition authorities to exchange confidential information and to 
																																																								
53 (Turkish Competition Authority, 2006), pp. 5-6. 
54 Article 43 of the Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement (e.g. Decision No 1/1995 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council of 22 December 1995 on Implementing the Final Phase of the Custom Union) 
55 Articles 17 and 23 of the Agreement between EFTA States and Turkey [as amended by Joint 
Committee Decision No. 4 of 1996 (19 April 1996)]. 
56 (Turkish Competition Authority, 2006), pp. 3-6. Consequently, the Turkish Competition Authority 
could not complete its investigations with respect to firms located outside Turkey. Although an Austrian 
company was found guilty of price fixing, since the investigation report could not be communicated to 
the headquarters of the respective company, the Turkish Competition Authority could not impose a 




coordinate their enforcement activities alone would not be sufficient to relieve the 
several concerns. Parties should ideally develop a common understanding of the 
definition of ‘confidential information’ and ensure that it is treated in a similar way 
across the entire region. Deep RTAs are well suited to harmonising confidentiality laws 
as part of a broader integration plan the parties envisage. Even in the absence of binding 
rules on competition enforcement, similar treatment of confidential information by the 
parties may partly diminish concerns about exchange of information by NCAs, and 
facilitate deeper cooperation. In the absence of a binding agreement, however, exchange 
of information will continue to be subject to national interest review of the parties on 
every occasion.  
Regional integration of markets in deep RTAs may help to the collection of evidence 
located outside the borders of the regional bloc. As will be detailed below57 creation of 
larger markets as a result of regional integration may increase the economic value of a 
regional bloc as a whole in the eyes of the TNCs. A connection can be observed 
between regional economic integration and increased trade activity within a regional 
bloc.58 If so, higher (international) trade within a regional bloc may then increase the 
incentives of other jurisdictions to cooperate with the regional bloc in the investigation 
of international anti-competitive conduct, as the reciprocal benefits of cooperation 
would then be greater for both parties.59  
 
Cost Efficiencies in Legal Enforcement 
Reduced cost of legal enforcement is a key consideration, in particular for developing 
countries, when entering into a regional competition agreement. Savings from regional 
cooperation in enforcement may be operational and/or developmental of technical 
expertise.  
Most developing countries suffer from the lack of sufficient financial resources for 
effective national competition law operation and enforcement, which is generally more 
expensive than that in many other legal fields.  A workable competition law regime 
																																																								
57 See the sub-section on ‘Casting a Credible Threat against Anti-Competitive Behaviour’ below. 
58 (Aggarwal, 2008), p. 4-5. Aggarwal summarises the findings of various empirical studies on the effects 
of RIA on FDI. He concludes that “there seems to be unanimity that RTA-generated effects simulate FDI 
(at least do not dampen them)...” 
59 When the role of a jurisdiction in global trade increases it may gradually acquire more data on 
international anti-competitive behaviour affecting other jurisdictions. 
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necessities not only adequate law and institutional design but also resources for market 
observance, on-site investigation, well-trained officials to undertake complex economic 
and legal analysis, and campaigns raising awareness of competition policy.60    
As shown above, cooperation under first generation agreements is typically limited to 
exchange of non-confidential information and technical assistance from more advanced 
jurisdictions to their less advanced regional partners.61 Such cooperation may bring 
substantial benefits to developing countries as well as to their developed partners. For 
instance, as a short-term gain, exchange of information on the techniques used in 
competition law enforcement may avoid duplication of efforts expended in collecting 
and assessing evidence across the NCAs of different jurisdictions. Moreover, in the long 
term, increased cooperation in a region might lead to closer convergence between 
national competition law regimes, and thereby may increase legal predictability and 
reduce the cost of compliance. However, as will be examined below, even a low level of 
regional cooperation may be burdensome to some developing countries due to the costs 
involved  in information sharing and/or the receipt (or delivery) of technical assistance. 
Cost efficiencies achieved under a second generation agreement may be more 
significant than those secured by first generation agreements, as the former usually 
include more detailed rules on the procedural steps of cooperation, and allow exchange 
of confidential information between the parties. Although the density of information 
exchange can lead to higher savings, actual cooperation under both groups of agreement 
may remain limited due to the cost of cooperation and the non-binding character of the 
respective agreements.      
Deep RTAs that establish a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
may lead to the highest cost savings. This can be explained by the design of the 
competition law provisions in such agreements, and the resulting economies of scale in 
legal enforcement. From the institutional design perspective, regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems are designed mainly in three forms: (i) they may 
require the harmonisation of domestic competition law of the parties yet leave 
enforcement to the independent NCAs of the member states,62 (ii) they may adopt  
common competition law and establish a regional competition authority exclusively for 
																																																								
60 See (Gal, 2004). 
61 See also (Holmes et al., 2006), pp. 41-3.  
62 E.g. ANZCERTA. 
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competition cases with a regional dimension (i.e. cases concerning domestic markets of 
two or more member states),63 or (iii) they may adopt common competition law and 
establish a one-stop shop regional competition authority for all (regional and purely-
national) cases within the region.64 Members of a regional bloc may choose to abolish 
NCAs if they exclusively authorise a regional competition authority for both purely 
national and intra-regional competition matters. That said, NCAs might also be 
preserved for the purpose of assisting the regional competition authority in the 
collection of evidence and the evaluation of local market dynamics in member states.  
Even in the absence of a working regional competition authority, significant 
harmonisation of competition law across a regional bloc may notably improve regional 
cooperation in legal enforcement, as the similarities in domestic legislation of the 
parties would make correspondence between competition officers of member states 
easier, and similar procedural steps would largely alleviate concerns of delay in the 
collection of evidence and exchange of information.  
On the other hand, the establishment of a regional competition authority may lead to 
significant cost savings on several grounds. Firstly, transfer of authority to review 
competition cases from NCAs to a regional enforcement body may prevent duplication 
of certain legal enforcement procedures across the NCAs of the regional bloc. In 
particular, regular correspondence between member states concerning actual 
enforcement cases may reduce the cost of evidence gathering. Secondly, legal 
enforcement by a regional competition authority or close cooperation between NCAs 
may reduce costs both of delivery and receipt of technical assistance in the regional 
bloc. Thirdly, the presence of a regional competition authority may lead to better 
coordination of competition advocacy among member states. As a result regional 
cooperation may reduce the cost of competition advocacy campaigns. Lastly, a regional 
competition authority with sufficient resources may be able to deal with more 
competition cases than poorly financed NCAs of its member states. This may, through 
																																																								
63 E.g. EU, COMESA and CARICOM. Certain deviations might be possible. For instance, according to 
the regional competition law of the Andean Community, cases with a regional dimension are decided by a 
regional institution while those concerning the domestic markets of a single member state are decided by 
the NCA of the respective member state. In the early times of the CAN competition regime, however, 
member states that did not have national competition legislation were allowed to enforce regional 
competition laws directly until they adopted national competition legislation. See, (Botta, 2011), p. 20. 
64 E.g. WAEMU. Due to the difficulties the current institutional design of the WAEMU has caused, the 
member states of the WAEMU are working on a substantive reform of their regional competition law 
regime. For more information on this 3-year reform plan; see (UNCTAD, 2013c), pp. 8 and 11. 
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experience, contribute to development of expertise in competition law enforcement, 
possibly with less external training. Such experience may be sustained within a regional 
competition authority by right institutional government, and may achieve significant 
cost savings for the respective jurisdiction. In addition, stronger competition law 
protection in a regional bloc may bring some reputational benefits. 
From a business perspective harmonisation of domestic competition law across a 
regional bloc and/or authorisation of a one-stop shop regional authority for merger 
(and/or other competition) review would ultimately reduce compliance costs of private 
and public companies. 
 
Countering Anti-Competitive Conduct 
A common characteristic of most developing countries is their small economies. This 
has consequences for the effectiveness of a competition law regime. The key 
implication of the ‘big’ market for competition law enforcement is its leveraging effect 
on the ability of competition authorities to impose deterrent sanctions against anti-
competitive conduct. 65  By contrast, a small economy may mean the failure of 
competition enforcement bodies to impose deterrent sanctions on TNCs. In small 
economies consumer demand and accordingly trade potential for TNCs tend to be low 
for many sectors. As a result, when the NCA of a small economy imposes a significant 
fine on a TNC, the TNC may, if it is less costly than payment of the fine imposed, 
prefer to leave the markets of the respective jurisdiction altogether.   
Such was the position of Microsoft Cooperation with regard to its supply of Hebrew 
supported operating systems to Israel. The Israeli authorities requested Microsoft to sign 
an agreement limiting its anticompetitive conduct in Israel. Although the terms of the 
proposed agreement were similar to those of the agreement Microsoft concluded with 
the EU, Microsoft refused Israel’s request.66 Since Microsoft’s exit from the market 
would then have meant that the market for Hebrew supported operating systems would 
no longer be available, the Israeli authorities had limited power to insist on the 
agreement.67 
																																																								
65 For a detailed analysis of the effect of small market size on competition enforcement, see, (Gal, 2002a). 




Another example is an international cartel investigation initiated by the Turkish 
Competition Authority in the seized coal market. In the seized coal market case, upon 
initiation of an investigation by the Turkish Competition Authority, one of the 
suspected firms closed its offices in Turkey without even waiting for the completion of 
the investigation.68 As a result, the Turkish Competition Authority reported that it could 
not access any evidence of the suspected firm’s infringement of competition law.69 
The above two examples indicate that the size of an economy is directly related to 
(domestic) demand, and to the strategic importance of the respective economy in the 
eyes of private businesses. As the strategic importance of a market for private 
businesses increases, the responsible competition enforcement authority’s power to 
impose deterrent sanctions increases as well.  
When this positive effect is considered in the context of different levels of regional 
competition agreements, it is apparent that such reinforcing effect of regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems can hardly be replicated under a first 
generation agreement or a second generation agreement. In this respect stand-alone 
competition agreements are irrelevant, as these do not exercise any direct influence on 
the trade between the parties, and therefore do not affect the strategic importance of the 
domestic markets of the parties in the eyes of the TNCs. On the other hand, an RTA 
envisaging only cooperation between its member states might also promote the intra-
regional trade. However, although an increase in the trade volume under a shallow RTA 
might leverage the strategic importance of the regional bloc as a whole for businesses, 
the positive effect it may have in strengthening the enforcement power of the NCAs is 
likely to be rather limited since the enforcement of regional competition policy would 
remain to be carried out domestically. By contrast, a regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement system under a deep RTA might achieve more significant benefits due 
to market integration, close regional cooperation in enforcement, and the decision-
making power of the relevant regional competition authority. 
 
																																																								
68 See (Turkish Competition Authority, 2006), p. 4-6. The decision of the Turkish Competition Board 




Increased Deterrence against International Anti-Competitive Conduct 
Regional cooperation on competition law enforcement may also leverage the deterrence 
of competition authorities against international anti-competitive conduct. Neighbouring 
countries are more likely to enjoy similar natural resources and other factor 
endowments,70 as well as similar consumer preferences. Such similarities combined 
with liberal trade policies may encourage TNCs to design their business activities with a 
regional perspective. This may include regional planning of anti-competitive practices.  
A clear example of how firms can coordinate their anti-competitive activities 
regionally/internationally is the strategic alliance agreement of 2001 between the 
African beer business division of the Castel group and SABMiller.71 According to the 
agreement SABMiller and Castel wanted to form an alliance by SABMiller’s acquiring 
a 20% share in Castel’s beer division, and Castel’s acquiring a 38% share in SABI 
Africa by way of share exchange. Parties were operating in different geographical 
markets in Africa, and both were in dominant position in the beer markets of their own 
regions. The agreement was expected to give market access to both  parties in African 
countries where they previously had no significant presence, but at the same time it 
allowed them to operate in their preferred zones without fierce competition from each 
other.72 Although the agreement was not anti-competitive in any single African country 
due to the lack of geographical overlap between the preferred zones of the parties, the 
alliance would help them to preserve their market power within the entire region 
without facing competition from one another.73  
In many cases it is not easy to inspect and condemn internationally organised anti-
competitive activities like that in the above example. Currently, the prevailing model 
concerning competition policy is national enforcement. This means that, apart from a 
few economically -as well as legally and institutionally- strong jurisdictions like the US 
and EU, all jurisdictions can implement their domestic competition laws only within 
their geographical borders. 74  Furthermore, NCAs usually do not have the full 
knowledge of anti-competitive events taking place outside their national borders; and 
																																																								
70 (Gathii, 2010), p. 580. 
71 (Jenny & Lewis, 2010). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Due to the political tension extraterritorial enforcement of competition law raises, developing countries 
are generally not well equipped to address all international anti-competitive actions that they are aware of, 
even if their national laws embrace the effects doctrine (or a similar doctrine, such as the implementation 
doctrine adopted by the CJEU) for defining the scope of their competition jurisdiction.     
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due to difficulties in relation to investigation and collection of evidence outside their 
national borders, they are generally reluctant to prosecute cross-border competition 
cases.  
Regional competition agreements can be helpful when they facilitate information 
exchange between NCAs.  The influence of first generation agreements, however, is 
comparatively limited since the restriction on exchange of confidential information 
largely prevents cooperation between competition agencies in actual enforcement cases. 
Nevertheless, consultancy and technical training may be helpful to the parties to a first 
generation agreement in understanding the dynamics of certain types of international 
anti-competitive behaviour.  
On the other hand, second generation agreements can be more effective in facilitating 
cooperation in specific enforcement cases. Depending on the terms of cooperation, 
exchange of confidential information may make detection of anti-competitive action, 
collection of evidence and assessment of the effects of anti-competitive behaviour much 
easier for the competition enforcement officers. In particular, notification requirements 
on actual enforcement cases may bring the existence of anticompetitive action to the 
attention of the agency receiving the information for the first time. Cooperation under a 
second generation agreement can be limited due to conflicting domestic interests of the 
cooperating parties.  Because cooperation under a typical second generation agreement 
is essentially voluntary, actual cooperation in enforcement cases primarily depends on 
mutual trust between the parties, and convergence of their laws and operational 
procedures.  
Lastly, regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems under deep RTAs 
may constitute the strongest group that can help to deter international anticompetitive 
behaviour in a regional bloc. As mentioned earlier, regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement requires consideration of the interest of the regional bloc as a whole, in 
contrast to the individual interests of member states. A regional competition authority 
would assess both national and regional market dynamics in its case investigations 
which may in return improve the detection and deterrence of international anti-
competitive conduct.  
Although it is true that the relevant market for competition law assessments should not 
be affected from the domestic borders of the responsible jurisdiction, in developing 
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countries, and in particular in young competition agencies, some reluctance can be 
observed to defining the relevant geographical market as broader than the domestic 
territory. Regional integration combined with a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system may improve the accuracy of the relevant geographical market 
definitions when the geographical market is actually broader than the territory of a 
single member state. Competition authorities can gain compliance with their decisions 
mainly by threatening two kinds of action. The first is a levy of execution on valuable 
assets of an anti-competitive firm that are located in the prosecuting jurisdiction. 
Secondly, in the absence of such assets, a competition authority may threaten to block 
the access of noncompliant firms to its domestic markets. Regional competition law 
enforcement accompanied by regional (economic) integration may provide regional 
competition authorities with a broader scope of sanction (in terms of both threats 
mentioned above).75 
 
Increased Bargaining Power 
A deep RTA may also contribute to regional competition law enforcement by creating 
increased bargaining power in international negotiations on trade.  A deep RTA can 
serve its member states as a platform for creating a united voice in order to protect the 
joint interests of the region. In this case the regional bloc may be able to enter into 
agreements with other jurisdictions on more preferable terms than would be possible in 
agreements signed by individual member states.  
The bigger market of a regional bloc -in comparison with each of its member states- 
may increase the interest of non-member jurisdictions to enter into a regional 
competition agreement with the regional bloc as the potential benefits of regional 
cooperation on competition is likely to increase in parallel with the volume of internal 
trade between the parties to the agreement. However, such a positive outcome is 
inevitably subject to economic development levels and commonalities in competition 
cultures as well as legal and institutional structures of the negotiating jurisdictions.  
Leveraged bargaining power in international negotiation is also a direct result of joint 
regional interests due to economic integration, and therefore applies only to deep RTAs.  
 
																																																								
75 (Sugden, 2002), p. 996. 
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Reduced Influence of National Vested Interest Groups and Daily National Politics 
In addition to the above benefits, regional competition agreements may be useful in 
reducing the influence of vested interest groups and daily national politics on 
competition policy and its enforcement. Depending on the degree of corruption, vested 
interest groups in a particular jurisdiction may be able to influence the law-making 
process and/or case reviews before courts/competition authorities. Regional competition 
agreements may be helpful in levelling down this negative influence as and when they 
oblige signatory parties to adopt specific legislation or to pursue certain (concrete) 
policies at the domestic or regional level. When the obligatory harmonisation rules 
become more expansive, the scope for external influence may narrow. This potential 
benefit may apply to all types of regional competition agreement. But since first and 
second generation agreements usually involve only moderate harmonisation 
requirements (if any) and are typically non-binding, their effect in overcoming 
corruption might be inconsequential. In comparison with the first and second generation 
agreements the influence of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
under deep RTAs in reducing the negative effect of vested interest groups over 
competition policy and enforcement might be more substantial since such deep RTAs 
require significant legal harmonisation and the transfer of certain legal enforcement 
powers to the regional level. Nevertheless, for all regional competition agreements the 
respective benefit is subject to social dynamics and level of corruption. With respect to 
deep RTAs, some interest groups might preserve their influence at the regional level as 
well. A deep RTA may itself encourage regional organisation of the vested interest 
groups in certain sectors as a result of which the pressure for protectionist policies may 
increase.76 Presumably, this can be the case for industries in which the potential returns 
to vested interest groups are significant, and communication between anti-protectionist 
groups is weak. Likewise, even if regional competition law enforcement is partly 
cleared of the external influences, political tensions between the parties might still 
hamper the regional competition enforcement. The latter concern can be especially 
significant when the operations of a regional competition authority are subject to the 
approval of another regional body of a political nature.77   
																																																								
76 (Bilal, 1998), pp.30-61. 
77 The CARICOM Competition Commission may be cited as an example. Its operations are largely 
dependent on the cooperation of the CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development, the latter 




3.2.2 Costs of Regional Competition Enforcement 
As shown above, regional competition agreements might substantially improve the 
efficiency of competition law enforcement in signatory jurisdictions. Reaping the 
benefits of regional competition agreements, however, usually necessities bearing the 
high cost of enforcement. Five categories of potential cost of regional competition 
agreements are examined below: (i) economic costs, (ii) sovereignty concerns, (iii) 
inter-states conflict, (iv) costs related to differences in national enforcement capacities 
and competition cultures, and (v) collective action problem in regional enforcement.  
 
Economic Costs of Regional Competition Agreements 
Cooperation under regional competition agreements is typically carried on by exchange 
of information and technical assistance. As the level of cooperation increases, 
competition agreements tend to require a level of harmonisation of national competition 
law and policies of signatories. Although such regulation can be useful in avoiding 
duplication of effort and therefore cutting expenses, regional cooperation itself is not 
cost-free. In addition to the costs accompanying the negotiation phase of a regional 
competition agreement, there are at least three major operational costs concerning 
regional cooperation in competition law enforcement. Firstly, exchange of information 
typically means regular costs to the parties the amount of which increases with the 
amount of shared information. Parties need to allocate a budget for the identification of 
the information that needs to be exchanged, preparation of the documents to be shared, 
and usually the examination, and in first generation agreements the omission, of 
confidential information, if any. It has been estimated that if a regional competition 
agreement requires an NCA to notify every single investigation that may affect the 
counterpart jurisdiction, at least five additional staff members are needed to deal with 
such notifications alone.78 In addition, if parties use different languages, further costs 
will derive from translation of all documentation.  
																																																								
78 (Rosenberg & Tavares de Araújo, 2005), p. 194. However, this number can clearly vary according to 
the overall workload and efficiency of an NCA. 
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Secondly, where a regional competition agreement requires a level of harmonisation of 
the national competition policies of the signatory parties there will be expenses 
concerning amendments to the domestic laws and institutional structures of the parties.  
Lastly, regionally integrated competition law enforcement under a deep RTA inevitably 
entails significant costs deriving from the formation of new regional institutions, 
harmonisation of domestic competition law of the parties, and the regular co-operation 
between the national institutions of the member states. A regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement system under a deep RTA typically requires regular 
meetings between the member states in order to decide on regional competition policy 
and enforcement priorities. Moreover, in the presence of a regional competition 
authority, the respective body would need an additional budget for supervising the local 
practices of the NCAs of the member states, if any, and for ensuring the uniform 
enforcement of the regional competition policy across the respective regional bloc. In 
addition, regional competition law enforcement may entail significant transport costs, in 
particular, when the regional competition authority has exclusive competence to decide 
competition cases in the relevant regional bloc. Transport costs involved in the 
operations of the WAEMU Competition Commission exemplifies this situation.79  
The economic cost of regional competition agreements totally depends on the actual 
level of cooperation. In this respect, when actively pursued, regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems under deep RTAs are likely to be more costly for 
the signatory states than first and second generation agreements. 
Adoption of national competition law and NCAs can be especially problematic for 
developing countries with small economies. As noted above, competition law 
enforcement has high operational costs due to the nature of competition analysis. In 
most parts of the world implementation of competition law is mainly financed by 
allocations from government budget. 80  Accordingly, parliaments, ministers and/or 
governments usually have certain discretion over the budget of their NCAs. Developing 
countries that face budgetary restraints may be more reluctant to spare significant 
resources on competition policy due to other immediate needs of the public. In addition, 
in some developing countries, the lack of public support for the competition policy may 
further reduce the incentives of the governments to allocate the required budget to 
																																																								
79 (UNCTAD, 2013c), p. 11. 
80 (OECD, 2003b), p. 03. (UNCTAD, 2008), p. 8-9. 
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competition policy.81 Such budgetary implications of competition policy in developing 
countries may call for alternative funding mechanisms.  
One alternative funding mechanism is the levying of fees for adjudication (e.g. 
notification fees, service charges). For instance, according to an UNCTAD study, the 
South African Competition Commission financed over 64% of its 2006/7 expenditure 
by fees it charged for its services.82 However, such a budget resource is clearly subject 
to the number of competition cases decided in a given jurisdiction.83 Newly established 
competition authorities can hardly expect service fees to be a significant contribution to 
their internal budgets. 
Another alternative source of funding for competition law enforcement is the allocation 
of a portion of the fines collected by an NCA to the same NCA’s budget. One 
bottleneck of such funding for developing countries is the limited ability of NCAs in 
small economies to impose deterrent sanctions against anticompetitive conduct. 84 
Another point of concern is that a sanctions-based funding mechanism might give 
wrong incentives to competition agencies, distort their enforcement priorities, lead to 
corruption as well as inadequate accounting and control measures.85 In practice, for the 
reasons mentioned above, a sanctions-based funding system is applied only by a small 
number of jurisdictions.86 For instance, the NCA in Turkey was allowed to retain 25% 
of fines it had imposed on firms in the early years of its operation. However, the 
provision was annulled in 2003, presumably due to abovementioned reasons. A new 
provision was introduced in 2004, which allows the Turkish Competition Authority to 
collect a portion (i.e. 0.04%) of the capital of newly established joint stock and limited 
companies, as well as to collect the same portion of the capital increases in such types 
of business entity.87 However, the contribution of such a funding mechanism to an 
NCA’s budget is directly related to the amount of financial activity in (and therefore, 
the market size of) the jurisdiction. Some developing countries might be more cautious 
																																																								
81Ibid., p. 13-4. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See Section 3.2.1 above. 
85 OECD (2003) (OECD, 2003b), p. 10; (UNCTAD, 2008),  p. 14. In contrast, see (Sabbatini, 2009) – 
Sabbatini supports funding NCAs via the fines they impose. 
86 (UNCTAD, 2008), p. 9. 
87  Article 39 of the Turkish Competition Law; available in English at: 




in loading such burdens on private investors in order not to risk money flow into their 
economies.      
Besides the above, developing countries may finance some of their expenditure by the 
support of external sources which have legitimate interest in having a harmonised 
competition practice in developing economies. For instance, some developed 
jurisdictions may like to have harmonised competition law and/or enforcement in 
developing countries for reducing the compliance costs of their national firms, 
especially by encouraging developing countries to have competition laws similar to 
their own. Such an influence can be traced to the development of regional competition 
policy in the Andean Community. The substantive competition law of the Andean 
Community was designed largely along the same lines as EU competition legislation as 
a result of a three-year project financed by the EU.88   Alternatively, funding might be 
provided by a multinational organisation that works towards strengthening international 
trade and free markets.89  
 
Sovereignty Concerns 
A high level of regional cooperation on competition may cause loss of certain sovereign 
rights to the participating jurisdictions. When a regional competition agreement puts 
pressure on its signatories to amend their national law and policies and/or to change the 
design and duties of their national institutions, the agreement may effectively result in 
the transfer of certain sovereignty rights from national governments to regional bodies. 
The potential loss of sovereignty is greater for a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system under a deep RTA which obliges the parties to secure deeper 
cooperation. The loss of sovereignty for signatory parties of first and second generation 
agreements can be insignificant, due to the typically non-binding nature of these 
agreements. However, the literature offers some evidence of political pressure soft law 
instruments can put on national governments towards ensuring compliance. Soft law 
mechanisms for legal convergence under the leadership of certain multinational 
forums/organisations have proven to be efficient. The ICN, OECD and UNCTAD are 
																																																								
88 See (Botta, 2011), p. 24-5. However, Botta criticises the EU, noting that the legal implant did not lead 
to efficient competition law enforcement in the Andean Community. 
89 However, developing countries would need to prove external funding bodies and/or developed 
jurisdictions that their genuine intention is to reform their competition laws, and that once substantial 
financial support is provided they have the necessary capacity as well as political dedication to achieve 
the long-term targets. 
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prominent examples of multinational platforms that adopt soft mechanisms to contribute 
to the development of a global understanding of certain competition concepts. One 
might conclude that as participation in voluntary platforms for competition increases, 
the pressure on nation states to comply with the guidelines and best practices suggested 
by such platforms increases as well.90 This can be a function of global political trends 
and the fear of individual states of being left behind in the developments in the 
international arena.91 Other reasons for states’ compliance with soft law on competition 
may include the on-going interaction between the NCAs of different jurisdictions and, 
as a result of this, the development of similar thinking in dealing with competition 
matters. Another factor could be the intention of individual jurisdictions to develop a 
good international reputation. In line with the increasing influence of soft law 
mechanisms, there is also a growing literature acknowledging the solid influence of soft 
law on law making in sovereign states. Accordingly, it is suggested that soft law can 
actually limit sovereign rights to a certain extent.92         
In light of the above it may be concluded that the actual degree of loss of sovereignty 
cannot only be determined by the contractual terms of competition agreements. 
Interference in sovereignty should rather be analysed in the context of the degree 
sovereign states feel themselves obliged to comply with a regionally or internationally 
imposed set of rules. For instance, the practical impact of a practice recommended by 
the ICN might be much higher than a loosely drafted RTA envisaging regional 
integration of competition law and enforcement. Nevertheless, on the assumption of 
political goodwill for the enforcement of a regional competition agreement and the 
existence of the necessary (national and regional) enforcement capacities, the costs to 
national sovereignty increase in proportion to the depth of cooperation between the 
parties. In this respect, a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
under a deep RTA can limit the sovereignty rights of the participating jurisdictions 
more than the limitations caused by a first or second generation agreement. On the other 
hand, however, the difference between the effects of first and second generation 
																																																								
90 (D Daniel Sokol, 2008), p. 265-6. 
91 (Damro, 2006), p. 30. 
92 (D Daniel Sokol, 2008) around fn. 155, and the references therein. An example of the power of soft law 
instruments is the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures. 
According to the ICN, nearly two-third of its members have cited the respective recommendations when 
amending their merger laws. See (ICN, 2006), p.5.    
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agreements on loss of national sovereignty is likely to be minor due to their essentially 
voluntary nature.  
A separate point concerning sovereignty can be assessed in the context of the role of 
competition policy in an increasingly globalising trade environment. As broadly 
acknowledged, free market theory anticipates abolition of all barriers to trade while 
strictly limiting government intervention to the economy. In this regard, it is expected 
that most market inefficiencies will automatically be corrected by way of free 
competition. Accordingly, one of the principal duties of a jurisdiction is the protection 
of competition in the market place. In this context, however, governments can use 
competition policy as a legitimate tool for interfering in free markets. This is because a 
parallel duty of governments is to implement policies promoting the smooth operation 
of public services. In addition, governments are expected to create and preserve a 
healthy trading environment (by having all legal, institutional and financial 
arrangements in place), and to provide economic support to certain strategic sectors in 
order to ensure economic stability and growth. Such public policies may often have 
restrictive effects on competition, and the power to balance these competing 
competition and (economic and non-economic) public policies usually belongs to the 
government (and to some extent, to the courts and other adjudicative bodies) of a given 
jurisdiction. The most straightforward form of interference by governments in trade is 
the provision of state aid to certain sectors. More indirect forms of interference can be 
found in tax law (e.g. regulation of tax advantages for certain sectors), laws introducing 
quotas and other trade restrictions (e.g. limiting the number of producers by requiring 
licences), international free trade agreements (e.g. exclusion of some goods and/or 
services from the scope of FTAs, thereby protecting local producers –sometimes to the 
disadvantage of consumers in downstream markets).        
With respect to regional integration under deep RTAs, the influence of national 
governments over these strategic economic and non-economic public policies might 
become subject to regional review. This is clearly at a heavy cost of the sovereignty of 
participating national governments. That said, states may limit the scope of regional 
cooperation on competition to protect at least some of their strategic powers to regulate. 
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Presumably, due to similar concerns, state aid rules are excluded from the scope of 
some RTAs which include detailed competition provisions.93  
 
Inter-State Conflict 
Another limitation to the implementation of a regional competition agreement might lie 
in differences in individual interests, trade policies and legal enforcement traditions of 
the participating jurisdictions. These factors can lead to attribution of different goals to 
competition policy by different jurisdictions. In such situations, it could be especially 
difficult for a group of independent jurisdictions to agree on an intensive cooperation or 
joint enforcement model of competition policy. 
Andrew Guzman conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of the effects of 
international trade on international competition agreements.94 He suggests that the 
appropriate level of competition law protection in an independent jurisdiction need to be 
determined by considering the international trade activity of the respective jurisdiction. 
He argues that a jurisdiction which is a net importer of goods and services would like to 
have stricter competition rules which give more weight to consumer welfare. Contrary 
to this, a jurisdiction which is a net exporter of goods and services would aim to protect 
its producers over its consumers, and therefore adopt less strict competition policies. 
Guzman’s claims are positioned in comparison to what he calls optimal global 
competition policy which favours total welfare standard (i.e. treating consumers and 
producers across the world equally).95   
The above conclusions of Guzman are mainly based on jurisdictional limitations. Apart 
from a handful of agencies that enjoy the power of applying their competition laws 
extraterritorially, in most parts of the world the jurisdiction of a competition authority 
does not reach beyond the domestic territory of the relevant government. Furthermore, 
even if a jurisdiction enjoys extraterritorial enforcement power, competition authorities 
may de facto favour domestic firms and consumers over foreigners.96 Likewise, no 
jurisdiction would base its competition policy on global welfare; and as a result of this, 
the interest of producers and consumers outside the territory of a competition agency 
																																																								
93 Examples include MERCOSUR and NAFTA; see (Solano & Sennekamp, 2006), p. 20-9. 
94 (Guzman, 1998). 
95 Ibid. 
96 See (Guzman, 2007), pp. 429-30. 
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might not be considered in competition assessments.97 Accordingly, jurisdictions may 
desire to achieve different competitive outcomes for cross-border competition law cases 
depending on their contrary domestic interests.  
Independent of the choice between consumer and producer welfare as the goal of 
competition policy, if a jurisdiction is not an importer but only an exporter of a product, 
then any anti-competitive behaviour in the relevant product market would be 
investigated in the respective jurisdiction by considering only the producer surplus, if 
any (due to the absence of firms’ market presence and consumer harm in the respective 
jurisdiction, it could as well be argued that no behaviour can raise competition issues).98 
Likewise, if a jurisdiction is not an exporter but only an importer of a product, then its 
competition reviews would exclusively focus on consumer surplus, and therefore the 
national approach would be an overregulating one in comparison to what Guzman’s 
optimal global competition policy requires.99      
A conflict may occur between the above two jurisdictions when two producers in the 
exporter jurisdiction would like to merge. Merger would strengthen the market power of 
the respective firms in the market of the importer jurisdiction. The exporter jurisdiction 
would not object to the merger on the ground that it would increase producer surplus 
while not causing any harm to consumer welfare due to the absence of merging entities 
in the domestic markets of the exporting jurisdiction. By contrast, the importer 
jurisdiction may like to block the merger on grounds of the increased market power of 
the merged entities and the potential loss of consumer welfare in its domestic 
																																																								
97 However, this statement does not exclude the necessity of making welfare considerations on the basis 
of the relevant geographical market which can be defined broader than the relevant domestic territory 
depending on demand and supply. But a caveat needs to be made concerning the practice of young 
competition agencies in developing countries; see the sub-section entitled ‘Increased Deterrence against 
International Anti-Competitive Conduct’ above – those competition agencies tend to define the relevant 
geographical market within their domestic territories. 
98 The exclusion of export cartels from the scope of US anti-trust law’s application under the Webb-
Pomerence Act is consistent with the above line of argument. Similar exclusions can be found in the law 
of other jurisdictions (and in both developed and developing economies). 
99 (Guzman, 1998), p. 1512-3. A similar point is made by Ezrachi who examined welfare transfers on the 
basis of different national competition policy goals in an international context. Ezrachi notes that different 
goals of enforcement may lead to ‘cross-border transfer of wealth’ from domestic markets to foreign 
markets and vice versa. Ezrachi also suggests that the presence of cross-border transfer of wealth may 
create disincentives to entering into regional competition agreements, or cooperating jurisdictions may 
exert similar externalities as a group on non-members. See, (Ezrachi, 2013). 
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markets. 100   A similar conflict can also be observed when both jurisdictions 
accommodate a percentage of the production and of the consumption.  
Assume that jurisdiction A is the net importer of a good while jurisdiction B is the net 
exporter of the same good. Jurisdiction A would like to block a merger that would lead 
to higher profits for producers and reduce consumer welfare; whereas the jurisdiction B 
would prefer to approve the same merger.101   
It can be deduced from Guzman’s article that when international trade in imperfect 
markets is considered countries that are in the position of net exporter are likely to be 
better off if they embrace lax competition policies. Accordingly, the opposite would be 
true for net importer countries.102   
Without prejudice to the above, Guzman adds another dimension to his assessments and 
examines the effects of the ability to enforce national competition laws extraterritorially 
on competition policy preferences of individual jurisdictions. He notes that jurisdictions 
that can apply their competition laws extraterritorially will do so in line with the above 
assertion without necessarily carrying an intention to enter into a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement aiming to create a platform for intensive cooperation on competition law 
enforcement.103   
On the other hand, jurisdictions which cannot apply their competition laws 
extraterritorially would be those which can benefit most from an international 
competition agreement, since they would be able to deter international anti-competitive 
behaviour only by way of an international agreement. However, when such a 
jurisdiction is a net importer and implements stringent competition policies, then the 
strict rules would become increasingly burdensome for its national producers while 
remaining ineffective for foreign firms engaging in most forms of international 
anticompetitive behaviour outside the domestic borders of the respective jurisdiction. 
On this basis Guzman concludes that in order to protect their national businesses net 
																																																								
100 The above example can be simplified by considering a two-country world where one country 
accommodates the entire production of a given product for which there is no domestic demand. All 
production is exported to the other country, which is not a producer of the respective product. See 
(Sugden, 2002), p. 994. 
101(Guzman, 1998), pp. 1518-21. 
102 For the purposes of the above statement, ‘net importers’ represent countries which produce less than 
they consume. Accordingly, ‘net exporters’ represent countries which produce more than they consume. 
See ibid., pp.1517-6. 
103 However, these jurisdictions might be persuaded to enter into such international agreements in return 




importer jurisdictions that are not able to implement their domestic competition laws 
extraterritorially would prefer to adopt less restrictive competition policies.104 In other 
words, jurisdictions which cannot enforce their competition laws extraterritorially 
would have less strict competition policies than the optimal global competition policy. 
However, Guzman does not exclude that deviations from his above conclusions might 
occur when competition laws also aim to achieve non-economic policies,105 or when 
political considerations of governments play a role in the legal design and/or 
enforcement of domestic competition policies.106  
Guzman’s work has been very useful to understanding the economic dynamics of 
international competition policy negotiation.107 However, his conclusions stated above 
are not fully applicable to all situations. Although it is true that NCAs, as well as 
regional competition authorities may have a tendency to favour local firms and 
consumers over foreigners in their competition assessments, a country’s overall trade 
balance might not have such a direct influence on the welfare standard embraced in a 
domestic competition policy. This might be explained on various grounds. Firstly, as 
acknowledged by Guzman, public choice considerations may lead to pursuance of 
unconventional economic and non-economic objectives in competition policy and 
therefore reshape competition law enforcement. Secondly, fast growth in international 
trade may obstruct the necessary calculations required for such policy design. Today 
most product markets involve numerous firms from numerous countries. Due to this 
cosmopolitan structure of most product markets, making reliable estimations on the 
right level of rigidity of a competition policy for increased profitability might be a big 
challenge. Lastly, trade balances of countries may change over time, and it might not be 
desirable to change the welfare standard applied in an established competition practice 
accordingly. Consequently, designing competition law and policy on the basis of 
fairness, and the role attributed to the competition law and policy within the targeted 
social order might be more appropriate. 
																																																								
104 See (Guzman, 1998), pp. 1523-4. 
105 Ibid. pp, 1511-2. 
106 Ibid, pp. 1529-31. 
107 Guzman’s work has been widely cited in the recent literature; in particular by those who accept 
Guzman’s conclusions, including (Sugden, 2002), (Gal, 2010b), and (Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012). By 
contrast, Waller explains the different approaches of independent jurisdictions to competition policy by 
bureaucratic political concerns; see (Waller, 1997), pp. 343-404. 
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Nevertheless, in light of the above, it may be concluded that inter-state conflict in 
relation to regional competition enforcement may occur mainly on two vertical levels: 
(i) jurisdictions which aim to enter into a deep regional competition agreement may find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus on the goals and rigidity of a regional 
competition policy, and (ii) different goals of domestic competition policies may lead to 
regional conflict in the simultaneous reviews of competition cases by independent 
NCAs of the participating jurisdictions.     
Limitations to the scope of regional competition law enforcement or a careful selection 
of regional cooperation mechanisms may partly relieve the costs that may derive from 
inter-state conflict.108 Especially when there are various technical, financial and political 
obstacles to the adoption of an effective regional competition policy, participating 
jurisdictions may wish to cooperate on voluntary terms, or to limit the scope of their 
cooperation to exchange of non-confidential information and/or provision of technical 
assistance (i.e. first generation agreements). When countries intend to involve more 
intensive forms of regional cooperation they might prefer to limit the scope of regional 
competition enforcement to areas that are to the mutual benefit of all parties (such as the 
so-called ‘plain vanilla’ international cartels). 
In regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems under deep RTAs 
different welfare implications of regional competition law enforcement might lead to 
political tension within a regional bloc. Intra-regional transfer payments from 
advantaged member states to their negatively influenced counterparts may be helpful in 
removing such political tension.109 Transfer payments are not required to be in the form 
of direct transfer of money. Rather, compensation is more likely to be agreed upon if it 
can be made under other economic or non-economic policy areas integrated in a deep 
RTA.110 Nevertheless, the difficulty of calculating the appropriate amount of transfer 
payments remains;111 likewise political tension any form of regular transfers creates in 
the long run.  
																																																								
108 (Guzman, 1998), p.1545-6; (Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012), p. 302-3; and (Gal, 2010b), p. 252-4. 
109 Ibid. 
110 (Guzman, 1998), (Gal, 2010b). 
111 Ibid. On the difficulty of direct wealth redistribution, see Chapter 4, around fn. 94-7. 
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Inter-state conflict may arise in different forms under different types of regional 
competition agreements. Diverse strategic interests112 and competition policy goals of 
cooperating jurisdictions are likely to lead to the obstruction of actual cooperation under 
first and second generation agreements. In other words, since cooperation takes place 
only voluntarily under these two forms of agreement, the main effect of inter-state 
conflict is the avoidance of cooperation in specific enforcement cases. 
With respect to regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems under deep 
RTAs, inter-state conflict may lead to at least two kinds of negative effect. Firstly, 
differences in the perception of the goals of competition policy may result in serious 
delay in the drafting of primary and/or secondary legislation on regional competition 
law and regional institutions.  Inter-state conflict may cause substantial delay in the 
establishment of a workable regional competition enforcement system, or may lead to 
abandonment of competition provisions of the relevant RTAs.  
Secondly, a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system under a deep 
RTA may require a regional competition authority to balance conflicting domestic 
interests of member states.113 The potential effect of such conflicts is closely related to 
the robustness of regional competition laws, as well as to the presence of intra-regional 
transfer mechanisms. In cases of inter-state conflict under regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs, the first point of concern is 
whether the division of competence between the regional competition authority (and 
other regional adjudicative bodies) and the NCAs (of the participating jurisdictions), as 
well as between the NCAs themselves is clearly regulated. In the absence of clarity in 
the respective regional laws, conflicts can increase, and may significantly risk the 
operability of regional competition authorities. Inter-state conflict might also be carried 
further at a political level, if regional enforcement ultimately causes a welfare loss in 
one or more member states while leading to a welfare gain in others. In such a case the 
presence of compensating transfer payments to disadvantaged member states under the 
relevant RTA gains more weight. As mentioned above, such transfers need not be 
relevant to competition policy and enforcement. Total absence of balancing mechanisms 
																																																								
112  These include the clashes concerning independent producer welfare and/or consumer welfare 
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in a regional bloc, however, may risk the very existence of regional integration in the 
long term.114 
 
Differences in National Enforcement Capacities and Competition Cultures 
In addition to the above, different enforcement capacities, competition cultures, and 
legal and institutional structures of individual jurisdictions may significantly hinder the 
efficiency of regional competition agreements. Such differences may create at least 
three major difficulties concerning the prospects of a regional competition agreement. 
Firstly, in terms of regional politics, such differences may lead to imbalances between 
the actual contributions of the parties to regional cooperation. This might reduce the 
benefits of regional cooperation for some or all parties, and might adversely affect the 
motive for further cooperation. In addition, regional financial and technical resources 
may need to be allocated differently among the parties, if applicable. Substantial 
differences in regional resources allocated to individual parties may also lead to 
political tension.  
Secondly, as regards law-making, differences in competition culture, legal tradition and 
perceptions of core competition law concepts may prevent smooth cooperation between 
the parties during negotiation of the terms of a regional competition agreement.115 For 
instance, the different definitions of the term ‘dominance’ in the national law of the 
member states of the WAEMU apparently led to a problem in reaching a consensus on 
the definition of the term in the regional competition law of the union.116 In such cases 
promoting constant dialogue between the NCAs of the participating jurisdictions seems 
to be the necessary initial step before reaching a common understanding on the core 
competition concepts and the objectives of regional cooperation.  
Thirdly, with respect to legal enforcement, lack of an adequate legal environment and 
institutions may obstruct the enforcement of regional competition policies, the receipt 
and/or provision of technical assistance, the success of competition advocacy 
campaigns, etc. Improvement of legal and institutional structure of all parties, however, 
can be a very challenging task requiring long-term strategic planning as well as 
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115 (Guzman, 1998), p. 1540. 
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significant financial resources depending on the development level of the cooperating 
jurisdictions.  
In relation to first and second generation agreements the above-mentioned problems 
would mainly reflect on the actual cooperation between the parties. Since cooperation is 
essentially voluntary under these two kinds of agreement, independent jurisdictions can 
freely decide on their commitments at all times. On the other hand, however, such 
differences typically reduce the incentives for the parties to conclude a second 
generation agreement from the outset.117  
The negative influence of different enforcement capacities and competition cultures of 
the parties can be more substantial under regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems in deep RTAs. As deep RTAs envisage long-term integration in 
various policy areas the success of such agreements is mainly dependent on constant co-
operation and good performance by member states.  
As mentioned above, a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system under 
a deep RTA may require co-existence of the NCAs of member states and the regional 
competition authorities, or it may abolish the NCAs and give an exclusive decision-
making power to the regional competition authorities for all competition law cases 
across the region. In particular, in the case of shared enforcement competences between 
the NCAs and regional institutions, the success of regional enforcement is clearly 
dependent on the good performance of all national and regional competition authorities. 
That said, even for deep RTAs in which regional competition authorities hold exclusive 
competence for decision-making, contributions of member states to the competition 
enforcement process is still necessary for the success of regional enforcement. Such 
cooperation on the part of member states may include, inter alia, collection of case 
relevant materials, competition advocacy and execution of decisions taken by regional 
competition authorities. The experience of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 
regional competition law enforcement can be cited as an example. Regional competition 
law in CARICOM is largely informed by EU competition legislation. However, 
CARICOM countries are more reluctant than the EU member states to surrender their 
sovereignty rights and as a result the CARICOM Competition Commission has not been 
given complete autonomy in administration and implementation of CARICOM 
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competition law under the CARICOM agreements. As mentioned earlier, according to 
Articles 175 and 176 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the CARICOM 
Competition Commission is obliged closely to cooperate with the NCAs of member 
states in the preliminary investigation stage.118 On this ground, possible deficiencies in 
the national competition proceedings of CARICOM member states directly influence 
the efficiency of regional competition law enforcement by the CARICOM Competition 
Commission.119  
Most developing country governments duly acknowledge their capacity constraints in 
relation to domestic competition law enforcement. Therefore, developing countries have 
been particularly reluctant to enter into binding regional/international agreements that 
would require good performance of their NCAs. Accordingly, although there are plenty 
of deep RTAs with competition policy provisions, the respective provisions are 
typically excluded from the existing dispute resolution procedure under the respective 
agreements.120  
 
Collective Action Problem in Regional Competition Enforcement  
A further problem peculiar to regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems under deep RTAs may arise in relation to individual profit maximising 
behaviour of member state governments. 
‘Collective action theory’ was first modelled by Mancur Olson121 in order to explain the 
‘public goods’ concept. Public goods are defined as those that are inevitably open to the 
use of all parties once produced, such as clean air, national defence, and publicly 
available academic works. According to the theory, individual parties have minimal 
interest in contributing to the production of public goods, but instead expect others to 
																																																								
118(Stewart, 2004b), p. 5-6. 
119 Such stringent rules on cooperation between regional and national competition authorities can limit the 
operability of regional authorities if NCAs refuse to cooperate for political or other reasons. 
120 See (Teh, 2009), p. 482-3. Teh demonstrates that: “Out of fifty-five RTAs with specific competition 
provisions, fourteen go on to exclude all these provisions from dispute settlement while another two 
excludes parts of competition provisions from dispute settlement. (…) All fourteen RTAs with complete 
carve-outs include at least one developing country member.” Sokol makes a similar observation in 
relation to Latin American regional integration agreements: ‘The empirical study’s most interesting 
finding is that competition policy chapters lack dispute settlement while other similar chapters have 
them’ [(D Daniel Sokol, 2008), p. 262-3]. 
121 (Olson, 1965). 
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undertake the burden of production while wishing thereafter to enjoy a free ride from 
the benefits of public goods.  
An intensive form of regional competition law enforcement may show similar 
externalities.122 For instance, when decision-making authority on competition law cases 
is transferred from the NCAs of member states to a regional competition authority under 
a deep RTA, the existence of the regional competition authority will be to the benefit of 
all member states within the regional bloc once it is established and operational.123  
Externalities deriving from collective action theory might be avoided by explicitly 
regulating the scope of the participation duty of all member states, and also by 
introducing an adequate monitoring and dispute resolution mechanism in order to 
ensure compliance. However, Croley (2008) points out that the application of sanctions 
or other selective instruments within a group in order to overcome the collective action 
problem also suffers from the very same weakness that observation of the actions of 
group members as well as implementation of any form of sanction themselves constitute 
a ‘public good’ in the sense of Olson’s collective action theory.124  
However, unlike Olsen, Croley has more confidence in the regulatory government and 
sets forth three reasons why a public good can nevertheless be produced 
continuously125: 
i. Individual members of a group may be motivated to contribute to a group good 
(i.e. public good) in response to ‘moral considerations’; 
ii. The benefits of participation itself may motivate the contributor to a group good; 
and 
iii. Groups may be organised by political entrepreneurs who receive a different sort 
of private benefit from the act of providing a group good (e.g. gaining voter 
sympathy).  
All three reasons stated by Croley may be applicable to the public good nature of 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs. Contribution 
to the production of a public good for purposes of moral considerations obviously 
																																																								
122 (Gal & Wassmer-Faibish, 2012), pp. 309-10. 
123 However, some member states might accommodate more competition disputes and therefore might 
benefit from regional competition law enforcement more than other member states. 
124 (Croley, 2008), p. 29-36.  
125 Ibid.  
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depends on local culture and the contemporary as well as historical relationship between 
the nations.  
In accordance with the second point above, some members of a group may agree to 
make higher or exclusive contribution to the public good because of comparatively 
higher benefits they expect to get from it. The same might apply to regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement under deep RTAs. Distinct interests of the parties 
concerning regional competition law enforcement might be possible to estimate in 
regional competition agreements, for instance by examining the number and economic 
value of cases affecting each member state. In these situations member states especially 
which have lower interest in the presence of a workable regional competition law 
enforcement system might expect other member states to bear all or a large percentage 
of the costs of the regional competition law enforcement regime. Despite the imbalances 
in financial contributions of member states to regional competition law enforcement, 
however, parties may like to keep the regional competition law regime operational. This 
might be the case when more advantaged member states are (economically) better off 
due to the regional competition law enforcement despite bearing a higher percentage or 
all of enforcement costs.  
The third point suggested by Croley can be explained by the public choice theory. 
Politicians might have personal interests in pursuance of certain policies that require 
international cooperation. In addition, member states of a deep RTA and their domestic 
governments might wish to comply with regional competition law not only for the sake 
of the competition policy itself, but also in order to protect the other interests they might 
have in the broader economic (and social) integration under the same RTA. 
Furthermore, the politicians might use their obligations under an RTA as an excuse for 
adopting unpopular policies against the desire of their constituencies.126 
The collective action problem concerning a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system is likely to be more significant at the early stages of regional 
cooperation. The parties to a deep RTA may reap the benefits of regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement only after the establishment of a workable legal and 
institutional system in the respective region. As shown above, for deep RTAs the 
establishment of such a system may require, among other things, legal reform, 
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establishment of new national and regional institutions, and reform of the existing 
institutions of member states. Therefore the incentives of member states of a deep RTA 
to finance the early stages of a working regional competition law enforcement system 
might be significantly lower, as the early stages are likely to involve high sunk costs 
with no or minimum immediate returns. This problem can be more significant for 
developing countries with tight national budgets. It is believed that only well-planned 
foreign aid might be helpful to address this difficulty faced by significantly resource-
constrained developing countries.127  
 
3.2.3 Assessment of the benefits and costs of regional competition agreements 
The above discussion might suggest that the potential benefit of a regional competition 
agreement may increase in parallel with an increase in the depth of cooperation between 
the parties. However, as can be seen from the competition agreement between New 
Zealand and Australia, the actual gains from a regional competition agreement largely 
depend on the level of cross-border trade within the region, coherence in the law and 
institutional traditions of the parties, and political willingness of the national 
governments to cooperate.  
The competition agreement between New Zealand and Australia is technically second 
generation.128 However, the actual cooperation between the parties is closer and more 
efficient than many other regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
under deep RTAs. The regional competition agreement between New Zealand and 
Australia indicates that the parties found deep cooperation in competition law 
enforcement desirable, given their highly integrated markets, harmonised business law, 
and the similarities in their national competition law proceedings.129 This implies that 
the respective second generation agreement is actually a natural extension of the 
economic integration agreements between the parties [i.e. the 1965 New Zealand - 
Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), followed by the 1983 Australia – New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)]. Secondly, 
although the agreements between the parties do not explicitly oblige them to harmonise 
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the substantive competition provisions in their national law or to establish a regional 
body to supervise each other’s enforcement activities, over time the parties have 
significantly harmonised their national competition law voluntarily in order to 
strengthen the trans-Tasman businesses.130 Soft harmonisation of their law, similar 
enforcement capacities of their NCAs, and the strong business ties between their 
economies has made the NCAs of New Zealand and Australia natural strategic partners. 
Although it is true that the national interests of the parties still set the limits of regional 
cooperation, due to their widely overlapping commercial interests the parties seem to 
work very closely and efficiently in administering their competition law enforcement. 
A general implication of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand is that, 
given political goodwill and sufficient level of advancement in law enforcement, second 
generation agreements can also facilitate deep and efficient regional cooperation in 
competition law enforcement. Therefore potential costs and benefits of a regional 
competition agreement should be considered mainly on the basis of the specific 
relationship between the parties rather than solely on the terms of a regional competition 
agreement and the extent of cooperation envisaged therein. However, in any case the 
above sub-sections demonstrate that for efficient regional cooperation in competition 
law enforcement, parties must have a common understanding of the core competition 
concepts, similar substantive competition law and procedure, and mutual trust in each 
other’s national legal enforcement practices. In addition, the efficiency of legal 
enforcement of any national or regional arrangement is essentially subject to parties’ 
respect of the rule of law, political goodwill, adequate laws, and institutions with 
sufficient (financial, technical and human) resources.  
The above sections also demonstrate that the tools required for cooperation in 
competition law enforcement are mainly the same for all levels of regional competition 
agreement. Accordingly, in line with the OECD Recommendations, 131  regional 
cooperation may take place via notification requirements, exchange of information, 
coordination of action, consultation and conciliation. The terms of a regional 
competition agreement and the extent of actual cooperation between the parties, 
however, is determined by the confidence of the parties in the fulfilment of the above-
mentioned prerequisites of deep regional cooperation. 
																																																								
130 Harmonisation took place mainly on the basis of MoUs signed by the parties. Ibid. 
131 (OECD, 1995). 
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Second generation agreements are typically signed and enforced by developed 
jurisdictions with established domestic competition law practices. The absence of 
effective second-generation agreements between developing countries can be explained 
by the lack of above-mentioned prerequisites for deep regional cooperation between 
most developing countries.  
The previous two sections have also shown that a major difference between regional 
cooperation agreements and regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
in deep RTAs concerns the objectives of regional cooperation. While cooperation 
agreements are drafted with the sole intention of facilitating cooperation between 
independent jurisdictions, deep RTAs establishing regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems carry the additional aim of strengthening regional economic 
(and social) integration. Since the competition policy of each of the parties to a 
cooperation agreement continue to be designed and enforced domestically, these 
agreements can have only a limited effect in enhancing domestic competition law 
enforcement capacity of their signatory jurisdictions. Regional cooperation agreements 
mainly aim to make identification and deterrence of anti-competitive conduct easier for 
each of the participating jurisdictions, and to ensure efficiencies in the cost of legal 
enforcement where possible. On the other hand, the above discussion suggests that 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs may have an 
additional target of the improvement of individual competition enforcement capacities 
of their member states. Deep regional cooperation in competition law enforcement 
might be achieved between developing countries via deep RTAs to the extent that they 
can remove the obstacles faced by developing countries in legal enforcement due to 
their development level. Nevertheless, as shown above, deep RTAs require higher 
economic and political commitment from member states than the level of commitment 
required by regional cooperation agreements on competition enforcement.  
In light of the above, the next section discusses when and under what conditions 
regional competition agreements can address specific problems faced by developing 
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Section 3.3 Meeting the Specific Needs of Developing Countries in 
Regional Competition Agreements 
Regional competition agreements might be helpful in addressing some common 
problems of developing countries concerning competition law enforcement, such as 
problems deriving from lack of resources, low competition awareness, small-sized 
economy, strong vested interest groups, inadequate legislation, and dysfunctional 
institutions.    
A major obstacle to the efficiency of competition law enforcement in developing 
countries is the lack of financial resources. As shown in previous sections regional 
cooperation in competition law enforcement can bring significant cost savings, 
especially when the cooperation includes exchange of confidential information between 
the parties. In addition, harmonisation of competition law of the parties is identified as 
an important facilitator of regional cooperation, and thereby more cost efficient 
competition law enforcement. Depending on the actual level of cooperation between the 
parties, regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs might 
achieve the highest cost savings in the long term since an integrated structure requires 
closer legal harmonisation,132 and may thereby eliminate most of the duplicated law 
enforcement activities across the respective regional bloc. As mentioned in the previous 
section, however, soft law mechanisms for legal harmonisation and coherent 
enforcement may not be suitable for developing countries due to problems of political 
economy and underdeveloped legal systems of the respective jurisdictions. Regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems may also provide a better platform for 
the coordination of competition advocacy campaigns of the cooperating parties, and 
thereby also reduce the cost of law enforcement.   
Limited human resources constitute another common problem of many developing 
countries. All types of regional competition law agreements might achieve significant 
improvement through cooperation in the form of training and technical support. Second 
generation agreements and regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
in deep RTAs, however, may also partly reduce the problems faced in actual 
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constraints (e.g. differences in legal systems and incoherent domestic legislation) constitute a bigger 
obstacle to the efficiency of regional cooperation than practical constraints (e.g. scarce resources, timing 
and language differences). See (OECD, 2013), p. 85. Moreover, the parties of a deep RTA would 
presumably be more willing to undertake significant legal reform as they would envisage (and be ready 
for) more sophisticated forms of cooperation on various policy grounds, and accordingly expect higher 
benefits from the greater  scope of regional cooperation. 
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competition law enforcement processes if they realise exchange of confidential 
information between the parties. Although the closeness of actual cooperation between 
the parties would be the main determinant of the effectiveness of any regional 
competition agreement, extensive cooperation in various policy areas under a deep 
RTAs may play a key role in encouraging developing countries actively to cooperate in 
competition law enforcement as well.  
Another important obstacle to the success of competition law enforcement in 
developing countries is corruption. In many developing countries the rule of law is not 
yet established and certain vested interest groups and/or politicians continue to be able 
to influence the judiciary. Regional competition agreement may put national 
governments of member states under pressure to comply with the regional and/or 
national competition policies. In regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems in deep RTAs this positive pressure can be more significant than in first and 
second generation agreements, as compliance might then be ensured by binding 
regional rule, observed by a regional institution, and might be made subject to direct or 
indirect sanction (e.g. trade remedies). In addition, as noted above, in the presence of an 
operational regional competition authority, the influence of vested interest groups and 
local politicians on the administration of regional competition law and enforcement 
might be less powerful. As regional cooperation agreements on competition law 
enforcement do not primarily aim at improving legal enforcement systems of the 
signatory parties, these agreements are less likely to remove corruption in developing 
countries’ administration of competition law.  
Lack of financial and human resources as well as deficiencies in legal proceedings in 
developing countries usually lead to weak or inoperative institutions. Regional 
competition agreements may help to relieve these problems to the extent they can 
provide technical assistance and guidance on best practices. The additional positive 
effect of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs may 
derive from the establishment of a regional competition authority.  This might help to 
remedy problems of institutional design as it would undertake all or a part of the 
enforcement activity within the respective region and provide long-term guidance to the 
NCAs of the member states, if any.  
Lastly, as mentioned above, the size of an economy directly influences the power of 
competition agencies to deter anti-competitive TNCs. It is not regional cooperation in 
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competition law enforcement but regional economic integration which may be helpful 
in strengthening the ability of competition authorities of small-sized economies to 
impose deterrent sanctions.133 The same applies to reduced influence of domestic vested 
interest groups and improved bargaining power of regional blocs in international trade 
negotiations following the conclusion of a deep RTA. Accordingly, these benefits can 
only be gathered from a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
under a deep RTA.  
The above discussion suggests that regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems under deep RTAs might be better suited to addressing the specific problems of 
developing countries in competition law enforcement, although administration of deep 
RTAs always involve much higher costs, including that of national sovereignty.  
In line with the above, one may safely conclude that the achievement of the above-
mentioned benefits of regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems is 
subject to the presence of deep integration under a RTA, and a corresponding regional 
competition policy that receives political backing from member states. The viability and 
effectiveness of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in a deep 
RTA is conditional on the positive prospect and sustainability of the broader regional 
economic (and social) integration design, and coherence between the regional 
competition policy and the other regional integration policies pursued under the 
respective RTA. This issue will be investigated further in the following chapters.  
 
Section 3.4 Conclusions: Cooperation versus Integration 
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine the potential benefits and costs of 
regional competition agreements from the perspective of developing countries. 
Different types of regional competition agreement are identified mainly by focussing on 
the depth and goals of regional cooperation in competition law enforcement. 
Concerning the goals of regional competition agreements it is suggested that a 
																																																								
133 Although in theory NCAs of independent jurisdictions may agree to give a collective response against 
an anti-competitive behaviour in one party’s territory, in practice there is very little prospect for such 
form of cooperation. Because sanctions imposed on a TNC for its unlawful behaviour in another territory 
is likely to influence the national markets of the original jurisdiction negatively. For example, seizing an 
anti-competitive firm’s assets can potentially lead reduction of the firm’s market activity in the 
cooperating jurisdiction and therefore, adversely affect its national economy. Likewise, the anti-
competitive firm might be the national of the cooperating jurisdiction. Alternatively, a sanction which 
forces or encourages the firm to exit the cooperating jurisdiction’s market can be undesirable due to 
market concentration.   
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distinction be made between regional cooperation agreements on competition law 
enforcement, and regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep 
RTAs. A principal difference is that while regional cooperation agreements aim to make 
the detection and sanctioning of anticompetitive actions easier for each of the 
participating jurisdictions, regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems 
in deep RTAs aim to achieve an additional objective of strengthening broader economic 
(and social) integration between the parties. With respect to the depth of regional 
competition agreements, a division was made of regional cooperation agreements into 
two groups according to whether the agreement permits parties to exchange confidential 
information. This distinction is appropriate as only the exchange of confidential 
information can promote effective cooperation in actual competition law enforcement 
cases.  
Examination of the potential benefits and costs of regional competition agreements has 
shown that, assuming sufficient political will and enforcement capacity, the deeper the 
level of cooperation between the parties, the higher the potential benefits they can 
accrue from the regional competition agreement. Accordingly, regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs are better suited to address the 
problems of developing countries concerning competition law enforcement. As certain 
outstanding aspects of these deep RTAs actually derive from regional economic 
integration, the respective benefits cannot be replicated in a stand-alone competition 
agreement.  
Another implication of the positive effect of regional economic integration on regional 
competition law enforcement is that the success of a regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement system under a deep RTA is subject to the workability of broader 
regional economic (and social) integration under the same RTA. Therefore effective 
regional cooperation in competition law enforcement under a deep RTA requires firstly 
the presence of a workable regional economic (and social) integration design, and 
secondly, a regional competition policy that corresponds to the broader integration 
envisaged under the respective RTA.  
The next chapter will examine the reasons for independent jurisdictions to enter into 
RTAs. It will discuss the role of competition policy in deep regional integrations, and 
the factors that may affect the success of a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system under a deep RTA. 
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CHAPTER 4 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS & THE ROLE OF 
REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY  
Introduction 
The main research question this thesis attempts to answer is whether regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs can help to overcome 
competition law enforcement related problems of developing countries. The second 
chapter was dedicated to mapping the problems faced by developing countries 
concerning competition law enforcement. The third chapter examined the suitability of 
regional competition agreements for addressing the competition law enforcement 
problems of developing countries. The chapter examined different types of regional 
competition agreement and concluded that regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems in deep RTAs may lead to the highest efficiencies in enforcement, 
and might thereby be more helpful in addressing the specific difficulties faced by 
developing countries. It was suggested, however, that the achievement of such an 
advanced level of regional competition law enforcement is inherently subject to the 
existence of a workable broader economic (and social) integration plan under the deep 
RTA between the parties. In order further to investigate this dependency the present 
chapter examines the motives of sovereign jurisdictions in entering into regional 
integration agreements. A detailed analysis of political and economic dynamics in 
RTAs is made in order to gain an understanding of the role given to regional 
competition policy in deep RTAs. In line with this, the chapter discusses the effect of 
establishing a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in the context 
of a broader economic (and social) integration scheme under a deep RTA.  
In light of the above Chapter 4 is organised as follows: Section 4.1 will give an 
impression of the basic rationale for regional integration and note the economic and 
political motives for regional integration in bullet-points. Section 4.2 will provide brief 
information on the evolution of regional economic integration. Sub-Section 4.2.1 will 
examine the historical evolution of regional economic integrations in Europe, as the EU 
today is the most prominent regional integration. Sub-Section 4.2.2 will shift the focus 
to developing countries and explain the three waves of regionalism from the 1960s to 
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the present. Section 4.3 will then examine the major economic motives for regional 
integration from the perspective of sovereign states, and Section 4.4 will discuss the key 
factors that should be considered for increasing economic gains from regional 
integration. Political motives for regional integration will be demonstrated in Section 
4.5. In the light of these economic and political motives Section 4.6 will submit that 
economic expectations lie at the heart of regional integration. Section 4.7 will examine 
the role of regional competition policy in the broader regional integration context of a 
deep RTA and in this context, comment on the further implications of the broader 
economic (and social) integration design of deep RTAs on regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems. Section 4.8 will offer a brief summary of 
findings.  
 
Section 4.1 The Basic Rationale for Regional Integration  
Chief purpose of regional integration is to secure the benefits of larger population and 
greater resources (natural as well as human and financial) at the regional level.  
From an economics perspective the principal aim of regional integration is to achieve 
economic growth. Subject to the presence of an adequate investment environment, 
unrestricted trade within a regional bloc may translate into increased (allocative, 
productive and dynamic) efficiencies, and reduced transaction costs, both of which may 
contribute to growth of businesses in the given region. Growth of businesses, on the 
other hand, might diffuse to the public and thereby increase the wealth of the citizens in 
some or all member states.1  
From a political point of view, the principal purpose of regional integration is to ensure 
regional peace by strengthening economic and social links between the participating 
jurisdictions to an extent that a profound political dispute or a war within a regional 
bloc, as well as with third countries, becomes (at least economically) highly 
undesirable, if not impossible. In addition, regional integration may provide significant 
leverage in international negotiation if the member states of a regional bloc agree to act 
in a uniform manner or decide on joint representation. 
																																																								
1 Harmonisation of laws on multiple industrial and social policies might reduce the operational costs and 
increase efficiency of businesses further, and thereby help economic growth. 
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All major economic and political motives for regional integration will be assessed in 
detail below. Major economic motives of sovereign states will be examined under five 
headings: (i) profiting from trade flows triggered by common internal and external trade 
policies; (ii) achieving economies of scale and scope, and greater specialisation across 
the region; (iii) attracting FDI and gaining increased credibility; (iv) triggering 
knowledge transfers from within and outside the region, and (v) enjoying better trade 
preferences as a result of increased bargaining power in international trade negotiation.  
Political motives for entering into an RTA can vary significantly across different 
geographies. Nevertheless, the following sections will examine the major political 
motives under five headings: (i) intra-regional and extra-regional security concerns 
(including the ‘new security’ needs)2, (ii) locking-in domestic reforms via commitment 
mechanisms under an RTA, 3  (iii) increased bargaining power in international 
negotiation, thus ‘getting noticed’ in the international arena, (iv) avoiding negative 
outcomes of ‘marginalisation’ in a globalised trade environment; and (v) receiving the 
support of strong lobbies and/or individual voters.  
Before the examination of the above motives, the next section will give an overview of 
the historical development of regionalism 
 
Section 4.2 Evolution of Regional Economic Integrations4 
4.2.1 Historical review of the shift from ‘closed-economies’ to ‘free trade’ in 
Europe: regional integration through bilateral preferential trade agreements and 
early customs unions  
International trade has not always been governed according to supply and demand, but 
rather by the power games of sovereign states. As Findlay and O’Rourke (2009) pointed 
out: 
‘…the greatest extensions of the world trade have tended to come not from the 
bloodless tâtonnement of some fictional Walrasian auctioneer but from the barrel of a 
Maxim gun, the edge of a scimitar, or the ferocity of nomadic horsemen. When trade 
																																																								
2 (Damro, 2006), p. 32-4. 
3 Lock-in effect is particularly the case with RTAs between developed and developing countries. 
(Previous literature often refers to developed and developing countries as North and South, respectively. 
However, given the current level of globalisation and the changing nature of economic powers across the 
globe, the North – South division is now less pronounced). 
4 Although there are slight differences in their meaning, the terms ‘regional integration’, ‘regional 
economic integration’, ‘regionalisation’ and ‘regional trade agreement’ will be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper to explain regional economic integration of countries under an RTA. 
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required more workers, parental choices regarding quality/quantity trade-offs could 
often safely be ignored, since workers could always be enslaved. When trade required 
more profits, these could be earned via plunder or violently imposed monopolies. For 
much of our period the pattern of trade can only be understood as being the outcome of 
some military or political equilibrium between contending powers... 
Politics thus determined trade, but trade also helped to determine politics, by 
influencing the capacities and the incentives facing states.’5 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries trade was under the dominant influence of 
nationalist and mercantilist policies. Foreign trade was strictly controlled by 
governments which had the primary aim of accumulating gold and silver. Under 
mercantilist policies imports were restrained and exports encouraged. States-imposed 
monopolies and exclusive trade agreements with overseas colonies were at their peak.  
The first real impetus for free trade in Europe6 was the change in the foreign trade 
policies of Britain and France following the collapse of the colonial routes in 1770s.7 
With the gradual loss of revenue raised from the colonies, commercial interests of both 
countries shifted towards increasing their trade in Europe. This had led to discussion on 
removal of barriers to trade between European countries.8   
Only in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did fruitful debate emerge on the 
desirability of free trade. Two grand pillars of thought led these debates.9 On the one 
hand, Adam Smith (in The Wealth of Nations, 1776), followed by David Ricardo (in On 
the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817) argued in favour of 
liberalisation of the markets and heavily influenced free trade movement in Europe. On 
the other, opponents of free trade, most famously Alexander Hamilton (in the Subject of 
Manufactures, 1791) and Friedrich List (in National System of Political Economy, 
1841), defended the need of protectionist policies for infant industries and contributed 
to the employment of protectionist policies in America in the early-1800s.10   
																																																								
5 (Findlay & O'Rourke, 2009), p. xviii-xix. 
6 For a careful analysis of the historical development of customs unions in Europe in the late-eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, see (Irwin, 1993).  
7 Ibid. p. 92-3. 
8 Arguably, the Hanseatic League of the 13th – 16th Centuries had certain similarities to preferential trade 
agreements. However, the members of Hansa were independent of the rulers of their respective territories. 
The rise of the nation-state and strong governments led to the decline of the Hanseatic League. Likewise, 
membership of Hansa was far more flexible than contemporary RTAs, as the members of the former 
could come and go to the League according to their changing interests at the times. See, (Halliday, 2009).    




In the nineteenth century the first movements towards free trade in Europe occurred 
through the use of ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) provisions in bilateral preferential 
trade agreements. These MFN clauses enabled signatory states automatically to preserve 
their non-discriminatory access to one another’s markets in the event that either 
provided preferential trade conditions to a third country. The first use of the most-
favoured-nation clause was in the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860. 11 
According to Article V of the complementary Convention of the treaty: 
‘Each of the contracting powers engages to extend to the other any favour, any privilege 
or diminution of tariff which either of them may grant to a third power in regard to the 
importation of whether mentioned or not mentioned in the treaty of 23rd of January, 
1860.’12    
Following the Anglo-French commercial treaty, many European countries sought 
similar bilateral preferential trade agreements. Consequently low-tariff agreements 
gained a broad coverage throughout the Europe and restraints to intra-European trade 
were gradually reduced. However, the two world wars and the Great Depression of the 
1930s undermined the liberalisation of the European market and neo-imperialist policies 
were temporarily resumed. Nevertheless, the use of the MFN clauses for regional 
integration preserved its place in international agreements. Even today the MFN 
principle carries a central weight in WTO legislation.   
In parallel with the development of bilateral preferential trade agreements European 
countries had been discussing customs unions since the seventeenth century. Early 
seventeenth century France, although politically united under a monarch, was 
economically divided with numerous internal tariffs and customs regulations. A 
customs union was reached only in 1664 by the northern provinces of France.13 
Likewise, as early as 1665, Austria, Spain and Bavaria were considering establishing an 
economic union. 14  The most elaborate customs union of the nineteenth century, 
however, was secured in the territory of today’s Germany (i.e. German Zollverein).15 
																																																								
11(Irwin, 1993), p. 95-6. 
12 Irwin notes that ‘[w]hile Britain insisted on marking its own tariff reductions applicable to all nations, 
France lowered its import duties on British goods only, adopting a two-tier tariff system of 
“autonomous” tariff rates for MFN countries and higher “conventional” rates for others.’ (ibid., p. 96-7) 
Britain’s adaptation of unilateral free trade goes back to 1840s. In this respect Britain acted as the pioneer 
of the free trade movement in the nineteenth century.  
13 (McPhee, 1992), p. 23; (B. M. Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001), p. 477-8. 
14 (Viner, 1950), p. 93. 
15 Ibid. pp. 97-102. 
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The agreement united the then numerous German principalities and harmonised trade 
policies across the region in an effort to achieve economic development and political 
empowerment.16 
World War II changed the dynamics of trade significantly across the world. In 1950s 
war-torn continental Europe pioneered deep regional integration in its fight for urgent 
economic growth against the dominant economic powers of the era, the US and the 
USSR. During the Cold War of the capitalist and communist world powers economic 
integration in continental Europe flourished, with the keen support of the US, on the 
basis of liberal economic policies.  
The EU17 is currently the most prominent example of deep regional integration and 
therefore other regional blocs across the world often take the EU’s practices as a guide. 
Before examining the motives for regional integration, the following section will 
examine three waves of regionalism in developing countries. 
  
4.2.2 Three Waves of Regionalism in Developing Countries 
‘Regionalism’ may be defined and categorised according to the perspective of different 
disciplines.18 For example, regionalism has been defined as ‘an economic process where 
economic flows grow more rapidly among a given group of states (in the same region) 
than between these states and those located outside.’19 Alternatively, some define 
‘regionalism’ as ‘a political process characterised by economic policy cooperation and 
coordination among countries.’20 A detailed review of different perspectives on the 
definition of regionalism remains outside the scope of this thesis. The following 
																																																								
16 (Mattli, 2000), p. 154-61. On a different point, some argue that the German Zollverein was a key 
building block of German unification and today’s Federal Republic of Germany [(B. M. Hoekman & 
Kostecki, 2001), pp. 22-3 and 477-8]. However, (Viner, 1950) disagrees. With reference to old customs 
unions, Viner notes that ‘in none of these cases it can be held that the tariff unification was in any way 
responsible for creating a sentiment favorable to political union, or that it in any other significant way 
made a substantial contribution to the eventual realization of political unity’ (p. 96). In line with (Viner, 
1950), see (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 202. 
17 In the following, the term European Union is used to include the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the European Economic Community and the EU.  
18 For a good literature review on different definitions of regionalism, see, (Mansfield & Milner, 1999), 
pp. 590-2. 
19 Ibid. p. 591. 
20(Fishlow & Haggard, 1992) as cited in (Mansfield & Milner, 1999), p. 591. The authors make a 
distinction between the terms ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’. Regionalisation refers to the process of 
concentration of economic flows, trans-nationalisation and de-territorialisation at the regional level; see 
also, (Sanahuja, 2012), p. 2.     
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sections, however, will consider both economic and political cooperation aspects of 
‘regionalism’ when examining the motives that lead sovereign states to sign RTAs.  
For the purposes of this research the historical development of regionalism is reviewed 
in three waves: closed, open, and post-liberal regionalism.21  
 
Closed Regionalism: 
In the 1960s, as EU member states began to reap the benefits of economic integration, 
the idea of regional cooperation and gradual economic integration rapidly gained 
popularity across the world. Developing countries were attracted to the idea of 
promoting peace and economic growth by regional economic integration.22 However, 
with the influence of the Cold War, the world was divided according to economic and 
political ideology as a result of which countries implemented different and often 
conflicting trade policies. Regional integration agreements of the second half of the 
twentieth century were inevitably shaped by these divergent trade policies.  
In the twentieth century developing countries were still pursuing mercantilist trade 
policies (i.e. trade policies which aim to achieve economic development by restraining 
imports and encouraging exports). Inspired by the success of European integration, 
some developing countries, particularly those in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
attempted to integrate their national economies in parallel with their existing 
mercantilist trade policies.23 Accordingly, developing countries experienced ‘closed-
regionalism’ in the 1960s.24 The main objective of closed regionalism was import 
substitution. Developing countries aimed to replace imports from third countries with 
exports from their regional partners. By abolishing the barriers to intra-regional trade 
countries pursuing closed regionalism expected to achieve more efficient allocation of 
resources within their regional blocs, and specialisation in production and services 
which would in return promote higher efficiencies. In addition, some regional blocs 
formed by developing countries implemented heavily protectionist policies in order to 
protect their local infant industries from foreign competition.  
																																																								
21  On evolution of regionalism, see: (Matthews, 2003); (World Bank, 2000), p. 1-3; (Bhagwati, 
Greenaway, & Panagariya, 1998), p. 1128-9; (Gratius, 2012), pp.13-6. Not all of these authors embrace 
the same categorisation of the waves of regionalism.  
22 See, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 below. 




Closed regionalism, however, did not meet these expectations. On the contrary, most of 
the respective countries suffered from economic downsizing as a result of regional 
integration. One reason for the failure was the insufficient scope and depth of regional 
integrations to achieve the intended efficiencies.25 Furthermore, the RTAs between 
developing countries failed to overcome the dependency of member states on external 
input (i.e. imported goods from outside the relevant regional blocs) in their domestic 
manufacturing. As a result strong protectionism increased the cost of imports from non-
member countries, thus making domestic as well as regional production less profitable. 




Regionalism saw a resurgence in the second half of the 1980s. The unilateral 
liberalisation trend across the world was then a significant influence on the dynamics of 
international trade. First the EU, a little after the US, began to negotiate preferential 
trade agreements with developing countries, and thereby played an important role in the 
expansion of RTAs.26 In this second wave of regionalism international trade had 
gradually moved from ‘closed regionalism’ to a more open market structure. The 
principal mechanism for regional integration was changed from a protectionist, import 
substitution model to a liberal, free market model. The second wave of regionalism, also 
known as ‘open regionalism’ or ‘new regionalism’27, ultimately aimed at improving the 
access of member states of an RTA to the global markets by increasing their 
international competitiveness.28   
In the 1990s liberal economic policies embraced by developing countries led to the 
reduction of external tariffs, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and increased 
trade through new or reformed customs unions. MERCOSUR was formed based on the 
principles of open regionalism; likewise, some of the then-existing regional blocs such 
as CARICOM, CAN, and SICA (the Central American Integration System) reformed 
																																																								
25 The ‘depth’ of regionalisation concerns the level of harmonisation within a region in terms of 
economic, political and/or social governance. Whereas the ‘scope’ of regionalisation concerns the number 
of member states of an RTA. 
26 (B. M. Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001), p. 477-8. 
27(Matthews, 2003). 
28 (Gratius, 2012), p. 15 
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the terms of their regional cooperation in line with the free market approach of open 
regionalism.29  
Open regionalism still defines the main principles of cooperation under many 
contemporary regional blocs.  
 
Post-Liberal Regionalism: 
Sanahuja (2012), however, argues that some developing countries have now recognised 
certain drawbacks to open regionalism. According to the author, under the second wave 
of regionalism most RTAs were mainly designed to achieve negative integration and 
included only few or no provisions for positive integration.30 In line with this, regional 
integration led to increased regional inequalities (e.g. as in the WAEMU31), and thereby 
triggered political tension in some regional blocs.32 
Secondly, most RTAs between developing countries embrace and today are still 
embracing inter-governmental cooperation instead of supra-national cooperation. 
However, due to the special political economy of developing countries, absence of 
regional institutions with supranational powers might discredit the regional policies and 
institutions, and fail to ensure full compliance of member states with the regional 
legislation.33  
Thirdly, the current state of globalisation, free trade policies and open regionalisation 
have encouraged developing countries to enter into multiple RTAs.34 Unprecedented 
proliferation in RTAs created conflicting commitments for developing countries under 
different RTAs,35 and the simultaneous administration of the respective agreements 
became costly and complex.  
																																																								
29 Ibid. 
30 Positive integration refers to common rules that aim at reducing inequalities within a regional bloc. It 
entails harmonisation of social policies and cooperation in institution building. By contrast, negative 
integration refers to common rules that aim at removing barriers to free trade only. See, (Sanahuja, 2012), 
pp. 3-4. See also, (World Bank, 2000), p. 2-3. 
31 See around fn. 102 below. 
32 (Sanahuja, 2012), pp. 3-4. 
33 Ibid. The author cites the MERCOSUR as an example. 
34 Multiple RTA membership is very common, especially in Africa. For instance, Swaziland is a member 
of three RTAs (COMESA, SACU and SADC). On membership of multiple RTAs in Africa, see (Gathii, 
2010), pp. 653-65. Chapter 5 further examines the problems in relation to multiple RTA membership. 
35 Ibid.  
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Post-liberal regionalism (a.k.a. socio-political, post-commercial, or post-hegemonic 
regionalism) is a fairly new concept which is used in relation to Latin American 
regional integrations since the early 2000s.36 Post-liberal regional integrations aim to 
reverse the invariable resignation to liberal free market ideology. The goal of post-
liberal regionalism is to increase the role of the state, and to give more weight to 
positive integration.37  
The terms of cooperation under this third wave of regionalism are not clearly defined. 
However, cooperation under post-liberal regional integrations may include 
‘commitments to political cooperation in the areas of social, technological, 
communications, financial, infrastructure, energy, judicial, and defence policies.’38 
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations –which aims to integrate MERCOSUR 
and CAN) and ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) are cited as 
representatives of this last wave of regionalism. 
There are various uncertainties about the scope and credibility of post-liberal 
regionalism, and the possible spread of the term from Latin America to the rest of the 
world. The next section will examine economic factors that encourage sovereign states 
to sign into RTAs. 
 
Section 4.3 Economic Motives for Regional Integration39 
There is a massive literature dealing with the economic benefits of regional integration. 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of economic benefit of regional integration: those 
deriving from ‘trade flows’, and those deriving from ‘competition and scale effects’.40  
The term ‘trade flow’ in its most minimal occurrence may be simply defined as a 
change in the parties to a commercial transaction. A trade flow takes place when Firm A 
changes its trading partner from Firm B to Firm C regardless of the subject of the 
transaction (i.e. the sale of any goods or services). Discriminatory tariff reductions in 
RTAs necessarily lead to changes in relative prices in member jurisdiction and in most 
																																																								
36 (Serbin, 2012), pp. 148-53. According to Sanahuja, the move towards post-liberalism in Latin America 
occurred from 2005 onwards; see, (Sanahuja, 2012), p. 7.  
37 Ibid. (Gratius, 2012), pp. 15-6, (Serbin, 2012), pp. 148-53. 
38 (Saguier, 2012), p. 125. 
39 The sections on economic and political motives for regional integration (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) are 
mainly built on the relevant parts of (World Bank, 2000) and, (Schiff & Winters, 2003).  
40 (World Bank, 2000), p. 29. 
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cases such changes prompt trade flows.41 Trade flows may benefit some member 
jurisdictions at the expense of other members and/or the rest of the world (ROW). As 
will be seen below, the accumulated effect of trade flows may or may not be profitable 
to the host countries, depending on, among other factors, the cost efficiencies of the 
firms involved in comparison with the ROW, changes in tariff rates, changes in prices, 
and elasticity of demand.  
On the other hand, competition and scale effects can be related to improved efficiencies 
and economic potential due to a regional market larger than the domestic markets of 
each member state.  
   
4.3.1 Trade Flows: Welfare implications of RTAs on the basis of trade creation 
and trade diversion 
Until the mid-1900s RTAs were considered to be unconditionally welfare increasing. 
The superficial view was that the reduction or elimination of restrictions to trade in a 
certain region would eventually contribute to globally unrestricted markets, and would 
therefore be welfare-increasing.42 Accordingly, the ultimate aim of all economies was 
the elimination of trade barriers worldwide, as it would lead to the highest efficiencies 
for all market players in all jurisdictions. From an economics perspective the 
elimination of all trade barriers would indeed be the most efficient option for all. In 
reality, however, there are always some political obstacles that prevent the formation of 
a global free trade area. A major drawback is the tendency of sovereign states to favour 
short-term domestic interest over long-term common economic interest. As a result of 
this tendency there is an unsettled discussion in the literature on whether RTAs are 
building or stumbling blocks to the ultimate goal of the elimination of trade barriers 
worldwide.43  
The roots of today’s economic understanding of the welfare implications of RTAs and 
resulting trade flows can be found in Jacobs Viner’s seminal work, The Customs Union 
Issue (1950).44 Viner starts with an assumption of a customs union agreement between 
																																																								
41 Ibid. p. 39. 
42 (Lipsey, 1960), p. 496-7; (Bhagwati et al., 1998), p. 1128-9, 1136.  
43 See, (Bhagwati et al., 1998), pp. 1140-5. However, this question is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter since it does not directly relate to the motives of sovereign countries for forming regional trade 
blocs. 
44 As explained in Appendix I, regional economic integration can take place on various levels (i.e. FTAs, 
customs unions, common markets, full economic unions, etc.). However, a common feature of all levels 
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two countries and analyses the effects of mutual abolition of trade barriers on the 
national economic welfare of member states. He identifies two kinds of trade flow that a 
customs union may create, ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’, and concludes that a 
customs union agreement is desirable when it entails more trade creation than trade 
diversion. Subsequent studies, however, have proven that certain other factors have to 
be considered in making a reliable assessment of the economic welfare implications of 
an RTA.45 However, as will be seen below, the terms ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade 
diversion’ Viner coined have remained the starting points of any economic welfare 
analysis of regional integration.  
Under a customs union of two countries trade creation occurs when a less efficient 
producer’s products in a member state (home country) are replaced by imports from the 
more efficient producer’s products in the other member state (union partner). In other 
words trade creation occurs when higher cost production in the home country is 
replaced by imports from the lower-cost union partner.  
A typical example of trade diversion arises when the home country is not a producer but 
an importer of a product from the ROW. As a result of a customs union the home 
country may displace its imports from the most efficient producer in the world with the 
imports from the less efficient union partner. Accordingly the price of the products of 
the union partner in the home country’s domestic market might become lower than the 
price of the globally most efficient the ROW firm in the absence of tax duties on the 
union partner. Such diversion would only occur when the price difference between the 
products of the ROW firm and the union partner firm is below the tax duty the ROW 
firm is obliged to pay. In more general terms trade diversion occurs when a higher cost 
union partner firm displaces the lowest cost ROW supplier.   
																																																																																																																																																																		
of RTAs is introducing a mechanism for reducing or eliminating taxes and other custom duties 
exclusively for the internal trade among members of a regional bloc. In other words, although different 
RTAs may anticipate different levels of economic integration, ensuring preferential trade conditions to 
regional partners is indispensable to all RTAs. In line with this, economic analyses of regional 
integrations are dominated with discussions on welfare implications of discriminatory tariff reductions. 
The early economic literature on regional integration, in particular, is mainly developed around the 
assumption of a customs union. However, as all RTAs aim the reduction or elimination of tariffs, 
inferences about customs unions are at least partially applicable to other levels of RTAs as well. 
Therefore, in line with the economics literature, the below sections will analyse the economic effects of 
RTAs by using a customs union agreement as an example. 
45 Among others, (Meade, 1953, 1955), (Lipsey, 1957, 1960), (Collier, 1979), (Bhagwati et al., 1998), 
(Panagariya, 2000), (World Bank, 2000), (Anthony J Venables, 2001), and (Schiff & Winters, 2003). 
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The best way to clarify Viner’s definition of trade creation and diversion effects of 
customs unions is to demonstrate them by example. 
 
Case Study 1: Trade Creation 
Country of origin Price Imports tax in A 
Market price in 
A 
A £ 90 N/A £ 90 
B £ 80 20% £ 96 
Assume that X is a homogeneous product and A and B are its only producers in the 
world. The marginal cost of X is £90 per unit in country A (home country) and £80 per 
unit in country B (union partner). The market for X is subject to perfect competition in 
both A and B; therefore the marginal cost of X is equal to its market price in both 
countries. A imposes a 20% tax on imports of X. All consumers are assumed to be well 
informed about the market conditions and always to act rationally (i.e. buying only from 
the cheapest source available), as usual in simple economic assessments. 
In A’s market for X, the market price of the products imported from B is £96 (i.e. £80 + 
20% tax) and the products of the domestic industry in A is £90. Therefore all consumers 
in A buy domestic products only. Consequently a 20% imports tax is sufficient to 
protect A’s domestic industry for the commodity X from producers in B. 
Now assume that A and B have formed a customs union and eliminated tariffs for 
internal trade. Producers from B are now able to sell per-unit of X from £80 in A, while 
the per-unit price of the domestic products in A is unchanged. Consumers will then shift 
their entire purchase from domestic products to the imports from B. This shift from 







Case Study 2: Trade Diversion 
Country of origin Price Imports tax in A 
Market price in 
A 
A N/A N/A N/A 
B £ 80 35% £ 108 
C £ 60 35% £ 81 
In order to provide an example of trade diversion, this time assume that A is not a 
producer but an importer of commodity Y. A can import Y only from B and C for £80 
and £60, respectively. On these imports prices A imposes a 35% tax; thus the market 
price of the products of B and C in the domestic market of A for Y are £108 and £81 
respectively. The above assumption concerning consumers is also applicable here.   
Given these circumstances, all consumers in A buy commodity Y only from C for £81. 
However, when A and B form a customs union (and C remains outside the union), B’s 
products will be sold tax free (for £80) in A’s market, whereas the price of C’s products 
(£81) will not change. Therefore, as a result of the customs union, consumers in A will 
change to imports from B, although production in B is actually less efficient. This 
change from the more efficient producer (C) to the less efficient union partner (B) is 
called trade diversion.   
In light of the above Viner (1950) draw the above-mentioned general conclusion that 
the trade creation effect of customs union increases welfare, and the trade diversion 
effect of customs unions reduces welfare.46 When a customs union is considered as a 
whole, some products could be trade creating, others trade diverting. Therefore 
according to Viner, the welfare implications of a particular customs union agreement 
will generally depend on the magnitude of the trade creation and diversion.47  
An early and thoughtful critique of Viner’s work can be found in Meade’s ‘The Theory 
of Customs Union’ (1955). Meade pointed out that Viner (1950) does not offer any 
method by which to weigh up the economic gains from trade creation against the losses 
																																																								
46 (Viner, 1950), p. 43.  
47 Ibid. p. 52. 
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from trade diversion. Meade (1955) showed that for assessment of the effects of a 
customs union on total costs the total volume of trade flows as well as ‘the extent to 
which costs have been raised on each unit of the diverted trade and the extent to which 
costs have been lowered on each unit of the newly created trade’ have to be 
considered.48      
  Case Study 3: The effect of a customs union on total costs 
The point made by Meade can be demonstrated with the help of the two cases described 
above. Assume that A and B have formed a customs union which covers the trade of the 
products X and Y. The prices and tariffs given above remain the same. 
In addition assume that A imports 100 units of X and 100 units of Y annually. 
Following the customs union consumers in A buy 100 units of X from B for £80 per 
unit, and the total volume of imports is £8000. Likewise, consumers in A buy 100 units 
of Y from B for £80 per unit; thus the total volume of imports is £8000.  
Although, as shown in the above cases, the customs union is trade creating for 
commodity X and trade diverting for commodity Y, the overall effect of the customs 
union cannot be calculated simply by subtracting the two trade volumes. The percentage 
of price changes has to be included in the assessments. As a result of the customs union 
on in place, the price for X is reduced by 12.5% (£10 profit per each £80-product), and 
the price of Y is 25% higher than the price of Y before tax (£20 loss per each £80-
product). The change customs union created in terms of the total cost of imports of X 
and Y by A is equal to approximately minus £1000 [i.e. (12.5% x £8000) – (25% x 
£8000)].     
 Secondly, Meade (1955) demonstrated that Viner’s (1950) customs union model 
assumes that the demand elasticity is always zero and supply elasticity is always 
infinite.49 However, for most goods and services neither is demand inelastic nor supply 
infinite. Figure 1 below shows trade creation and diversion examples of Cases 1 and 2 
above. It employs the assumption of inelastic demand and infinite supply as claimed to 
be Viner’s own assumption at the time of writing his ‘The Customs Union Issue’ 
(1950).50 
																																																								
48 (Meade, 1955), p. 34-6. 
49 Ibid. p. 36-41. 
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Figure 1:  Viner’s Trade creation             &  Viner’s Trade diversion 
 
In Figure 1 the trade creation effect of the customs union under Case 1 is represented by 
the area [k]; and the trade diverting effect of the customs union under Case 2 is 
represented by the area [m + n]. In the first half of Figure 1 the area [k] represents 
consumer surplus in A; there is no loss shown on the diagram. In the second half of 
Figure 1, [m+n] represents A’s tax revenue loss. Out of this loss, [m] is the consumer 
surplus, and [n] is the cost of B’s higher cost of production to A. In other word, [n] 
represents a transfer of wealth from A to (the exporters in) B.51   
Figure 2 demonstrates a customs union for a single product where demand is not 
inelastic but downward-slopping. To interpret Figure 2 assume that A (home country) is 
not a producer but an importer of commodity X. A imports X from B (union partner) 
and C (the most efficient ROW firm) for prices Pb and Pc respectively. A imposes a 
fixed [t] amount of tax on imports of X.  
Before A and B form a customs union all consumers are expected to make their entire 
purchases of X from C for the price Pct (i.e. Pc + tax); and the total amount of purchase 





51 However, when the demand is elastic, trade flows caused by a customs union will definitely change the 
product prices and thus the quantities. (Meade, 1955) followed, inter alia, by (Lipsey, 1957), (Bhagwati, 
1971) and (Panagariya, 2000), rightly pointed out that this new supply cannot be judged by the value of 
the quantity sold before the customs union. Meade argues that while the initial quantity should be valued 
from the higher pre-customs-union price, the new supply should be valued by the lower post-customs-




Figure 2:  Trade Diversion with Inelastic Demand 
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Following the formation of a customs union between A and B, B will be able to sell X 
from Pb in A’s market and all consumers in A will shift their purchases from C to B. 
Given the downward-slopped demand, the reduction in the price of X from Pct to Pb, 
will cause an increase in the quantity sold, from Q1 to Q2 (i.e. the new supply). 
Accordingly, customs union will lead to new supply, thus newly created trade. The area 
[d + e + f] represents the newly created trade which would not exist in the absence of 
the customs union.             
In Figure 2 the area [a + b] represents A’s tax revenue loss caused by the consumers’ 
shift from C’s products to B’s products. The area [a] represents the consumer surplus as 
a result of the reduction in the price of X after the customs union. Therefore area [a] 
shows the transfer of welfare from the government to consumers in A. On the other 
hand, the area [d] represents the gain of consumers on the new supply. On the downside 
the area [b] represents the cost of B’s less-efficient production to A, which can be 
interpreted as a transfer of wealth from A to (the producers in) B.  
The ultimate welfare implication of the customs union for A depends on the magnitude 
of these welfare transfers.52 Although the opposite is the case for Figure 2, in reality it is 
perfectly possible that the gains from new supply (i.e. [d]) are greater than the cost of 
																																																								
52 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p.35. 
133 
 
the less efficient production of the union partner to A (i.e. [b]),53 which would then 
mean that the customs union can be welfare enhancing despite trade diversion.54    
 
Figure 3: Pure trade diversion  
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Source: Panagariya (2000), pp. 293-5 
 
A more detailed analysis of the basic economic diagram for RTAs can be discussed 
with the help of Figure 3 above. Assume that A and B form a customs union which 
entails preferential tariff reduction for the trading of X. A (home country) is a producer 
as well as an importer of commodity X which is a homogeneous product. B (union 
partner) and C (the most efficient ROW firm) are the exporters of X. In B, X has a 
limited supply, so the supply curve of X is upward-sloping. On the other hand C has an 
																																																								
53 (Panagariya, 2000), p. 292-3. 
54 With respect to the calculation of the cost implications of the customs union (Meade, 1955) suggests 
that the area [b + c] should be valued by the pre-customs-union price (i.e. Pct), whereas the area [e + f] 
and [d] should be valued by the post-customs-union price (i.e. Pb). 
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infinite supply of X, which is equal to Pc. A imposes a fixed amount of tax on imports 
of X from both B and C. The market price of C is therefore Pct (i.e. Pc + imports tax).  
The export-supply curve of B is represented by ESb which is basically identical with 
B’s domestic supply curve but starts from the autarky price in B (i.e. the price where 
B’s demand curve meets B’s domestic supply curve). In other words ESb is calculated 
by subtracting B’s domestic demand from B’s total supply. The import tax of A creates 
a shift in the export-supply curve of B, from ESb to ESbt.  
Likewise the export-supply curve of B, import-demand curve of A is calculated by 
subtracting the domestic supply of X from the total demand for X in A’s home market. 
In other words the import-demand curve of A for commodity X is basically identical 
with A’s demand curve but starts from the autarky price in A (i.e. the price where A’s 
demand curve meets A’s supply curve). Import-demand curve of A is represented by 
MDa. 
In the absence of a customs union Pct meets MDa at a lower price than ESb meets MDa; 
therefore all consumers buy X only from C for the price Pct. The total amount of sales is 
Q3. Then assume that A and B form a customs union for commodity X, and eliminate 
taxes for their internal trade while harmonising their external tariffs. Assume also that 
extra-union terms of trade are fixed, so the price of C is not affected. Now the export-
supply curve of B will be shifted from ESbt to ESb; and the price of imports from C will 
remain the same, Pct. In this situation, despite abolition of the tax duty on B, MDa will 
still meet the Pct at a lower price than it will meet ESb. Therefore the imports may 
continue to come from C and the total quantity sold may not change. However, this 
does not mean that free trade between A and B will not lead to trade diversion. It is 
possible that following the customs union agreement the sale of X might be diverted 
from C to B to the extent of B’s supply available at price Pct. In this case only the 
remaining demand in A will be imported from C. Consequently the sales of Q1 Q2 will 
be shifted from the more efficient C to the less efficient B. This would be a pure trade 
diversion as no new trade will be created. Due to this trade diversion the rectangular 
area GFHL will be the loss of tariff revenue of A. Out of this revenue the area GFHU 
will be transferred to (the exporters of X) in B, whereas the area FLU will be the dead-
weight loss. In other words the area FLU will be lost both for the regional bloc and the 
ROW. There will be no gain for consumers in A either.  
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In the above case trade diversion may occur subject to the competitive pressure from C 
for selling on A’s market. Geographical proximity between members of the customs 
union (in the example, between A and B) may trigger trade diversion to the proximate 
regional partner (i.e. B) on the assumption of lower transport costs the regional partner 
would incur as compared with those of more efficient and more distant ROW producer. 
In line with this some economists have argued that geographical proximity and/or high 
pre-integration trade volumes make regional blocs less prone to trade diversion;55 and 
therefore, regional integration between parties that benefit from such factors should be 
considered to be ‘natural trading partners’.56 However, economists do not seem to have 
reached consensus on the general applicability of this hypothesis. 57  Despite the 
uncertainty on economic effects of geographical proximity, in practice the great 
majority of deep RTAs are formed by neighbouring jurisdictions. However, this might 
be explained also by other non-economic factors, such as well-developed political 
relationship and historical ties between neighbouring jurisdictions.   
In addition to the above, the size of domestic demand may directly influence welfare 
implications of trade flows triggered by regional integrations. The demand factor is 
particularly relevant to developing countries as most have small economies. Demand for 
a commodity in a developing country - or to be more precise, in a small economy- is 
usually too small to make any significant change in the total world demand for that 
commodity; thus the developing country cannot affect the price of the respective 
commodity in the world markets.58 In such a case any tariff duty imposed by the 
developing country on imports of the respective commodity would be reflected in 100% 
in the domestic price of the commodity and be paid by domestic consumers. Figure 4 
below helps to explain how tariff duties imposed on imports by small economies can be 




55 (Schiff, 1999) notes that the volume of trade between potential partners or the distance and transport 
costs between them are the two versions of the natural trading partners hypothesis (ibid. p. 2). 
56 (Wonnacott & Lutz, 1989) are the developers of the natural trading partners hypothesis. For an 
historical review of this argument see, (Freund & Ornelas, 2010).  
57 (Panagariya, 2000), pp. 303-4. (World Bank, 2000), p.41. (Schiff, 1999) argues that both supporters 
and opponents of the hypothesis miss the point by focussing only on the relationship between the home 
country and its regional partner and by failing to examine the relationship between the regional partner 
and the ROW.  
58 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 54. 
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Figure 4: The effect of imports taxes imposed by small economies 
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Assume that A is a small economy and MDa is its import-supply curve for commodity 
X. Due to low domestic demand A will not be able to affect the world price of X. Thus 
the export-supply curve of X in the world market is horizontal, and represented by 
XSw. In the absence of an import tax A would import Q1 amount of X at the price of P1, 
which is equal to the world price of the commodity. If A imposes [t] amount of import 
tax, then the total amount of imports will reduce from Q1 to Q2; and the domestic 
market price of X in A will increase from P1 to P1t. Consequently the tax amount (i.e. 
[t]) will be transferred from consumers in A to the government of A.     
It has been shown in the above that the welfare implications of customs unions -and to a 
certain extent the other levels of economic integration- depend heavily on tariff rates of 
member states, the degree of change in prices, elasticity of demand, and the overall size 
of a given economy. However, all of the above assessments rely on the assumption that 
the customs union is relevant only to a single homogenous product, and that the trade 
conditions in the external world always remain unaffected. However, this is hardly the 
case in the real world trade. In order to calculate economic welfare implications of 
regional integrations various other factors must be considered in economic assessments. 
These factors may include, among others, changing trade dynamics in international 
markets, interdependencies across different product markets, changing demand patterns, 
inter-commodity substitution, and knowledge spillovers and other technological 
externalities.59 Technical details of the influence of such factors will not be investigated 
any further in this chapter. It should be noted, however, that economic welfare 
implications of regional integration cannot be demonstrated by simple Vinerian trade 
																																																								
59 (Meade, 1955), pp. 44-53; (Lipsey, 1960), pp. 499-503. 
137 
 
creation and diversion calculation. 60  Nevertheless, at least three matters may be 
considered to inform understanding of the general pattern of welfare implications of 
most RTAs; these are (i) intra-regional welfare transfers and re-distributions, (ii) 
internal and external comparative advantages, and (iii) agglomeration effects. These 
three points will be briefly explained in the following.    
 
Intra-regional Welfare Transfers and Re-Distribution 
A factor relevant to most RTAs that lead to trade diversion is intra-regional welfare 
transfers. As can be seen from Figures 3 and 4 above, trade diversions increase internal 
trade within a regional bloc only at the expense of trade with more efficient suppliers 
from outside the regional bloc. This means trade diversion normally increases the 
wealth of the exporting member state always at the expense of its importing regional 
partner. This is because the governmental revenue (i.e. tax revenue) the importing 
member state (home country) loses as a result of a trade diversion will be transferred to 
the suppliers in the exporting member state (regional partner) either in full, or in part (a 
part of the governmental revenue might be transferred to consumers in the importing 
member state). In such cases, when we consider short-term economic implications of 
trade diversions, welfare transfers between member states of an RTA cannot improve 
the welfare of the regional bloc as a whole because the gains accrued to the exporting 
member state cannot be higher than the revenue loss of the importing member state.61 
Long-term economic implications of regional integrations, however, might look 
different from a short-term view, especially on the ground of knowledge transfers 
																																																								
60 (Lipsey, 1957), p. 41. The most commonly used model for assessing the economic welfare implications 
of RTAs is the ‘gravity model’.  Assessments based on this model first identify several variables as 
determinants of trade, and then estimate whether changes in trade between two countries are a result of 
implementing an RTA.  However, identification of trade variables and making assumptions on the pattern 
of trade that would occur in the absence of an RTA are among the weaknesses of the gravity model. It is 
noted that often the gravity equations cannot control all factors determining trade flows. An alternative 
model is ‘computable equilibrium studies’ which enable researchers to construct a full economic model of 
the economies under consideration in great microeconomic detail, and then stimulate the effects of policy 
changes associated with an RTA.  Reportedly, computable equilibrium studies generally suffer from 
complexity of data, and therefore fail in making rigorous economic estimations. On the two models of 
welfare assessments, see (Shirley & Walsh, 2000), pp. 44-9. 
61 However, there might be some situations where a trade diverting customs union nevertheless leads to 
welfare gains [e.g. when the home country allows substitution of consumption or when the supply 
elasticity in the home country is positive but finite); see (Panagariya, 2000), p. 293 and (Bhagwati, 
1971)].   
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between member states (or from non-members),62 decreased x-inefficiencies, scale 
economies,63 and/or specialisation in production and services within a regional bloc.  
Intra-regional welfare transfers often constitute a serious obstacle to the stability of 
regional integration. This is especially the case when the governmental budget of one or 
more member states is heavily reliant on trade revenue. Dependency of governments on 
trade revenue is a common practice in many developing countries. There is some 
evidence that in some developing countries trade revenue from imported products may 
constitute as much as one-half of the entire governmental budget.64   
 
Internal and external comparative advantage: 
The above discussion on trade creation and trade diversion is useful to understanding 
the various dynamics that may influence welfare implications of RTAs. However, such 
Vinerian analyses are not very informative of the general pattern of the distribution of 
gains and losses among member states of an RTA. Venables (1999)65 discovered that 
distribution of gains and losses among member states of a customs union is determined 
by the comparative advantages of each member state relative to other member states as 
well as the ROW.  
The main focus of Venables (1999) is welfare gains and losses for individual countries, 
rather than regional blocs as a whole. He demonstrates that countries with comparative 
advantage closer to that of the world average can gain more from entering into an RTA 
than countries with more extreme advantages.66 The starting point of Venebles (1999) is 
the potential for trade diversion as a result of different domestic factor endowments of 
member states of a customs union. Different endowments, or in other words different 
comparative advantages, of countries in manufactures may be a function of various 
factors, such as the level of technological development, geographical location or 
institutional traditions.67 As explained above, due to these comparative advantages 
(which reflect prices and demand), elimination of trade barriers in RTAs often creates 
intra-regional and extra-regional trade flows. On the assumption that the necessary data 
																																																								
62 See Section 4.3.4 below. 
63 See Section 4.3.2 below. 
64 (World Bank, 2000), p. 44. 
65 See, (Anthony J.  Venables, 1999). A revised version of the analysis in this paper can be found in 
(Anthony J Venables, 2003) which reaffirms the conclusions of the former.  
66 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 55-7. 
67(Anthony J.  Venables, 1999), p. 4. 
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on comparative advantages of the countries are available, Venables establishes that if a 
country has an endowment like that of the world average, there will be less scope for 
diversion.68 This is because such a country would conduct little trade with the ROW 
even before the regional integration, and therefore the amount of trade that might be 
diverted as a result of an RTA will be small. In line with this, if a country with an 
endowment close to that of the world average enters into an RTA with a country with a 
very different endowment, then the scope for trade creation would be the highest.69 In 
addition, Venables demonstrates that countries with ‘extreme’ endowments relative to 
the world average are most likely to suffer a welfare loss.70 Therefore Venable’s first 
general conclusion concerning customs unions is that ‘countries with “extreme” 
comparative advantage do worse than those with comparative advantage intermediate 
between partner and the ROW.’71 Moreover, Venables systematically ties comparative 
advantage to per capita incomes of member states, and draws a second general 
conclusion that customs unions between countries with above world-average 
endowments tend to cause convergence between the incomes of member states, whereas 
customs unions between countries below world-average endowments tend to cause 
divergence between the incomes of member states.      
Accordingly, considering endowment of capital per worker, both Kenya and Uganda are 
below the world average, but Uganda has more extreme endowment. By contrast, both 
France and Spain are above world average, but France has more extreme endowment. 
The first regional integration is likely to lead to trade diversion from Uganda to Kenya 
due to the higher endowments of the latter. From the perspective of factor endowments, 
this can be explained by the availability of more or better skilled workers -and better 
trade conditions- in Kenya than in Uganda. If so, the resulting trade diversion will boost 
Kenya’s net income to an amount that is closer to that of the world average. On the 
other side, Uganda, which had a lower net income level initially, will suffer further 
welfare loss. Consequently the customs union will lead to a divergence between the net 
incomes of the respective countries. By contrast, a customs union between France and 
Spain is more likely to create trade diversion from the richer member state, France, to 
its poorer regional partner, Spain. As a result the customs union is more likely to lead to 
																																																								
68 Ibid. pp, 8-10. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 (Anthony J Venables, 2003), p. 759. 
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a convergence between the incomes of the respective countries. Trade diversion in the 
second case is based on the lower cost of labour (and possibly also land and other factor 
endowments) in Spain than that in France.  
 
Figure 6: Convergence and divergence of real incomes  
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Source: Replicated from World Bank (2000) - which is based on Venables (1999)72 
 
The above conclusions of Venables can also be observed in some real-world RTAs. For 
instance, Ireland, Spain and Portugal experienced significant growth in their per capita 
incomes following their accession to the EU.73 By contrast, in the ECOWAS, although 
the regional integration increased the combined share of Ivory Coast and Senegal in 
manufacturing, Ivory Coast’s income lead was narrowed.74    
																																																								
72 Originally (Anthony J.  Venables, 1999) refers to a customs union agreement between France and 
Portugal rather than France and Spain, but the remaining assumptions and conclusions are identical with 
the above.  
73 (Anthony J Venables, 2003) finds that ‘whereas in the mid-1980s [Ireland, Spain and Portugal’s] per 
capita incomes were, respectively, 64%, 67% and 57% of the income of the large EU countries, by the 





In addition, a regional integration between two countries, one with endowments above 
that of the world average, and the other below that of the world average, is likely to 
benefit both parties as in each case comparative advantage relative to the partner and the 
world average push in the same direction.75 It is suggested that benefits from such 
agreements can be particularly high for the lower-wage member state.76 The positive 
effect of NAFTA, in particular to Mexico, can be cited as an example.77 
In light of the above, the comparative advantage theory also suggests that RTAs 
between low-income countries are more likely to benefit richer member states at the 
expense of poorer, and therefore increase regional inequalities (i.e. divergence). On the 
other hand, RTAs between low-income and high-income countries are more likely to be 
mutually beneficial and lead to a convergence.  
 
Agglomeration: 
A further danger of trade diversion that is particularly relevant to developing countries 
is relocation of economic activity to a few centres within a regional bloc. This is called 
agglomeration. Economic centres in regional blocs typically arise from the interaction 
of centripetal and centrifugal forces.78  
Centripetal forces are factors that lead firms to locate close to each other; centrifugal, to 
spread out. According to the usual classification, centripetal forces are a function of 
three factors.79 Firstly, knowledge spillovers or other technological externalities may 
lead to clusters of firms, as this may make diffusion of new technological development 
among competitors easier.80 Secondly, regional economic centres may lead to labour 
market-pooling effects which would then make skilled workers readily available to 
firms, and may increase competition. Lastly, linkages between buyers and sellers may 
also favour formation of economic centres since, if all other things are equal, sellers 
would normally like to locate closer to their consumers and vice versa.81 On the other 
hand, centrifugal forces may be relevant to congestion, pollution, dispersed consumers, 
																																																								
75 (World Bank, 2000), p. 56;(Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 56-7. 
76 Ibid. (Anthony J Venables, 2003), p. 759. 
77 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 56-7. Elsewhere it is confirmed that NAFTA has had a positive influence 
on the Mexican economy; however, the agreement alone is found insufficient to ensuring economic 
convergence between the NAFTA states; see (Lederman, Maloney, & Serven, 2003). 
78 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 137-8. 
79 (Marshall, 1920) as cited in (World Bank, 2000), pp. 56-9. 
80 See Section 4.3.4 below. 
81 (World Bank, 2000), pp. 56-9. 
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and negative externalities of concentration such as increased price of labour, land or 
other immobile inputs.82  
Agglomeration may occur at an aggregate level or may be much more narrowly 
focussed, depending on the characteristics of a production process or industry, as well 
as the specific conditions of a certain geographical area.83 RTAs may strengthen 
centrifugal forces by opening markets and stimulating trade flow. Depending on the 
level of economic integration, RTAs may also facilitate re-allocation of labour and other 
economic factors such as financial resources and services, and therefore speed 
agglomeration.  
When agglomeration occurs in relatively small sectors spread across member states of a 
regional bloc, it might increase allocative efficiency and not lead to wealth inequalities 
between the member states. In other words, depending on domestic factor endowments, 
each member state might be specialised in the sector(s) in which it has the highest 
comparative advantage. By contrast, when domestic factor endowments of member 
states are heavily imbalanced, or when some parties suffer from under-developed 
infrastructure and/or under-developed financial and other business services, 
accumulation may take place on larger scales, leading various industries’ being 
relocated only in few economic centres in the more-favoured member states. This would 
then mean trade diversion from less-favoured member states to their more advantaged 
regional partners. Likewise, when manufacturing in a regional bloc as a whole 
constitutes only a small share of the regional economy agglomeration will be more 
likely, since the relocation of businesses in a few economic centres would then not 
create substantial costs or supply constraints for the investors.84       
Thus RTAs between under-developed countries are more likely to lead to agglomeration 
in the territory of the more developed member state of the region. In the long term, 
however, agglomeration might be partly reversed across a regional bloc depending on, 
among other things, (i) the extent to which restrictions to intra-regional trade are 
abolished, (ii) facilitation of free movement of ‘factors’, and (iii) the development of 
intra-regional transport links and other infrastructure.85 In a healthy regionalisation 
process the price of land and labour would eventually increase in economic centres, 
																																																								
82 Ibid. (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 138. 
83 Ibid. 
84 (World Bank, 2000), 58. 
85 See, (Krugman & Venables, 1995), pp. 860-2. 
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which would in turn make the low-cost production opportunities at the periphery more 
desirable to businesses. The spread of an industrial movement from economic centres to 
the periphery, however, is conditional on the existence of well-established physical 
(hard) infrastructure (e.g. transport, electricity, telecommunication networks) and soft 
infrastructure (e.g. adequate social policies, laws, institutions), as well as supportive 
industrial policies. From this perspective a deep RTA which is likely to lead to 
agglomeration in one or a few more-favoured member state(s) in the initial period might 
be desirable as creating new trade in (and net investment to) the regional bloc on the 
condition that the RTA and subsequent (regional as well as national) policies are 
designed to support the gradual spread of industrial movement and services to the 
periphery.  
 
Intra-regional welfare transfers, combined with agglomeration and more generally with 
the disproportionate benefits member states of an RTA may get due to different factor 
endowments, might constitute a threat to economic and political stability of regional 
integration. The above sections show that regional integration does not necessarily bring 
economic benefits to all participating jurisdictions. In line with the balance of the 
national factor endowments of member states and the supplementary regional and 
national policies, an RTA may fail to improve the economic condition of member states, 
or even worse, may increase intra-regional economic inequalities through divergence. In 
this regard a recent examination of per capita GDPs in WAEMU member states has 
shown that ‘the countries that were the richest in 1990—Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and 
Benin—remained so and experienced respective growth in income. [By contrast], the 
economically weak countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Togo stagnated or fell 
behind.’ 86 As a result the average income gap between the two groups was increased by 
56% between 1990 and 2007.87 Arguably the regional integration between the parties 
played a significant role in the increased divergence.   
Even if an RTA is welfare-increasing for all member states, the differences between 
benefits accrued to member states can lead to political conflict which may threaten the 
future of the regional integration. The EAC and the CACM can be cited as examples of 
																																																								




regional integration that suffered heavily from inequalities in economic benefits accrued 
to member states.88  
As was the case with the EAC member states of an RTA may agree to mitigate regional 
inequalities by direct re-distribution of wealth within a regional bloc. A contemporary 
example of an RTA which envisages direct re-distribution is the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). SACU member states implement a controversial revenue-
sharing formula for re-distribution according to which regional customs and exercise 
revenues are first pooled and then re-distributed among the member states on the basis 
of their intra-SACU trade share.89 However, such direct re-distribution mechanisms are 
economically problematic as they fail to recognise wider benefits of regional integration 
in the long-term, and instead focus on direct, obvious and immediately accrued 
benefits.90 In addition, compensation has to be paid out of the public revenue of the 
member states that receive higher benefits despite the actual benefit of trade flows’ 
accruing to the private sector which may be partly foreign owned.91 In order to address 
such drawbacks of re-distribution developing countries might be advised to reduce their 
dependency on trade revenues by creating alternative revenue sources (e.g. VAT), and 
also to reduce external barriers to trade, minimising trade diversion and improving 
productive efficiencies.92 
It may fairly be concluded that regional integration may create new trade and become a 
significant factor in facilitating economic growth. However, this positive economic 
outcome is far from definite. Independent jurisdictions must carefully assess their 
current and prospective share in the global trade, the parties with whom they are 
entering into an RTA, terms of the integration agreement, and complementary economic 
and non-economic policies aimed at reducing intra-regional inequalities. The above 
discussion suggests that rigorous ex-ante estimations on the welfare implications of an 
RTA might not always be possible.  
																																																								
88 See, Section 4.5.1 below. 
89 For the details of the SACU revenue sharing mechanism see Part 7 of the 2002 SACU Agreement. See 
also (Flatters & Stern, 2005), pp. 1-4. Due to disagreements between the SACU member states on their 
shares in intra-regional trade the union is currently working on the revision of the existing revenue 
sharing mechanism; see, (SACU, 2011).  
90 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 79-80. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. However, for SACU region, (Basdevant, Benicio, & Yakhshilikov, 2012) argues that direct 
redistribution, if carefully designed, can be very effective in reducing regional inequalities. 
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The following subsections will review further economic factors that might encourage 
countries to conclude RTAs. It will be seen that the other economic factors may also 
add to uncertainty about accruing benefits from trade flows created by a regional 
economic integration.   
 
4.3.2 Economies of scale and scope  
As noted above, the main function of all levels of RTAs is to eliminate barriers to intra-
regional trade between member states. This means regional integration increases the 
size of the market that local firms of member states can freely access. From the 
perspective of businesses free access to bigger markets means more customers, and 
accordingly the opportunity to increase production and sales. This may improve 
productive efficiencies. Elimination of barriers to regional trade may also mean 
increased competition in regional markets.  
The term ‘economies of scale’ may be defined as lowering average costs by increasing 
scale (i.e. total quantity) of production. The term ‘economies of scope’ may be defined 
as lowering average costs by increasing the scope of production (i.e. by producing two 
or more different -though usually close products). Because regional integration 
increases the size of the ‘free market’, companies can serve a bigger customer group 
and accordingly may be able to secure more efficient levels of production. 
Achieving economies of scale and scope might be crucial to economic growth in 
developing countries. Like other small economies, developing countries are more likely 
to suffer from insufficient domestic demand for manufacturing on efficient scales. 
Inefficient production may in turn result in concentrated markets and low international 
competitiveness of local firms.  
The literature suggests that economically integrated markets may create four positive 
economic outcomes that are particularly relevant to small economies.93 Firstly, the 
growth of markets may increase the level of competition, thus help reducing 













Figure 7:  Average cost of production & economies of scale 
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Figure 7 above shows average cost curves for two industries. Economies of scale would 
be achieved in the first diagram until Qm, and in the second diagram until Q2. In the 
first diagram we see that the average production cost meets demand curve at the lowest 
cost of production point (represented by [x]). This means in such a market only one 
single firm can operate at the minimum cost. In other words the market has a tendency 
to monopolistic structure. In the second figure, which represents a relatively large 
industry, the production cost is at its minimum between Q1 and Q2. However, if the 
demand curve meets the average cost curve at point [a], then there would be only one 
firm that can operate at maximum cost efficiency. However, expansion of demand to a 
degree that meets the average cost curve somewhere in-between [a] and [b] would open 
the market to greater competition by giving an option to the firms to compete with each 
other while operating in a cost efficient manner. In this respect regional integration and 
expansion of markets can be useful in reducing monopolistic behaviour by introducing 
more competition.  
Secondly, following the first point above, expansion of markets may allow small 
economies to increase their productivity levels. As noted above, regional integration 
means greater demand for companies operating in member states as a result of which 
they will be able to produce at more efficient levels (of scale and scope) which would in 
turn make domestic industries more competitive.94 
Thirdly, increase in demand may reduce x-inefficiencies by increasing competition in 
the markets. X-inefficiencies, or in other words ‘internal inefficiencies’, occur where 
the possession of high market power reduces the incentives of firms to operate more 
																																																								
94 (Cooke & Elliott, 1999), pp. 24-5. 
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efficiently.95 In this regard, due to the absence of competitive pressure in the market, 
firms may not strain to increase their efficiency by better managerial arrangements or by 
reducing the costs, investing in innovation, etc. As a result of small demand market 
concentration and x-inefficiencies are more common in small than in advanced 
economies. Therefore potential gains from elimination of x-inefficiencies may be 
greater for small than for advanced economies. 
Lastly, expansion of markets may increase the range and variety of production, which 
may in turn enhance consumer choice.  
However, in the economic literature these benefits of economies of scale and scope are 
mainly attributed to the trade liberalisation effect of regional integration, rather than 
regional integration itself. There is some evidence of increase in efficiencies as a result 
of unilateral liberalisation of trade, whereas evidence of the relationship between 
regional integration and efficiency is arguably more vague.96   
 
4.3.3  Attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs) and gaining credibility97 
Governments as well as local businesses of many developing countries struggle to 
realise the large investments necessary to improving infrastructure and trade in their 
respective territories. Foreign investment may help funding certain key projects, trigger 
competition in markets and thereby play a crucial role in promoting economic growth in 
developing countries.  
Creation of larger markets and increased competition as a result of regional integration 
may stimulate FDI. Broadly speaking, regional integration is attractive to foreign 
investors because the larger the market, the greater the possible economic gains. 
However, foreign investment is always conditional on the presence of an adequately 
safe investment environment which primarily requires, among other things, adequate 
property rights protection as well as banking, trade and investments regulation, and a 
well-working administrative system.98 If a foreign investor had previously suffered 
financial loss in a country as a result of sudden tariff changes, tax increases or 
																																																								
95 (Motta, 2004), p. 47-8. 
96 See (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 51-4, and (World Bank, 2000), p. 31-2 and the references therein. 
97 As a related issue, Sub-Section 4.4.4 below concerns regionalisation of countries to lock in domestic 
reforms. 
98 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 101-22. 
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expropriation, he would approach that country with great caution.99 Consequently FDI 
depends crucially on the credibility of the receiving country in its intention and ability 
to pursue liberal economic policies.  
Regional integration may serve to increase the credibility of a country by adopting 
binding commitment mechanisms as the guarantee of that country’s pursuance of liberal 
economic policies and protection of the trade environment. In particular, regional 
integration between developed and developing countries, where member states can 
directly punish one another for infringement of regional rules (the so called ‘club 
rules’), adds important credibility to the governments of the developing member 
state.100    
An empirical study by te Velde and Bezemer reconfirms that being a member of a 
regional bloc increases extra-regional FDI inflows.101 The authors, however, also 
demonstrated that not all RTAs lead to the same amount of FDI inflow, and likewise not 
all member states of a regional bloc gets the same amount of FDI inflow.102 The factors 
that might affect the amount of FDI inflow into a member state of a regional bloc 
include, among others, (i) the presence of an adequate investment environment, (ii) the 
relative size of a member state in the regional bloc (when all other things being equal, 
larger member states might attract more FDI), and (iii) the closeness of a member state 
to the largest economy in the region (the closer the better).103 With respect to adequate 
investment environment, te Velde and Bezemer suggest that the presence of greater 
regulation of investment and/or trade may significantly increase investment inflow – by 
about 41% to 123% on average.104  
In addition to the above, FDI may be the key source of new technology, particularly in 




99 Ibid. 107. 
100 (Matthews, 2003); see also, (Lloyd, 2002), p. 1284. 
101 The study examines the UK’s and the US’s FDI in developing countries over the period between 1980 
and 2001. With respect to the NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN, ANDEAN, SADC, and 
COMESA regions, the authors note that ‘the real stock of FDI is on average 68% higher if countries 
become a member of one of the seven regions identified above’; (Te Velde & Bezemer, 2004), p. 22. 
102 Ibid., p. 23. 
103 This is because, when all other things are equal, investors like to be close to the source of greatest 




4.3.4  Knowledge transfers due to regional integration 
Hoekman and Javorcik (2006) recognise that ‘international technology diffusion’ can 
occur at least through three channels: (i) trade in goods and services, (ii) FDI or the 
pursuit of project-specific joint ventures, and (iii) direct knowledge transfers through 
technology purchases or licensing. 105  Trade in goods and services may increase 
productive efficiency when imports are used as an input in production.106 Moreover, use 
of new technologies may spread when exporter firms are supplied with technical 
knowledge on product design and production techniques by knowledgeable buyers.107 
Secondly, FDI often leads to transfer of knowledge though management of local 
subsidiaries, through direct use of new technologies in the host jurisdiction, or through 
establishment of joint ventures for specific projects or R&D. With respect to technology 
transfers through both trade and FDIs, once knowledge is transferred to a firm by a 
transnational partner, it may further spill over to other firms operating in the same 
industry in the host country via ‘demonstration effects, labour turnover, mutual input 
suppliers, or reverse engineering.’108 Lastly, knowledge can be acquired by direct 
payment through licensing or other purchases. 
As seen in previous sections, an RTA may create new trade between its member states 
due to elimination of barriers to intra-regional trade. In addition, there is some evidence 
that formation of a regional bloc may increase the volume of trade of member states 
with non-member jurisdictions.109 While an increase in trade is inevitably dependent on 
numerous factors such as the size of an economy, per-capita income, existing 
infrastructure, geographical position, and connectedness to world markets, trade 
liberalisation is likely to promote trade, and thereby facilitate economic growth. 
Similarly, as shown in the previous sub-section, regional integration may attract FDI 
and increase commercial activity across the relevant region. To the extent that an RTA 
leads to increased cross-border commerce it can stimulate international technology 
transfers.  
																																																								




109 This may be a result of decreased x-inefficiencies or the achievement of scale economies as a result of 
regional integration. See also (Te Velde & Bezemer, 2004), p. 22. 
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Increased trade and FDI are among the key factors that facilitate the use of new 
technologies, especially in small economies.110 Ensuring openness of an economy into 
those countries that hold largest technological knowledge stocks could be desirable for 
maximising technology diffusion.111 Developed countries tend to use more superior 
technology in production and undertake more R&D than do developing nations. For this 
reason one might conclude that a developing country would benefit from international 
technology diffusion significantly more if it establishes strong trade ties with developed 
countries rather than with other developing countries. Knowledge diffusion, however, is 
primarily dependent on the host county’s absorptive capacity. Trade liberalisation 
should ideally be accompanied by complementary public policies. Relevant 
complementary policies might include, among other things, education reform, R&D 
initiatives, and amendments to intellectual property legislation. Countries with a weak 
education system, in particular, might struggle with dissemination of new technology, 
as these might not be understood by local investors/workers in full. Coe, Helpman, and 
Hossmaister (2009) suggest that ‘countries where it is relatively easy to do business’ 
and ‘countries where the quality of tertiary education systems is relatively high’ tend to 
benefit more from their own R&D efforts, from international R&D spillovers, and from 
human capital formation.112 The estimates of authors also confirm the positive effect of 
strong patent protection on R&D spillovers.113 Nevertheless, when the institutional 
arrangements in a developing country allow the transfer of new technologies, that 
country might be better off in terms of achieving larger R&D spillovers by entering into 
deep RTAs with developed countries. That said, market access to firms from countries 
that hold largest technological knowledge stocks can also be provided through unilateral 
trade liberalisation or separate bilateral preferential trade agreements.  
 
4.3.5 Better trade preferences as a result of increased bargaining power  
Countries forming a regional bloc may prefer to represent themselves jointly, as a 
region, in international trade negotiation. This is because, when all other things are 
equal, a large geographical market will always have higher trade potential than a 
																																																								
110 (B. Hoekman & Javorcik, 2006); (World Bank, 2000), pp. 59-60; (Cooke & Elliott, 1999), pp. 24-5. 
111 (World Bank, 2000), pp. 60-1. See also, (Coe & Helpman, 1995), (Coe, Helpman, & Hoffmaister, 
1997), (Coe, Helpman, & Hoffmaister, 2009), (B. Hoekman & Javorcik, 2006). 




smaller geographical market. As a result, in the eyes of the third jurisdictions, the 
negotiating leverage of a regional bloc as a whole could be higher than the negotiating 
leverage of each member state individually.  
Alternatively, individual members of a regional bloc may communicate their 
preferences to each other prior to actual negotiation, and agree to vote in favour of one 
another’s preferred areas. This alternative mechanism is called ‘logrolling’, which may 
be defined as the policy of ‘I’ll vote for your issue if you vote for mine’.114 However, if 
member states of an RTA pursue numerous diversified and/or conflicting interests, then 
collective action might not be possible. Likewise, collective action in international 
negotiation might get harder as the number of the member states of an RTA increases.   
Collective action may help members of an RTA to obtain better preferential trade 
conditions (e.g. greater tariff reductions) from their external trading partners. However, 
superiority in trade negotiation also depends on the economic power of the counter side 
of the discussion. Therefore the influence of the joint representation or collective action 
of several developing countries before advanced economies might bring about only 
limited bargaining power due to the gap between the economic sizes of the parties.115   
 
Section 4.4 Factors to Consider in Increasing Economic Gains from 
Regional Integration 
Despite the complexity of assessments of trade flows, there are a few points of general 
application which may help increase welfare gains of individual states from RTAs.116 
These are listed below. The accuracy of inferences below, however, is contingent upon 
product substitution and demand patterns in a given regional bloc. 
The first and the most commonly acknowledged rule of thumb is to minimise trade 
diversion by unilaterally reducing external barriers to trade. As noted above, trade 
diversion occurs when there is a trade flow from a more efficient ROW supplier to a 
less efficient regional partner due to the trade preference the RTA provides to the 
latter.117 Accordingly, trade diversion cannot take place when (a) there is not any more 
																																																								
114 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 204. 
115 (Matthews, 2003). 
116 See, inter alia, (B. M. Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001), p. 479; (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 261-6; 
(Matthews, 2003); (B. Hoekman, Schiff, & Goto, 2002), p. 21-2; (Inotai, 1991), p. 7; (Langhammer & 
Hiemenz, 1990),  pp. 59-68; and (Meade, 1955), pp. 107-15. 
117 See the Case Study 2 above. 
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efficient ROW supplier (which implies that the regional firms are the most efficient 
suppliers globally even prior to the RTA), or (b) there is no trade barrier to imports from 
the most efficient ROW supplier. Although the former case avoids trade diversion, it 
implies that the parties to the RTA are already globally competitive, so that the potential 
gains from the RTA will be relatively low. High international competitiveness might 
not be easy to achieve for most developing countries. Elimination or reduction of most 
barriers to external trade, on the other hand, is often at the discretion of the national 
governments. An RTA would be less prone to trade diversion the lower the external 
tariffs of its member states. In the absence of external tariffs there will be no trade 
diversion.  
Although trade diversion leads to economic losses for the host member state (as well as 
for the ROW), it might still be a suitable policy for the protection of the infant 
industries of a regional bloc. Accordingly, member states of an RTA may initially keep 
external trade barriers high in order to protect their domestic firms operating in certain 
strategic sectors from international competition. As a result of high external tariffs 
and/or other direct or indirect subsidies, local firms operating in the respective 
industries may eventually grow and gain international competitiveness. This would give 
member states an export capacity in the long term. Comparative advantages of all 
member states of an RTA need to be considered prior to the implementation of a 
protectionist measure at the regional level. In this regard, various factors such as (i) 
international efficiency of local production in a regional bloc, (ii) transport networks 
and other infrastructure, (iii) the size of internal demand (relative to global demand), 
and (iv) any foreign input that is required for local production in the region need to be 
calculated. Extreme protectionist measures with high external trade barriers may reduce 
the average welfare of a regional bloc, rather than strengthen infant industries, as was 
the experience of developing countries in 1960s and 1970s. 118  Although some 
protection might be economically desirable for certain strategic sectors within a regional 
bloc, the decision on which sectors should be protected initially is politically difficult 
for all governments. To achieve efficient production and international competitiveness 
in the long-term, tariff preferences, subsidies and protectionist measures should be 
removed gradually once the protected industries become operational. At that time the 
reversal of protectionist policies may be another political challenge for both national 
																																																								
118 See the explanations on closed regionalism under Section 4.2.2 above. 
153 
 
and regional governments. For instance, gradual reduction of common external tariffs in 
the CACM (Central American Common Market) faced the successful resistance of ‘the 
new class of import-substitution industrialists’ in late 1960s.119   
Secondly, gains from trade creation might be more likely if the volume of intra-regional 
trade is high and extra-regional trade is low prior to regional integration. Accordingly, a 
low level of imports from outside a regional bloc prior to integration represents less 
dependency of production in member states on external sources.120   Less dependency 
on imports will mean that the regional bloc is less prone to trade diversion since it meets 
the domestic demand internally in a cost-efficient way even before the regional 
integration. High volumes of intra-regional trade will be the case if union partners are 
producing at higher efficiency levels than the ROW. In other words, if regional partners 
are among the most cost-efficient suppliers of commodities that are traded within the 
region, gains from regional integration will be more likely. However, in this case 
additional gains from product specialisation as a result of regional integration might be 
relatively small, as the agreement would have a more limited effect on trade flows. 
Furthermore, in practice, deep RTAs are typically entered into between neighbouring 
countries, although they are not necessarily formed between countries that are already 
major trading partners.121  
Thirdly, similar to the second point above, gains from trade creation may increase if 
member states produce complementary products. This might be the case as a result of 
more efficient allocation of resources which may lead to inter-industry specification 
across the region in the long term. However, specialisation within a regional bloc is 
dependent on factor endowments as well as industrial development capacities of 
member states.  
Fourthly, the greater the share of member states in the world’s production, 
consumption, and trade, the higher is the likelihood that regional integration will lead to 
welfare gains. This argument has a parallel logic with scale and scope economies. A 
larger market may help firms operating in member states to reach efficiency in 
production or to gain increased buyer power in extra-regional trade negotiations. These 
may in turn increase the economic benefits accrued to member states. By contrast, if 
																																																								
119 (J. W. Fox, 2004), pp. 5-6. 
120 However, this conclusion would not be applicable if the pre-regional-integration imports from third 
countries were low due to the inability of the parties to afford production. 
121 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 35-6. 
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member states already control a large share of the world trade this is presumably a result 
of the existing ‘comparative advantage’ that member states have in international 
markets. In the latter case the effect of regionalisation in increasing efficiencies and 
accruing gains from regional specialisation might be small. 
Fifthly, the higher the pre-RTA tariffs among member states, the higher the gains from 
the elimination of these tariffs by the RTA. 
Sixthly, regional integration between two small developing countries is more likely to 
lead to trade diversion than trade creation.122 Developing countries are usually small 
economies. As a result of small size, total supply in a regional bloc formed by 
developing countries may not meet the regional demand. In this case developing 
countries would continue to import some input from the ROW after regional 
integration. As a typical small economy cannot influence the price of goods in 
international markets, the domestic price will continue to be fixed at the world price 
plus import tariff.123 In that case regional integration would not change internal demand 
within the region, but trade diversion may increase the cost of production within the 
region due to the trade flow from cheaper ROW producers to more expensive partner 
imports.124 As a result the RTA would lead a loss for both countries and the ROW.125  
In the light of the previous point, some argue the superiority of RTAs between 
developing and developed countries to RTAs between developing countries only.126 By 
contrast, Shams (2003) argues that regional integration of developing countries is by no 
means inferior to that of developed and developing countries with respect to their 
economic gains potential. He, however, notes that the main obstacle to RTAs between 
developing countries is the wrong economic policies applied across the regions or in 
certain member countries.127 In line with the above, regional integration of developing 
countries is further criticised for preventing them from establishing strong trade ties 
with economically more advanced developed countries. Moreover, regional integration 
																																																								
122 Ibid. 
123 See around Figure 4 above. 
124 In this case economic loss will be the immediate effect of trade diversion for the importing member 
state and the ROW. For the exporting member state short-term economic gains from trade diversion 
might increase the efficiency of production. In the long term, however, barriers to external trade might 
lead to an increase in x-inefficiencies and therefore bring about economic losses. See also, (Schiff & 
Winters, 2003), p. 36. 
125 Ibid.  
126 See ibid., pp. 35-6; (Matthews, 2003), (B. Hoekman et al., 2002), p 9. 
127 (Shams, 2003), p. 2. 
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with advanced economies may ensure developing countries’ access to bigger markets 
and better sources of trade, and may increase technology spillovers from advanced 
economies to developing countries. However, such disadvantages may partly be 
overcome when developing countries enter into bilateral or multilateral RTAs with 
advanced economies in parallel with (deep) RTAs with other developing countries. 
Seventhly, the loss of governmental tax revenue as a result of trade diversion might be 
critical, in particular for less developed countries. As shown above, tariff reductions 
under an RTA often lead to wealth transfers among member states. Since many 
developing countries are dependent on trade revenues for their public expenditure, the 
immediate wealth loss suffered as a result of trade diversion might not be tolerable for 
the domestic economy of such member states.128 In order to cope with the revenue 
losses resulting from regional integration member states may seek to adopt alternative 
sources of governmental revenue prior to entering into an RTA.129 In the absence of 
such mechanisms deep RTAs between developing countries in particular may reduce 
the wealth of relatively poorer member states (thus lead to divergence), and may create 
political tensions that may endanger the sustainability of regional integration. This 
problem is more acute with deep RTAs that establish monetary union, since this leaves 
the national governments of member states with even fewer instruments with which to 
manage their domestic economies.  
Eighthly, countries should consider potentially significant transaction costs arising from 
the operation of regional integration. Discriminatory application of trade preferences 
under an RTA is often managed by the implementation of the ‘rules of origin’ criterion. 
However, the exact rules for determination of the country of origin vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In this regard, discriminatory preferences often make 
international trade more complex and costly for all relevant jurisdictions.  
Lastly, deep economic integration involves not only the abolition of tariffs and custom 
duties but also elimination of non-tariff barriers, mainly through harmonisation.130 
																																																								
128 (World Bank, 2000) notes that ‘some African countries raise as much as one-half of government 
revenues from trade taxes’, p. 44. 
129 Ibid. (Meade, 1953) indicates three methods by which governments secure direct control over trade 
and payments: (i) accommodating finance from the surplus to the deficit countries within a union; (ii) 
deflation of money, income, costs and prices in the deficit regions and their inflation in the surplus 
regions (note that monetary unions are considered a special case); and (iii) variation of rates of exchange 
between the national currencies or union partners; pp. 29-55.  
130 Non-tariff barriers to trade can take various forms. For instance, as a part of its single market 
programme of 1992, the EU implemented five types of measure in order to ensure deep integration. 
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Policy harmonisation within a regional bloc may require, among other things, the 
establishment of new regional institutions, adoption of regional law, and reform of the 
domestic institutions and legislation of member states. Harmonisation, however, is often 
politically difficult and gives rise to significant expense.  
 
Section 4.5 Political Motives for Regional Integration 
The previous section has shown that welfare effects of regional integration strictly 
depend on the volume and dynamics of trade between the parties as well as between 
these and the ROW. Dynamics of the trade in a regional bloc might be affected by 
numerous factors, including changes in demand patterns, new product substitution 
options, changing product portfolios of the parties, internal and external politics, 
economic crisis, and natural disasters. Since the combined effect of such factors is not 
always predictable, the welfare implications of a regional integration are unlikely to be 
projected with full accuracy. Despite this economic uncertainty, there are political 
reasons that encourage sovereign states to enter into RTAs. The main political motives 
for RTAs are examined below. 
 
4.5.1 Intra-regional security concerns  
From the perspective of individual countries, a primary reason for entering into an RTA 
might be the promotion of intra-regional security through the establishment of strong 
economic ties between member states of the region. The link between regionalisation 
and promotion of peace might be explained on at least four grounds.131  
Firstly, an RTA tends to increase cross-border trade within the borders of a region. 
Increased trade within a regional bloc may eventually create an economic 
interdependence between member states, which may in turn reduce the incentives of the 
parties to fight each other. In this regard, independent jurisdictions would have an 
interest in pursuing a stable political relationship with their major trading partners for 
the continuance of their economic transactions. An RTA is likely to lead to economic 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Accordingly, the EU simplified and partly abolished intra-EU border controls, introduced product 
standards, deregulated the transport sectors, encouraged region-wide competition for public procurement 
in member states, and deregulated the service sector including financial services and the right of 
establishment – (World Bank, 2000), p. 35. 
131 (Schiff & Winters, 2003), pp. 189-90. 
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inter-dependence between its member states to the extent that it creates ‘new trade’ 
within the region.  
Secondly, increased cross-border trade within a regional bloc may help to establish 
closer ties and mutual trust between national governments (and possibly between their 
citizens).  Increased intra-regional trade might promote common economic interests of 
the member states. The closer relationship between the parties might facilitate the 
regulation of common economic interests of member states through deeper economic 
integration by the harmonisation of further law and policy.  
Thirdly, increased trade and trust within a regional bloc may improve the access of 
member states to one another’s supplies of strategic raw materials, and thereby reduce 
the threat of trade embargo.  
Fourthly, increased trust and at least partly resolved antagonism within a regional bloc 
might help to cut the national defence expenses of member states, which would in turn 
promote regional peace. Allocation of smaller resources to national security measures 
might be a result of lower conflict risk within the regional bloc and/or common security 
measures taken at the regional level. The resource savings can be used for other public 
interest purposes. 
In light of the above, one may conclude that creating an interdependence between 
member states of a regional bloc may be the guardian of intra-regional security. In the 
literature, Immanuel Kant is suggested as the first philosopher who indicated the 
possibility of establishing ‘perpetual peace’ on the basis of interdependence between 
sovereign nations.132 In his ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay’ (1975), Kant 
suggested that perpetual peace between sovereign nations is capable of establishment 
through an international convention recognising the principle of universal hospitality.133 
For this purpose he proposed the supervision of cooperation between sovereign nations 
at a supra-national level, through the establishment of institutions with supranational 
legislative, executive and judicial authority.134 Kant did not, however, make any specific 
mention of cross-border trade.135 
																																																								
132 (World Bank, 2000), p. 13; (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 189. 
133 (Kant, 1795). 
134 Ibid. To achieve perpetual peace, Kant stipulates the necessity of a set of compulsory measures which 
include  the abolition of national standing armies, the establishment of republican states (i.e. states in 
which the executive and legislative powers are separated) and representative government (since only then 
will the elected serve the people’s welfare rather than satisfy the desires of a leader, an elite or the 
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Intra-regional security concerns were at the forefront in the evolution of European 
integration together with the target of achieving economic growth in the region. The 
ideological architects of the EU, Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, further developed 
Kant’s proposal by suggesting the use of cross-border trade as a tool with which to 
create mutual trust and interdependence between sovereign nations. They considered 
that an economic integration in Europe ‘would make war “materially impossible”, 
meaning that interlocking steel, coal, and other strategic industries would leave 
countries unable to wage war against each other’.136  
According to Hung (2010) similar intra-regional security considerations were made 
concerning the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).137  According to the author, avoidance of pre-integration wars and other 
prolonged internal and external political conflicts was the main motive for the 
promotion of regional integration in the region. Regional conflicts were essentially 
rooted in political, legal and ideological diversity between the countries of the region. 
Due to such conflicts, countries in Southeast Asia needed to spend an important share of 
their national budgets on national security, and eventually became dependant on 
external aid.138 The ASEAN, Hung notes, was established as ‘an organization of non-
communist countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, which came together to cooperate actively towards peace, stability, progress 
and prosperity in the region’.139 
																																																																																																																																																																		
nobility), and having supra-national legislative, executive and judicial powers to reconcile the differences 
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135 In (Kant, 1795) the only reference to trade is as follows: “…as an opposing machine in the antagonism 
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trade as a tool by which to secure peace among nation states, Kant cites his concern at the use of the 
credit system for financing war. He argues that using credit to finance a war will eventually lead to the 
bankruptcy of the lending state, though such bankruptcy may be postponed by such state’s tax revenues 
on industry and commerce. 
136 (World Bank, 2000), p. 13. See also, (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 189 and 195-6. 
137 (Lin, 2010), p. 821-2.  
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Likewise, the promotion of regional peace, in particular that between Brazil and 
Argentina, is reported to be a core political motive for the establishment of the Common 
Southern Market (MERCOSUR).140   
While increased trade might promote trust and peace between member states of an 
RTA, this outcome is not inevitable. Economic dynamics examined in the previous 
section have shown that regional integration necessarily causes trade flow between 
member states. Although trade flows can be manipulated by regional and/or national 
economic policies, in reality, due to the complex dynamics of globalised markets as 
well as the quest for favouring the national interest, distribution of economic gains 
among member states of an RTA is often not balanced. The imbalanced welfare 
implications of a regional integration might raise political tension and create rivalry 
between member states. Political tensions accompanied the early times of the East 
African Community (EAC) can be cited as an example.141 The EAC was originally 
formed between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1967, with an aim of realising far-
reaching economic integration and common infrastructural projects. The parties 
anticipated achieving a customs union, tax harmonisation and monetary union. 
However, the EAC eventually led to welfare transfers to Kenya from the other two 
member states. Since Kenya’s national industries were more developed and the country 
had closer ties with developed economies (Kenya had been enjoying crown colony 
status)142 , the regional integration resulted in industrial agglomeration in Kenya. 
Industrial agglomeration, in turn, prompted welfare transfers between the member 
states. Although the EAC member states tried to enforce regional re-distributive 
measures against the welfare transfers (such as re-regulating intra-regional trade, and 
establishing a ‘Distributable Pool’ for the provision of financial compensation to the 
disadvantaged partners) none of the measures provided a sustainable solution.143 
Regional conflicts led to the dissolution of the EAC in 1977. Nevertheless, on 30 
November 1999, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed a new RTA, the Treaty for 
Establishment of the East African Community, which came into effect on 7 July 2000. 
In 2007 Rwanda and Burundi joined to this new Community. In 2010 the Community 
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established a customs union; and until 2015 they aim to unite under an East African 
Federation.144   
The Central American Common Market (CACM) is another example.145 CACM was 
established in 1960 by the General Treaty on Central American Integration. The 
members of the CACM were Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El 
Salvador. Although the CACM successfully ‘boosted intra-regional trade from 7.8 per 
cent of members’ exports in 1961 to 24.2 per cent in 1968, the two poorest members, 
Nicaragua and Honduras, were dissatisfied with the distribution of benefits.’146 Due to 
the imbalanced distribution of welfare gains from the regional integration and following 
the war between Honduras and El Salvador, Honduras withdrew from the customs 
union and did not join the establishment of the standard commission of the union 
(which aimed to regulate the regular functioning of the meetings) in 1971.147 At a later 
stage, on 13 December 1991, Central American states signed the Tegucigalpa Protocol, 
and formed the Central American Integration System (SICA). SICA is still operating to 
ensure ‘peace, liberty, democracy and development’ in the region.148 
However, besides imbalanced welfare gains from regionalism, pursuance of industrial 
policies based on import substitution were among the reasons that led to the collapse of 
the EAC of 1960s-70s and the CACM of 1960s.149 As noted earlier, when high external 
trade barriers are combined with extensive protectionism, regionalism is likely to result 
in significant trade divergence, in particular in RTAs concluded between developing 
countries. In such regional blocs intra-regional welfare transfers often take place to the 
disadvantage of the poorer member state(s).150 
Considering the centuries-long wars in the Europe’s history and the persistent conflicts 
between the EU member states, in particular between France and Germany, one can 
confidently conclude that protecting intra-regional peace was one of the core motives of 
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the member states of the EU. Concerning the difference between the European 
integration process and the regional blocs founded by developing countries in 1960s-
80s, a World Bank study states that: 
‘The genius of the European Community has not simply that it promoted regional 
integration but that it did so without generating the large transfers that trigger 
conflict.’151 
After a similar statement, Winters (1997) describes this outcome as a result of the 
design of the EU’s internal decision-making procedure and the compromising attitude 
adopted by the member states in internal negotiations.152 A notable exception, however, 
has been the common agricultural policy of the EU.153 As regards the early years of the 
European integration this exception might be explained as a strategic choice of the 
parties aimed at securing agricultural self-sufficiency against a possible risk of embargo 
in the Cold War period.  
Although the European integration did not lead to intolerable income flows within the 
region in its early years, significant gaps have emerged between the economic welfare 
of member states, in particular following the creation of the Eurozone and the Eastern 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. This also indicates the difficulty of making long-term 
projections on the welfare implications of regional integrations due to ever-changing 
economic and political dynamics affecting both national and international product 
markets. 
Nevertheless the above discussion suggests that promotion of intra-regional security is 
among the core political reasons for encouraging sovereign countries to enter into 
RTAs. However, regionalism seem to promote peace between member states of a 
regional bloc only when national political interests of member states show a degree of 
coherence and differences in the distribution of gains from regional integration between 
member states are not intolerably large. 
 
4.5.2 Extra-regional security concerns  
Extra-regional security may also be a major consideration for sovereign jurisdictions 
when entering into an RTA. Typically, extra-regional security concerns play a role 
																																																								
151 (World Bank, 2000), p. 15. A similar comment can be found in (Schiff & Winters, 2003), p. 195. 
152 (Winters, 1997), pp. 895-9. 
153 Ibid. (World Bank, 2000), pp. 15-6. 
162 
 
when a group of countries with small economies face an economic, political and/or 
military threat of a third country which tends to be the dominant economic power in the 
region.  
An RTA can be formed to reduce the economic dependence of member states on a 
regional dominant power, and to improve the international competitiveness of domestic 
industries of member states. For instance, extra-regional security was a key factor in the 
formation of the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The 
SADCC was founded by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania on 
April 1, 1980, and later on Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe joined to it.154 
A primary motive of the member states when forming the SADCC was to reduce their 
economic dependence on the dominant regional power, South Africa.155 Accordingly, 
the SADCC aimed to increase the economic security of the member states.  
Alternatively, extra-regional security concerns may relate to political governance 
conflicts within a regional bloc. Countries may wish to enter into an RTA to combine 
their resources in order to protect the political regime embraced by all member states 
and opposed by third countries.156 The ASEAN is an example of regional blocs in 
which member states were also motivated by common political governance concerns. A 
key objective in the formation of the ASEAN was to strengthen the ASEAN member 
states against the threat of Chinese supported communist insurgencies.157  
Lastly, an RTA may be designed to supress direct external threats to domestic borders 
of member states. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of Gulf (CCASG, a.k.a. 
the Gulf Cooperation Council) is one example of such regional integration. The 
CCASG was formed by the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait on May 25, 1981. The 
CCASG anticipates deep integration of various policies including finance, trade, 
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customs, health, education, tourism and foreign investment in the Arabian Gulf.158 One 
motive driving the CCASG member states at the initial stage of the regional integration 
process was suggested to be strengthening the position of the CCASG member states 
against external threats including ‘Iranian Revolution of 1979, Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the war between Iraq and Iran’.159 
 
4.5.3 New security needs 
In addition to the traditional internal and external security concerns it is suggested in the 
literature that sovereign jurisdictions may enter into deep RTAs in the interest of 
meeting the ‘new security needs’. Damro (2006) explains that these are ‘concerned with 
emerging causes of instability and threats to security, such as environmental damage, 
illegal migration, organised crime, drug smuggling and international terrorism’.160 
New security concerns might have played a role in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) of January 1, 1994 between US, Canada and Mexico. An 
indicator is Article 104 of the NAFTA which directly refers to environmental standards. 
In most cases the reason for including new security provisions in an RTA is to ensure 
coherence of relevant national legislations and harmonise the standards applied by 
member states in relation to respective policy areas. Member states with higher 
standards may request harmonisation of certain cost-generating standards to ensure 
equal access of their domestic firms to the relevant regional markets. In RTAs between 
developed and developing countries in particular, new security provisions often aim to 
align the protection provided in the domestic law of the respective developing countries 
with the level of protection required under the laws of the developed countries of the 
region. For instance, the primary purpose of Article 104 of the NAFTA was to improve 
Mexico’s domestic standards of environmental protection. 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) might be another example of RTAs that 
include provisions related to new security concerns. The FTAA is a long-term project 
that ultimately aims at uniting the economies of thirty-four states in the Americas. The 
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FTAA was initiated by the First Summit of the Americas held in Miami in 1994.161 
Parties to the FTAA pursue regional cooperation in various economic and non-
economic policy areas. In the Sixth Summit of Americas (held at Colombia in 2012) the 
objectives of the regional integration were extended to issues of poverty and natural 
disaster risk reduction, citizen security, infrastructure cooperation, transnational 
organised crime, human development, etc.162 However, so far the regional integration 
process has been slow partly due to a lack of mutual confidence in the FTAA member 
states.  
Like the FTAA, the CARICOM also anticipates regional integration in certain social 
and political spheres besides economic integration. In Article 6 of the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy163, objectives include enhanced cooperation in the advancement 
of social, cultural and technological development, and ‘intensified activities’ concerning 
health, education, transport, telecommunications etc.164  
In relation to the ‘new security needs’, Schiff and Winters (2003) make a narrower case 
and suggest that ‘formation of an RTA is sometimes seen as a means of preventing or 
reducing the spread of civil disturbances or civil war from neighbouring nations or of 
controlling migration flows’.165 The authors explain that rich countries may seek to 
form regional integrations with poorer countries in order to prevent large-scale 
migration flows from the latter. Rich countries may pursue regional integration for the 
purpose of strengthening intra-regional trade and thereby promoting the economic 
wealth of their less developed regional partner(s). However,  given the NAFTA and its 
effects on migration flows between Mexico and the U.S., Schiff and Winters (2003) 
show that regional integration may not reduce migration from poorer to richer member 
states. On the contrary, RTAs may increase the ability of people to emigrate.166    
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Although some RTAs explicitly refer to the so-called new security needs, the weight 
attached to such regional policies relative to more traditional objectives attributed to 
regional integrations (i.e. economic development and internal and external security) is 
likely to be minor. Furthermore, as mentioned above, introducing certain social and 
environmental regional standards might also be explained on economic grounds such as 
the elimination of inequalities in trading conditions across a regional bloc.  
 
4.5.4 Locking-in domestic reforms  
RTAs may oblige member states to comply with a set of common policies and to reform 
their domestic legislation concerning certain economic and non-economic areas. To 
ensure compliance RTAs usually include explicit enforcement and sanctioning 
mechanisms. Due to the pressure regional sanctioning mechanisms put on national 
governments of member states RTAs may prevent the reversal of compulsory domestic 
reforms made in member states upon government change or influential national 
lobbying campaigns.  
Most commitments under an RTA usually concern domestic trade policies of member 
states. A commonly cited example of the lock-in effect of RTAs concerns the domestic 
reforms that took place in Mexico following the conclusion of the NAFTA. As NAFTA 
required liberal trade and finance policies, Mexico made significant reforms to its 
domestic policies in 1990s, and these reformed policies are largely preserved today. 
One reason for the resilience of liberal trade and finance policies imposed upon Mexico 
by NAFTA is the irreplaceable trade advantages Mexico gets from trading with the 
other NAFTA member states. 167  Mexico’s non-compliance with NAFTA might 
endanger its free access to the markets of its historically largest trading partner, the US, 
as well as to the markets of Canada. It might also endanger the occasional financial and 
technical assistance provided to Mexico by the other two NAFTA member states. In 
light of this example one might conclude that long-term compliance with the 
requirements of an RTA may increase in parallel with the significance of gains from the 
respective RTA.  
In order to test the effect of NAFTA on the credibility of Mexico’s liberal trade reforms 
Schiff and Winters (2003) compared the behaviour of Mexico during its 1982 (pre-
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NAFTA) and 1994 (post-NAFTA) debt crises.168 The authors observed that before 
NAFTA, in the 1982 debt crisis, the Mexican government swiftly removed some of its 
then recent liberal reforms and returned to interventionist policies in the management of 
its national economy. These policies in response to the 1982 crisis included 
nationalisation of the banking system, regulation of foreign-exchange controls, adoption 
of a universal regime of import-licensing requirements and interventions in foreign 
investment.169 By the end of the crisis, and in particular after joining the GATT and the 
NAFTA, Mexico again reduced its tariffs and greatly liberalised its trade policies. 
Mexico survived its second big crisis in 1994, though this time without reversing its 
liberal trade policies. Although it raised the tariffs for certain non-NAFTA imports, 
Mexico did not return to protectionist policies to the extent it did during the 1982 crisis. 
At this time, however, Mexico was offered a $15 billion rescue package by the US 
government170 which had surely given an important incentive for preserving its liberal 
trade policies.  
Besides trade-related reforms, RTAs may persuade participating states to adopt reforms 
on core political governance issues such as strengthening democracy and political 
institutions. A prominent example is the ‘democracy commitment’ required from all 
MERCOSUR member states. An explicit rule on democracy was found necessary by 
the MERCOSUR member states following an attack on the fragile democracy in 
Paraguay in 1996. Its democratic regime was threatened by the Paraguayan armed 
forces that wanted to overthrow President Juan Carlos Wasmosy.171 Paraguay’s move 
towards dictatorship was avoided with the help of the explicit opposition of the other 
MERCOSUR member states, particularly of Brazil and Argentina, to a dictatorship.172 
This event led to the adoption of the Presidential Declaration on the Democratic 
Commitment in MERCOSUR, signed by the then four member states of the regional 
bloc (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) on June 25, 1996. The declaration, 
still in force today, rules that adherence to the principles of democracy is a compulsory 
requirement of membership of the MERCOSUR.173 It provides that ‘any change in the 
democratic regime constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the continuation of the 
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process of integration underway with respect to the affected member state.’174 Against 
noncompliance the declaration stipulates a negotiation procedure among member states, 
as well as a range of sanctions, varying from suspension of the right to participate in the 
organs of the various agreements to suspension from MERCOSUR.175 More recently in 
2012 Paraguay was accused of not adhering to its democracy commitment because of 
the allegedly unconstitutional impeachment of then-President Fenando Lugo.176 As a 
result Paraguay was suspended from the MERCOSUR between June 2012 and 
December 2013.177 
As noted above, the ‘lock-in effect’ clearly depends on individual gains of each member 
state from the regional integration, and, on the deterrence level of the commitment 
mechanisms under an RTA. One may fairly conclude that countries would be more 
agreeable to strict commitment mechanisms if economic and political gains from 
regional integration are sufficiently high. Besides, the general attitude of member states 
towards regional integration is crucial. If they treat their commitments under an RTA as 
flexible and lax, then the ‘lock-in effect’ will clearly not work. An example is the 
membership of some sub-Sahara African states to multiple RTAs with conflicting 
policy provisions, and in line with this, their lack of commitment to the regional 
integration processes.178  
RTAs between developed and developing countries may achieve higher compliance 
rates since the developed partner(s) might have the necessary bargaining power to 
persuade the developing regional partner(s) to agree to more strictly defined policy 
commitments and sanctioning mechanisms. The stronger negotiating power of 
developed countries might derive from their superior buying power, investment capital, 
R&D stocks and technology transfer potential. Yet even RTAs between developed and 
developing countries may have flexible policy designs, in particular when intra-regional 
trade levels and other common interests of the parties are not significant.  
On the other hand, a regional integration between a developed and a developing country 
might be valued differently by the two member states. The RTA might greatly increase 
the potential trade gains for the developing partner while its effect might not be so 
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significant from the perspective of the much larger economy of the developed partner. 
In such a case the developing country may still have a greater incentive to comply with 
the RTA.179  
Gaining credibility in international platforms might be an additional reason for 
developing countries to enter into an RTA even when the trade between member states 
is unlikely to generate high economic returns to the developing partner. In the latter case 
the RTA might still be economically desirable since increased international credibility 
might also attract FDI inflows from third party investors.    
Here the question arises whether multilateral organisations, such as the WTO, could 
provide better and stronger commitment mechanisms than that of bilateral or 
multilateral RTAs. Concerning facilitation of international trade, the WTO enforcement 
mechanisms are arguably stronger, and therefore more effective, than those found in 
many regional agreements.180 However, as pointed out by Schiff and Winters (2003), 
any commitment to democracy and political institutions remains simply beyond the 
mandate of the WTO.181 Although the United Nations and some other multinational 
organisations might be able to persuade developing countries to abide by some rules, 
Schiff and Winters indicate that so far these do not include democracy and other 
constraints on political regimes.182   
Although stricter commitment mechanisms under the control of a multinational 
organisation might appear desirable for ensuring compliance, four issues may still be 
problematic. Firstly, big multinational organisations might be more prone to red tape 
due to the number of the cooperating jurisdictions and the vast scope of the policy areas 
they might cover. This may in turn undesirably lengthen the dispute resolution 
processes. Secondly, members of each RTA may desire a different level of flexibility in 
their policy commitments. As noted above, the degree to which a state desires to be 
																																																								
179 (B. Hoekman & Winters, 2009) doubt that RTAs are the main drive behind liberal reforms. According 
to the authors ‘evidence that PTAs drive reform is not compelling. One can more convincingly argue that 
unilateral policy reforms and/or exogenous developments (e.g. technological change) allow commitments 
to be made in the PTA context.’ Ibid., pp. 657-63. 
180 (World Bank, 2000), p. 23. See also, (B. M. Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001), pp. 439-40. From the 
perspective of competition policy, however, the authors suggest that before inclusion of competition 
policy issues on the WTO agenda domestic competition law regimes and institutions need to obtain 
substantial national experience (ibid., pp. 424-34). – Guzman disagrees by arguing that the WTO is the 
most proper forum for negotiating international competition law principles also because of its dispute 
resolution system. See, (Guzman, 2007), pp. 439-41. 




bound by its supra-national commitments is a function of the extent of economic or 
other benefits it expects to get from this international cooperation. As long as a 
multinational organisation is not established in connection to a fairly deep RTA [which 
goes beyond a statement of an intention towards international free trade, and effectively 
reduces trade restrictions in a large area], participating countries might be unwilling to 
be subject to a strong sanctioning mechanism controlled by a multinational institution. 
However, concerns for international reputation and other political dynamics might 
increase the attraction of such commitments to individual jurisdictions. Thirdly, as the 
scope of a multinational cooperation regime (i.e. the number of the participating states) 
increases, the trust between the parties may decrease. This effect relates to less direct or 
less frequent inter-action between the individual parties. Fourthly, when the economic 
gaps between the parties are very large, more advanced jurisdictions might be able to 
exercise disproportionate influence on the operations of the multilateral organisations, 
which might result in under-representation of the economically or otherwise less 
significant jurisdictions.183 Lastly, policy reform requirements and strict commitment 
mechanisms under an RTA might not be sufficient to make a noticeable impact on the 
economic outlook of its member states. The independent ability of an RTA to grant 
credibility to its member states might be limited.184       
  
4.5.5 Increased bargaining power & getting noticed 
Section 4.3.5 above demonstrated that regional integration might increase the 
bargaining power of member states in international negotiation on trade. In this regard 
member states of a regional bloc may exercise their bargaining power either by joint 
representation or by ‘logrolling’ (i.e. voting in favour of one another). Such bargaining 
advantages can be used in negotiation of trade preferences and other economic or non-
economic policies.  
From a political perspective, collective action of a regional bloc aimed at enjoyment of 
increased bargaining power may have two important benefits that are especially relevant 
to developing countries. Firstly, regional integration may help developing countries to 
receive more financial and/or technical aid from external sources such as international 
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organisations and developed jurisdictions.185 External sources might be more willing to 
provide financial support to regional projects on developing an infrastructure, 
overcoming pollution, the efficient use of cross-border national resources (rivers, etc.) 
or other industrial projects of regional interest due potential cost savings from and 
potentially more significant benefits of region-wide action. For these reasons developed 
economies or international organisations may encourage regional integration between 
developing countries. In this regard the EU’s encouragement of regional integration in 
the Mediterranean and Central Africa might be cited as an example. 
Secondly, regional integration might help developing countries to pool their diplomatic 
resources and thereby to leverage their voice in international negotiations. Regional 
cooperation might be the only way in which some developing countries, in particular 
micro-sized or land-locked economies, can ‘get noticed’ at the international level and 
have the chance to get their representatives elected to key international positions.186 
Consisting of 15 very small states187, CARICOM is a good example that demonstrates 
increased international influence as a result of regional integration. Due to the small or 
micro size of the national economies of the CARICOM member states, economic 
activities across the CARICOM region are often less competitive and export-orientated. 
Because of the problems accompanying the smallness of their economies regional 
integration has been considered a necessity by the CARICOM member states since they 
gained their independence. 188  Over time CARICOM member states have also 
established a tradition of joint representation as a result of which the respective states 
have been influential in international negotiation, beyond the individual capability of 
any CARICOM member state.189 They have also contributed to the recognition of the 
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specific problems of small, weak and dependant island states all over the world, and 
secured important trade preferences in favour of their region.190   
 
4.5.6 Marginalisation Syndrome 
Damro (2006) suggests a further political motive concerning regional integration 
between developing countries only. He notes that ‘typically countries that are 
politically weak, geographically isolated, and/or economically dependent’ enter into 
RTAs ‘because they fear being left out, or marginalised, from important international 
economic and political developments.’191 Damro explains this fear of marginalisation as 
an almost psychological response of economically and politically vulnerable countries 
to regional integration taking place elsewhere in the world. Accordingly, vulnerable 
countries might consider that regional integration happening elsewhere might 
ameliorate members’ economies while further deteriorating theirs.192     
In his article Damro does not offer any real-world examples of the marginalisation 
syndrome. Therefore it is hard to appreciate the actual impact of the marginalisation 
syndrome. However, poorly drafted RTAs signed by developing countries might be 
interpreted as an indicator of such futile political concerns.   
Independent from Damro’s above suggestion, from an economic perspective, 
proliferation of RTAs might increase the incentives to enter into RTAs as remaining 
outside might become costly for non-members (i.e. domino regionalism).193  
 
4.5.7 Strong lobbies & individual voters 
National governments might also consider entering into an RTA to meet the pressure of 
strong lobby groups or individual voters. Such groups, in particular those formed and/or 
supported by exporters of goods and services within a region may organise influential 
campaigns promoting the benefits of an RTA.194 As discussed in Section 4.3 above, 
regional integration may lead to intra-regional trade diversions especially when regional 
partners keep their external tariffs high. Local businesses, which would benefit from 
																																																								
190 (Byron, 1994), p. 8. 
191 (Damro, 2006), p. 30. 
192 Ibid. 
193 (Baldwin, 1997), pp. 877-83. 
194 (World Bank, 2000), p. 26-7. 
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trade diversions, may put national governments under pressure to conclude an RTA 
with such influence.  
From the perspective of individual voters, RTAs might be preferable to unilateral 
liberalisation of national trade.195 Due to the provision of trade preferences on a 
reciprocal basis under RTAs, individual voters may more easily accept the potential 
benefits of trade liberalisation. Accordingly, some citizens who might know less about 
the dynamics of international trade might not be agreeable to the idea of the state’s 
provision of a benefit to other states without having anything in return.196 Therefore 
politicians and bureaucrats might more easily be able to justify trade preferences to the 
public when they are provided on reciprocal basis. 
Politicians may also seek to remit unpopular policies to a supra-national body in order 
to preserve the sympathy of voters in the next election. In this regard Langhammer and 
Heimenz (1990) note that:  
‘…public choice theory and the theory of political economy suggest that policymakers 
are rationally acting agents which [sic] maximise their individual benefits rather than 
those of the community… Under the objective of maintaining power it is rational to 
shift so-called ‘dirty jobs’ to the supranational body and to deny own responsibility. 
These ‘jobs’ are policies which benefit relatively small interest groups at the expense of 
the majority of voters such as sector specific tariffs and subsidies.’197 
However, the authors also acknowledge the income redistribution effect of group-
specific policies. Depending on the subject of the discriminatory policy, the willingness 
of politicians to take responsibility for public policies will depend on whether the 
appreciation of the targeted group is likely to overcome the opposition of the rest of the 
public.198 
  
Section 4.6 The Economic Focus of Regional Integration 
Previous sections have set forth the major economic and political motives of sovereign 
states to enter into an RTA. A major implication of the above discussions is that 
economic expectations lie at the heart of all RTAs. This is also evident from the fact 
																																																								
195 (Damro, 2006), p. 37-8. 
196 Ibid. 




that elimination of barriers to trade is the only common feature of all regional 
integrations of all depths.199 With respect to political motives all reasons but ‘security’ 
appear to be of secondary importance. For example, any sovereign state will be 
unwilling to enter into an international agreement with heavy burdens such as those 
under a deep RTA just to ‘lock-in domestic reforms’. Therefore the respective motive 
appears to be rather a side effect of a successful RTA. The same can be said for 
‘avoiding marginalisation’ and ‘gaining the support of lobbies/domestic constituents’. 
The former motive may be related to political psychology, and may not necessarily 
concern the functioning of RTAs. The latter motive, on the other hand, is mainly a 
reaction of governments to special interests of certain groups. These special interests 
might derive from special economic expectations, or political habits and behavioural 
codes. However, this latter motive can also not be directly related to the functioning of 
RTAs. Likewise, although increased bargaining power can bring substantial advantages 
to member states of an RTA, there is no obstacle to the establishment of a similar 
regional cooperation mechanism outside an RTA. 
In contrast to the other political motives, ‘security’ concerns seem to play a primary role 
in the formation of regional integration. This can also be confirmed by the open 
references to regional peace in the founding treaties of various regional blocs, such as 
COMESA (Article 3 of the COMESA Treaty), and ASEAN (Article 1 of the ASEAN 
Charter). A closer look at the security motive, however, reveals that regional 
integrations are designed to remove regional conflicts and to promote peace mainly by 
way of creating economic inter-dependence between member states, as well as between 
member states and the ROW. 
																																																								
199 One exception might be ‘silent integration’, which is a rather new concept. Silent integration means 
physical integration of the infrastructure which can be realised even in the absence of a traditional 
regional economic integration agreement (i.e. an RTA). Supporters of silent integration note that 
integration of certain key facilities may gradually increase common economic interests of the cooperating 
states, and may develop closer ties between the relevant people and political actors in the longer term. As 
political tension between the cooperating states of such integration is likely to be low due to exclusion of 
national sovereignty concerns and economic inequalities at the early stages, silent integration might pave 
the way to a deep economic integration. In this context, see (Sánchez & Tomassian, 2012)’s explanations 




Even when regional integration does not strengthen internal trade within a regional bloc 
it may protect the (internal and external) security of member states by promoting trade 
and ensuring their better integration in international markets. This shows that economics 
lies at the heart of the functioning of regional integration.200 In the absence of economic 
gains regional integration is unlikely to be useful in solving political problems of a 
regional bloc. Yet the focus on economics in the functioning of RTAs should not be 
interpreted as exclusion of the crucial role of politics, and institutions in particular, from 
the practicability of a regional integration system. The above analysis has shown that an 
RTA requires long-term compliance of all member states with regional standards and 
harmonised policies. In other words elimination of economic and non-economic barriers 
to intra-regional trade requires constant political commitment, adequate resources, 
reliable institutions and domestic enforcement capacity in all member states. 
 
Section 4.7 The Role of Competition Policy in Regional Integrations 
The above discussion on motives for regional integration makes no direct reference to 
competition policy. Despite this, as mentioned in the previous section, economic 
expectations lie at the heart of regional integration. Given this vital role of economics, 
																																																								
200 The claim that the ASEAN was first established for political reasons without an intention for economic 
integration [in this respect, see (Abad, 2012), pp. 41-2] does not negate the above conclusion. Abolition 
of trade barriers is to some extent an absolute requirement for defining a regional arrangement as an RTA. 
In this respect, a regional agreement with purely political objectives (such as increasing the participating 
states’ bargaining power in international/regional negotiation) cannot be considered an RTA. The 
improvement of economic cooperation in ASEAN, however, over time led to the conclusion of a free 






































competition policy also gains priority with its key function: the protection of fair 
trading, and hence of competition in free markets of a regional integration. In this 
context, however, competition policy is not a goal of economic integration but rather 
holds a vital supportive function of ensuring undisrupted trade flows and occurrence of 
other economic and non-economic gains. A closer look at the founding treaties of some 
existing RTAs also confirms the supportive function of competition policy. 
As the focus of this thesis is ‘regionally integrated competition enforcement systems in 
deep RTAs’, the role of competition policy in regional integrations will be examined in 
the following paragraphs on the basis of deep RTAs concluded between developing 
countries. With respect to shallow RTAs, however, the role of competition policy is 
often significantly more limited. In this regard, as discussed in Chapter 3 above, 
competition policy commitments of member states under shallow RTAs often do not go 
beyond a requirement to adopt a national competition law and enforcement system.  
The revision of six deep RTAs between developing countries that establish a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system (i.e. CARICOM, COMESA, CEMAC, 
CAN, WAEMU, MERCOSUR) shows that competition policy is seen not as an 
objective in its own right, but rather as a complementary policy for the fulfilment of 
broader economic and social integration objectives. In this regard, the founding treaties 
of two of the above RTAs, COMESA and CAN, do not make any reference to 
competition policy in their provisions that state the objectives of the respective regional 
integrations. The remaining four RTAs (i.e. CARICOM, CEMAC, WAEMU and 
MERCOSUR) refer to ‘competitiveness’ in the objectives provisions of their founding 
treaties. Although such reference gives a clear legal ground for adopting a regional 
competition law and enforcement system, this is not an absolute requirement for 
promoting regional competitiveness. At the same time one cannot assume that a 
carefully drafted and well-enforced regional competition law regime will alone ensure 
regional competitiveness. In other words, a successful regional competition law regime 
can play only a small role in strengthening local industries and improving the 
competitiveness of a regional bloc. To achieve the ‘competitiveness’ objective, member 
states have to develop coherent trade and investment policies, implement subsidies and 
other encouragement mechanisms for promoting investment and improving (hard and 
soft) infrastructure, etc. Therefore it is believed that competition policy should not be 
considered to be a goal in itself concerning the respective regional integrations. Rather, 
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competition policy should be seen as an instrument that works towards the fulfilment of 
the core objectives of such deep regional integrations.    
Regional Bloc Objectives of the Regional Integration 




REVISED TREATY OF CHAGUARAMAS (RTC)201 
 
Article 6: Objectives of the Community 
The Community shall have the following objectives: 
(a) improved standards of living and work; 
(b) full employment of labour and other factors of production; 
(c) accelerated, co-ordinated and sustained economic development and 
convergence; 
(d) expansion of trade and economic relations with third States; 
(e) enhanced levels of international competitiveness; 
(f) organisation for increased production and productivity; 
(g) the achievement of a greater measure of economic leverage and 
effectiveness of Member States in dealing with third States, groups 
of States and entities of any description; 
(h) enhanced co-ordination of Member States’ foreign and [foreign] 
economic policies; and 
(i) enhanced functional co-operation, including - 
(i) more efficient operation of common services and activities for the 
benefit of its peoples; 
(ii) accelerated promotion of greater understanding among its peoples and 
the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development; 








Article 3: Aims and Objectives of the Common Market 
The aims and objectives of the Common Market shall be: 
(a) to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member States 
by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its 
production and marketing structures; 
(b) to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and 
the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to 
raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer 
relations among its Member States; 
(c) to co-operate in the creation of an enabling environment for 
foreign, cross border and domestic investment including the joint 
promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for 
development; 
																																																								
201 The objective of the CARICOM competition policy is explicitly stated in Protocol 8 of the above 
agreement: “Article 30(a) Objectives of Community Competition Policy 
1. The goal of the Community Competition Policy shall be to ensure that the benefits expected from the 
establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) are not frustrated by anti-
competitive business conduct.” 
202  Available at: http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed on 
September 4, 2013). 
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(d) to co-operate in the promotion of peace, security and stability 
among the Member States in order to enhance economic 
development in the region; 
(e) to co-operate in strengthening the relations between the Common 
Market and the rest of the world and the adoption of common 
positions in international fora; and 
(f) to contribute towards the establishment, progress and the 





THE CONVENTION GOVERNING THE ECONOMIC UNION OF 
CENTRAL AFRICA (UEAC)203 
 
Article 1  
By this Convention, the High Contracting Parties [hereby] create among 
themselves the Economic Union of Central Africa, hereinafter Economic 
Union, in order jointly to establish the conditions for economic 
development and social harmony in the course of an open market and an 
appropriate legal environment. 
 
Article 2 
For the purposes stated in the First Article and in the conditions laid down 
in this Convention, the Economic Union aims to achieve the following 
objectives: 
(a) to strengthen the competitiveness of economic and financial activities 
by harmonizing rules governing their operation; 
(b) to ensure convergence towards sustainable performance by 
coordinating economic policies and by  putting national fiscal policies into 
coherence with the common monetary policy; 
(c) to create a common market based on free movement of goods, 
services, capital and persons; 
(d) to establish a coordination of national sectorial policies, to implement 
common actions and to adopt common policies, particularly in the 
following areas: agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industry, trade, tourism, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, environment, research, education 









Article 1.  
The objectives of this Agreement are to promote the balanced and 
harmonious development of the Member Countries under equitable 
conditions, through economic and social integration and cooperation; to 
accelerate their growth and the rate of creation of employment; to 
facilitate their participation in the process of regional integration, looking 
ahead toward the gradual formation of a Latin American Common 
Market.   
Likewise, this Agreement seeks to reduce external vulnerability and to 
improve the position of the Member Countries within the international 
economic context; to strengthen subregional solidarity, and to reduce 
existing differences in the levels of development among the Member 
																																																								
203 The author’s translation. 
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Countries.   
The fulfilment of these objectives shall lead to an enduring improvement 





WAEMU TREATY 204 
 
Article 4 
Without prejudice to the objectives defined in the Treaty of ECOWAS, the 
Union pursues, under the conditions laid down in this Treaty, the 
following objectives: 
a) to strengthen the competitiveness of economic and financial activities 
of Member States in the course of an open and competitive market and a 
legal environment which is rationalized and harmonized; 
b) to ensure the convergence of economic performance and policies of 
Member States through the establishment of a multilateral surveillance 
procedure; 
c) to create between Member States a common market based on free 
movement of persons, goods, services, capital and the right of 
establishment of persons occupying independent [self-employed] or 
employed activities, as well as a common external tariff and a common 
commercial policy; 
d) to establish a coordination of national sectoral policies, by setting 
implementation of joint actions and possibly common policies, 
particularly in the following areas: human resources, land use (regional) 
planning, transport and telecommunications, environment, agriculture, 
energy, industry and mining; 
e) to harmonize, to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the 
common market, the legislation of Member States and particularly the 





TREATY OF ASUNCION 
 
Article 1  
The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which 
shall be in place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the "common 
market of the southern cone" (MERCOSUR).  
This common market shall involve:  
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between 
countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-
tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent 
measures;  
The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a 
common trade policy in relation to third States or groups of States, and the 
co-ordination of positions in regional and international economic and 
commercial forums;  
The co-ordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the 
States Parties in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and 
monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, 
transport and communications and any other areas that may be agreed 
upon, in order to ensure proper competition between the States Parties;  
																																																								
204 The author’s translation. 
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The commitment by States Parties to harmonize their legislation in the 
relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process. 
 
Article 4  
The States Parties shall ensure equitable trade terms in their relations with 
third countries. To that end, they shall apply their domestic legislation to 
restrict imports whose prices are influenced by subsidies, dumping or any 
other unfair practice. At the same time, States Parties shall co-ordinate 
their respective domestic policies with a view to drafting common rules 
for trade competition. 
 
Identification of the role of competition policy in any deep RTA is important to 
understanding the expectations of national governments from the respective policy, and 
the requirements for tailoring the right policy design. It can be argued that the 
supplementary role of competition policy should not have any effect on the goals of the 
competition policy itself.205  
A holistic approach to law, however, would require consideration of the purposes of 
specific legislation in the broader context that the respective legislation is expected to 
serve. In this context, a regional competition policy that is designed as a part of a 
broader economic and social integration scheme should be functional in ensuring the 
fulfilment of the respective integration objectives. Then the following question that one 
needs to ask is to what extent a regional competition policy can be reasonably 
functional in the fulfilment of the objectives of a regional integration. 
The deep RTAs examined above suggest that regional competition policy206 is expected 
to be functional for at least three purposes: (i) effectively ensuring abolition of trade 
barriers between member states (in other words, avoiding the replacement of abolished 
trade barriers by private barriers to trade erected by anti-competitive conduct), (ii) 
promoting fair trade and a level playing field in regional free markets (so that market 
players will not be able to block one another’s economic actions, and all market players 
																																																								
205 (Qaqaya, 2013) cautiously notes that competition policy should not be seen as an answer to all 
economic and social challenges. Certain public needs can be better addressed under other policies. 
However, it is vital for countries to ensure coherence between competition and other public policies. 
According to him, for policy coherence developing countries should first ‘[set] policy objectives and 
[determine] which ones are priority objectives, and whether there are incompatibilities between 
competition policy and other objectives.’ Then they should determine mechanisms for resolving potential 
inconsistencies and conflicts, and establish reliable systems for regularly monitoring policy enforcement. 
Such transparent systems, although politically difficult to establish, may partly reduce the legal 
uncertainties in the balancing of other public policies in competition law enforcement. Townley proposes 
a similar mechanism for public policy balancing in EU competition law enforcement. See (Townley, 
2009), pp. 251-84.  
206 On the supplementary role of competition policy in deep RTAs, also see the discussion around fn. 23 
in Chapter 3. 
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will have a fair opportunity to grow), and (iii) promoting the competitiveness of 
member states (which may be interpreted as improving efficiencies and providing 
support for industrial growth). The last objective in particular necessitates coherence of 
competition policy with other policy areas including investment, trade, intellectual 
property and industrial policies which aim at achieving economic efficiency and 
development in member states. These targets of competition policy, however, are not 
necessarily vocal about optimal goals of regional competition law enforcement.            
  
Optimal goals of competition policy constitute an issue which has long been discussed 
in the literature but not yet resolved.207 While some support a strictly economics-centred 
approach and submit that total or consumer welfare and economic efficiency should be 
the only goals of competition policy, others defend the benefits of consideration of 
certain non-economic public policy objectives in addition to total/consumer welfare and 
economic efficiency. With respect to developing countries, however, many competition 
experts recognise the benefits of the consideration of certain non-economic, 
development goals in competition law regimes.208 
The discussion on optimal goals of competition policy in developing countries remains 
outside the scope of this thesis. In the context of a regional integration, however, it is 
believed that the conventional goals of competition policy (viz. consumer or total 
welfare and economic efficiency) as well as the other goals attributed to it (such as 
promoting economic development, reducing unemployment, certain re-distributional 
measures, etc.) need not be in conflict with the goals of regional integration. This is 
because the goals of competition policy and those of an RTA are almost always very 
broadly defined concepts whose realisation can be achieved by various political and 
economic arrangements. Broadly defined goals of competition policy and regional 
integration are often deliberately couched in general terms, precisely to leave enough 
room for future policy adjustment, and for the consideration of other public policy 
objectives during the implementation of the competition policy, if so desired. In light of 
																																																								
207 For a review of the US and the EU perspectives, see (Martin, 2008).  
208 For instance, Section E Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the UN Set of Principles and Rules on Competition 
indicates promotion of ‘economic development’ among the goals of competition policy. In practice many 
developing countries view economic development as among the goals of competition policy [(Qaqaya, 
2013)]. Likewise, (Elenor M. Fox, 2011) refers to the special needs of developing countries and the 
unsuitability of the Washington Consensus for the respective countries. By contrast, (Gal, 2009b) 
supports an economic efficiency-centred approach for ‘small economies’. See also Chapter 2, Section 
2.3.1 above on the goals of competition policy in developing countries. 
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the above, one might conclude that member states of a deep RTA may have some 
flexibility in defining the goals of and enforcement priorities under a regional 
competition law regime subject to the condition that these are coherent with the grand 
objectives of the respective deep RTA.209  
As discussed above, economic expectations play a key role in the functioning of RTAs. 
Abolition of (economic and non-economic) barriers to internal trade (i.e. internal 
market) under a deep RTA constitutes the basic mechanism that creates most of the 
common interests of member states. In line with this, the most prominent deeply 
integrated regional bloc in the world, the EU, gives special weight to the protection and 
promotion of regional integration between EU member states.210 Accordingly, the 
integration of the ‘single market’ is seen by the EU institutions as the overriding goal of 
the EU as well as the EU competition law regime.211 In line with this, the objective of 
protecting and strengthening regional integration is given priority in the enforcement of 
all EU policies including competition.  
Consideration of the ‘market integration’ or the ‘single market’ as the overriding goal of 
the regional competition policy is justifiable not only for the EU but all deep RTAs. 
This can be explained by the central importance of the integration of the markets across 
a regional bloc for the sustainability of the far-reaching economic and social 
cooperation between member states. In this regard, due to the key role of economics, 
disruptions to free trade in the internal market of a regional bloc may risk the very being 
of a regional integration, let alone regional competition law regime. Such risk may be 
greater at early stages of a regional integration, especially before member states start to 
accrue the full benefits of economic integration.  
Moreover, as a regional competition law regime would take its legitimacy from the 
relevant deep RTA, the objectives of broader integration under the RTA would 
normally provide a framework for the enforcement and interpretation of all subsequent 
legislation adopted at the regional level.  
																																																								
209 Along these lines, Menns and Eversley suggest that the competition policy design in CARICOM 
should observe the goals and broad objectives of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The authors also 
emphasise that the CARICOM Competition Commission is ‘afforded the opportunity to support more or 
less aggressively the fulfillment of CARICOM’s industrial policy objectives.’[(Menns & Eversley, 2011), 
pp. 12-15].  
210 On the strategic importance of the ‘single market’ for the EU, see (Monti, 2010). 
211 (Bailey & Whish, 2012), pp. 23-4 and 51. 
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From a practical point of view, pursuance of the internal market objective in regional 
competition law enforcement may (i) leverage the value given to regional competition 
policy by member state governments (as competition law would then become more 
influential in securing access of member states to one another’s markets), and (ii) make 
competition policy a showcase for demonstrating the benefits of the regional 
integration, which might be beneficial both for regional integration and the application 
of regional competition law. The latter point concerns the direct influence of 
competition law regime on the economic activities of market players, and thereby on 
wealth of the consumers, and the economy in general.  
 
Section 4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter is dedicated to examination of the main motives of sovereign states in 
entering into an RTA, and the role of regional competition policy in the broader 
economic and political integration agenda of a regional bloc. For these purposes the 
chapter first offered a brief review of the historical development of RTAs, and three 
waves of regionalism between developing countries from the 1960s until today. In the 
following, economic and political motives of sovereign states in entering into regional 
integrations are examined.  
Review of the factors that motivate sovereign states in entering into RTAs led to three 
main conclusions. Firstly, accruing gains, in particular economic gains, from regional 
integration is far from definite. Therefore member states must pay special attention not 
only to the terms of the integration agreement that they negotiate, but also the socio-
economic and geo-political situation of their regional partners. In this respect sovereign 
states must carefully assess their current and prospective share in the global trade, the 
parties with whom they are entering into an RTA, terms of the integration agreement, 
and complementary economic and non-economic policies aimed at reducing intra-
regional inequalities in the first place. Secondly, there are two primary goals of RTAs; 
these are to ensure economic development, and protect internal as well as external 
security/peace of member states. Thirdly, this study suggests that the economic 
development/gains objective lies at the heart of regional integration, because promotion 
of the peace objective is essentially based on the principle of establishing economic 
inter-dependency between member states. In this respect the success and sustainability 
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of regional integration is likely to develop in parallel with the success of its economic 
policies and the fair distribution of benefits deriving from regional integration between 
member states.  
Subsequently, the chapter examined the role of regional competition policy in the 
context of a deep RTA. It concluded that competition policy is not of itself a goal of 
regional integration, but rather plays a complementary role of ensuring smooth 
operation of free markets within a regional bloc, and of supporting the other core 
objectives of regional integration. In the light of this, regional competition law 
enforcement needs to be in coherence with the broader integration objectives of an 
RTA. On the basis of the vital role of free trade in internal markets of a regional bloc 
and the dependency of a regional competition policy on the success of the RTA in 
which it is regulated, it is suggested that pursuance of the internal market objective in 
the application of regional competition law is desirable and beneficial.  
Although regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs 
might be helpful in improving competition law protection in developing countries, 
regional organisation of competition policy and law enforcement does have a number of 
disadvantages. Such disadvantages gain more significance when one considers the 
conditionality of the success of a regional integration on various economic, social, 
political and even geographical factors. The major disadvantages of competition law 
and policy enforcement at the regional level under a deep RTA will be examined in the 




CHAPTER 5 THE INFLUENCE OF BROADER ECONOMIC 
(AND SOCIAL) INTEGRATION ON REGIONALLY INTEGRATED 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
This thesis concerns regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep 
RTAs. Its primary objective is to understand the political and economic environment in 
which regional competition law enforcement takes place, and to evaluate whether 
regional enforcement can succeed in mitigating common competition law enforcement 
problems of developing countries. Thus the main focus of the thesis is on the nexus 
between regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems and the internal 
dynamics of economic (and social) integration processes under deep RTAs.  
 Chapter 2 examined the major problems of developing countries face concerning 
competition law and enforcement in three groups, namely, problems deriving from (i) 
socio-economic dynamics, (ii) political governance, and (iii) legal environment. It was 
demonstrated that a great number of the identified problems do not originate in the 
design of competition law and policy but result from the low level of development of 
the respective jurisdictions and, accordingly, from the limited availability of financial, 
technical and human resources.  
Chapter 3 discussed ‘regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems’, and 
explained how these differ from other regional/international competition agreements. 
The chapter outlined the different kinds of regional/international cooperation models in 
competition law enforcement, and then examined the potential costs and benefits of 
each model to participating jurisdictions (Chapter 3). It was suggested that regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep RTAs is distinct from all other 
forms of regional/international cooperation agreements for at least three reasons: (i) 
they may lead to higher efficiency gains in legal enforcement, (ii) they contemplate the 
transfer of certain policy-making and adjudicative powers from the national to the 
regional level, 1  and (iii) they may include legally binding provisions concerning 
regional competition law enforcement. It was found that in some cases efficient and 
																																																								
1 Yet different RTAs contemplate different levels of policy-making and legal enforcement authority 
transfers from national bodies to a regional centre.     
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deep inter-jurisdictional cooperation in competition law enforcement might also be 
achieved through soft law mechanisms. For intensive inter-jurisdictional cooperation 
based on soft law mechanisms, however, it is necessary for the parties to have a 
common understanding of the core competition concepts, similar substantive and 
procedural laws of competition, and mutual trust in each other’s national enforcement 
standards and capacities.2 This thesis argues that these conditions are unlikely to be 
fulfilled by developing countries since in most the rule of law is not yet fully observed, 
and competition law practice, in particular, is not advanced. In addition it was shown 
that, unlike all other regional cooperation agreements on competition policy, regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems may bring about additional gains (such 
as further reductions in the cost of enforcement, and increased ability to detect and 
punish international anti-competitive conduct) due to their link to a deep RTA 
establishing a ‘common market’ or a deeper form of economic integration. In the light 
of the above, it was submitted that the benefits that might be obtained from a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system cannot be replicated in a stand-alone 
competition agreement, at least in the case of developing countries.3 Accordingly, it was 
concluded that regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems in deep 
RTAs might be more effective than other regional competition agreements in 
strengthening competition law protection in developing countries. A core finding of the 
thesis was that the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
system must be considered conditional on the success of the relevant regional 
integration agreement. The enforceability of such regional competition law enforcement 
arrangements, however, strictly necessities the existence of a workable regional 
economic (and social) integration plan, as well as political backing from national 
governments of all member states.  
On the basis that all existing regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
arrangements pursued by developing countries are established as an integral part of a 
regional economic integration agreement (i.e. a deep RTA), the nexus between deep 
economic (and social) integration and regionally integrated competition law 
																																																								
2 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3 above. 
3 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3. Only a few developed countries are able to achieve similar benefits to that of 
a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system by using soft cooperation agreements. 
Developed countries might match the additional benefits of forming a ‘common market’ when, inter alia, 
they naturally develop strong mutual commercial ties, and when all parties have sufficiently similar and 
advanced national competition law enforcement practices. 
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enforcement systems deserves further examination. For this reason, Chapter 4 examined 
the primary economic and political motives that lead sovereign jurisdictions to enter 
into deep RTAs. In the light of these primary motives, the role given to regional 
competition policy in deep RTAs was evaluated. Review of the literature disclosed that 
sovereign countries enter into deep RTAs in order to accrue economic benefits from the 
efficiencies achieved through the formation of an unrestricted region-wide market, or 
the so-called ‘common market’. In addition, a noteworthy political motive, which is 
closely bound to regional economic performance under a deep RTA, is found to be the 
protection of (national and regional) security. Accordingly, economic interdependency 
created via strengthened commercial ties between member states of a regional bloc -as 
well as between member states and the ROW- is expected to protect the national 
security of member states, and regional security, by making any serious political dispute 
economically undesirable for all relevant jurisdictions. It was found that competition 
policy is not among the main objectives of a deep RTA. Rather, it is suggested that 
regional competition policy is given an important yet complementary role of ensuring 
that the economic (and non-economic) benefits expected from the abolition of intra-
regional trade barriers will not be obstructed by anti-competitive action of (private or 
public) market players.4 This finding provided further support for the core thesis of this 
research that the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
in a deep RTA is necessarily conditional on the workability of the relevant broader 
regional economic (and social) integration. 
Given the above findings, this chapter will illustrate the major limitations any regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system faces due to its conditionality on the 
relevant broader economic (and social) integration arrangements. The literature often 
prefers to review regional integration from the perspective of a single discipline, and as 
a result the interactions between the law, politics and economics of regional integration 
remain largely undiscovered. Likewise, most legal studies on what this thesis calls 
‘regionally integrated competition enforcement systems’ examine the subject within the 
boundaries of competition policy, and largely independent of the internal dynamics of 
regional integration. In offering a discussion of the influence of regional economic (and 
social) integration on regional competition law enforcement, this chapter aims to outline 
some of the intrinsic limitations of regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
																																																								
4 See Chapter 4, Section 4.7. 
187 
 
systems. This chapter will discuss these major limitations under four headings. 
Accordingly it will examine the influence of (i) possible increases in regional 
inequalities as a result of a deep RTA (Section 5.1); (ii) persistent resource constraints 
and corruption (Section 5.2); (iii) preference for intergovernmentalism over 
supranationalism (Section 5.3), and (iv) the lack of implementation, the complementary 
role of competition policy in RTAs, and conflicting competition policy commitments 
under multiple RTAs (Section 5.4). During these assessments, the findings of the 
preceding chapters will be brought together. When examining the limitations of 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems, frequent reference will be 
made to the concepts and conclusions suggested in the preceding chapters, and their 
further examination will be conducted from a wider economic and political policy 
perspective. 
As mentioned above, the core research question this thesis attempts to answer is 
whether a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in a deep RTA can 
address competition law enforcement problems of developing countries. It is believed 
that analysis conducted in the present chapter will provide an understanding of the 
reasons for the poor performance of the existing regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems found under deep RTAs concluded between developing countries. 
A full answer to the core research question of this thesis, however, would require the 
examination of each regional bloc individually. Some relevant factors which may 
influence the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system, 
and the factors which may deserve regional bloc specific examination will be discussed 
briefly in Section 5.5. Finally Section 5.6 will offer a brief summary of the Chapter’s 
findings. 
 
Section 5.1 Increased Regional Inequalities as a Result of Deep RTAs 
Review of the economic and political motives of sovereign jurisdictions’ entering into 
RTAs has shown that economic expectations lie at the heart of all RTAs. The protection 
of regional security objective, although often considered crucial by member states, is 
aimed to be achieved mainly by creating an economic interdependency of member 
states. In other words, it is believed regional peace ought to be protected mainly via 
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increased economic activity within a regional bloc.5 Despite this key role of economic 
activity in the functioning of regional integration, analysis of economic dynamics of 
RTAs in Chapter 4 has shown that economic returns from RTAs cannot be considered 
definite. In the case of RTAs between developing countries in particular, there is a 
genuine risk of significant trade diversion, and transfer of wealth from poorer member 
states to their wealthier regional partners. As a result RTAs between developing 
countries may increase regional inequalities, and lead to divergence between the 
incomes of the member states.6  Given the assessments of Chapter 4 above, the 
following paragraphs will first provide a brief overview on the way in which RTAs may 
increase regional inequalities, and then comment on some basic preconditions of 
mitigating regional inequalities in the long term. The negative influence of increased 
regional inequalities on regional competition law regimes will then be discussed.  
A deep RTA between developing countries is likely to lead to higher trade diversion 
than a deep RTA between developed countries. This is because production of goods as 
well as provision of services in developing countries often cannot be made in efficient 
scales and with the use of the newest technologies. Trade diversion and wealth transfers 
from poorer member states to their wealthier regional partners will be higher the more 
the parties pursue protectionist policies such as employing high external tariffs or 
imposing legal barriers to avoid international competition.7 At the same time, however, 
some degree of protectionism is considered by many to be necessary, especially for 
regional blocs consisting of developing countries, in order to support infant industries 
and to gain international competitiveness.8 In addition, it is argued that protectionist 
measures may be essential to attracting net investment in the respective regions, and to 
triggering knowledge transfers. Although protectionism in such context is likely to 
																																																								
5 (Nazzini, 2011) also recognises the central importance of economic gains for the European integration. 
He suggests that “[e]conomic benefits of trade are a condition for the achievement of [the EU’s] political 
and social objectives”. Ibid., p. 28. 
6 See, (Anthony J.  Venables, 1999). 
7 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 above. 
8 Among others, Singh supports the state’s strong presence in economic planning in developing countries 
[(Singh, 1999, 2002)]. See also Chapter 4, Section 4.4. Fox argues that the US style free market economy 
(the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’) would not be suitable to securing the economic growth and 
development objectives of developing countries. At the same time the author warns that too much 
intervention and excessive discretion by officials would have severe costs as well [(Eleanor M Fox, 
2007), p. 119-23]. Stiglitz explains that ‘…whenever information is imperfect and markets incomplete, 
which is to say always, and especially in developing countries, then the invisible hand works most 
imperfectly.’ Significantly there are desirable government interventions which, in principle, can improve 
upon the efficiency of the market. These restrictions on the conditions under which markets result in 
efficiency are important – many of the key activities of government can be understood as responses to the 
resulting market failures [(Stiglitz, 2003), pp. 73-4]. 
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strengthen agglomeration of economic activity in member states with higher 
‘comparative advantage’ in the short term, at later stages of regional integration 
economic activity may gradually spread to the periphery, and to member states with 
lower ‘comparative advantage’.9 The diffusion of economic activity from the centre to 
the periphery has a significant impact on re-balancing regional inequalities in the long-
term by peaceful means, and should therefore be considered a key objective for the 
political sustainability of regional integration. Direct wealth transfers within regional 
blocs are unlikely to redress regional inequalities with any long-term success. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, there are at least two problems accompanying direct wealth 
transfers in the form of economic subsidies from advantaged to disadvantaged member 
states. Firstly, it is not possible accurately to calculate the amount of compensation, 
because not all benefits accrued to each member state from the regional integration are 
mathematically identifiable (e.g. long-term gains from technology diffusion). Secondly, 
direct wealth transfers inevitably produce political tension in both the compensating and 
compensated member states (e.g. the dissolution of the EAC in 1977; reoccurring 
disagreement on the terms of direct wealth redistribution between member states of 
ACU).  
As review of economic motives for RTA in Chapter 4 demonstrated, there are pre-
conditions of diffusion of economic activity from a regional centre to the periphery.10 In 
this respect, strong transport links between the regional centre(s) and the periphery, or 
in other words between advantaged and disadvantaged member states, is critical. 
Likewise, availability of other basic physical infrastructure, such as reliable network 
services (viz. energy, transport, telecommunications, and finance) at the periphery is 
vital, because only if adequate physical infrastructure is in place will businesses be able 
to operate at the periphery, and to sell to and outside the relevant regional bloc. 
Complementary social policies are also indispensible for the spread of industrial activity 
from the centres to the periphery, in particular, in regional blocs formed by developing 
countries. Economic activity can be hosted at the periphery of a regional bloc only to 
the extent of the availability of human resources with required skills.11 Likewise, 
transfer of technical knowledge to and emergence of local entrepreneurs in 
																																																								
9 See the explanations on ‘agglomeration’ at Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Although it is possible to arrange the relocation of skilled workers from outside, this might generate 
significant costs. Moreover, certain living standards might be required to persuade people with certain 
skills to relocate. 
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disadvantaged member states are dependent on the absorptive capacity of those states. 
The presence of skilled workers and the capacity to absorb and implement technical 
knowledge require a good education system, social security and overall quality of life in 
a given jurisdiction.12 Legal harmonisation and free movement rights might become 
great facilitators of the diffusion of economic activities. Harmonisation of law, in 
particular on property rights protection, the finance industry, and investment, might be 
indispensable to securing the rights of investors, reducing compliance costs of 
expanding businesses beyond the regional economic centre(s), and boosting the 
credibility of the periphery in the eyes of both regional and foreign investors. Free 
movement of goods, services, capital, establishment and workers, again, could be vital 
not only to the gradual diffusion of economic activity to the periphery, but also to 
mitigating the adverse economic implications of deep regional integration at the 
periphery from its early stages. Broadly speaking, while free movement of goods and 
services would help firms operating within a regional bloc to reach efficient production 
and service levels, free movement of capital and establishment would pave the way for 
the expansion or relocation of businesses from the regional economic centre(s) to the 
periphery. Free movement of workers, on the other hand, would offer employment 
opportunities to all people in a regional bloc (including the periphery) despite its being 
conditional on the possession of the required skills and an adequate physical condition 
for mobility. Although this conditionality will reduce the appeal of such employment 
opportunities in the most deprived parts of a regional bloc consisting of developing 
countries, eligible immigrant workers would typically spend a part of their income in 
their home countries or remit it to their families at their home state.13 In the longer term, 
if the reforms necessary to ensuring a secure investment environment are made at the 
periphery, some immigrants may return to their home countries and use their newly 
																																																								
12 A similar suggestion was made in connection with the development of the OECD Region (despite the 
absence of a formal deep integration agreement between the OECD members): ‘Infrastructure is the 
foundation of regional development and has been the target of significant investment through regional 
policy in the past years. Regional competitiveness is affected by infrastructure endowment, such as 
transport and telecommunications networks which, together with investment in human capital and 
innovation, can improve the access to markets, increase the connectivity of regions and provide 
services more efficiently.’ (OECD, 2011), p. 126 (emphasis added).    
13 Remittances constitute one of the vital sources of money inflow in some developing countries. 
According to the World Bank’s estimates, developing countries received above $410 billion in 
remittances in 2013. The World Bank estimates that in 2012 remittances accounted for 48 per cent of the 
total GDP of Tajikistan, and 31 per cent of the total GDP of the Kyrgyz Republic. See, (Ratha, Eigen-
Zucchi, Plaza, Wyss, & Yi, 2013).  
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obtained skills and capital to invest there. In the latter case free movement of workers 
will be a functional of the diffusion of knowledge from the centre to the periphery.14 
In light of the above it is fair to conclude that a deep RTA between developing countries 
is likely to produce disparities in benefits accruing to member states, and as a result, 
may increase regional inequalities. These could be mitigated either by direct wealth re-
distribution or adoption of a set of structural reforms across the regional bloc.15 As 
enforcement of direct wealth redistribution is often greatly constrained by economic and 
political problems, especially in the case of developing countries, investment in physical 
infrastructure, human capital, legal harmonisation and facilitating free movements 
becomes vital to the sustainability of regional integration. Taking regional action on 
these issues, however, frequently meets with resistance from national governments, 
because reforming the respective policy areas necessarily transfers some policy-making 
authority of the national government to a regional level. Given this sovereignty concern, 
despite the ambitious deep integration objectives in their founding agreements, many 
existing regional blocs formed by developing countries have experienced stagnation in 
regionalisation following the elimination of direct restrictions to intra-regional trade, 
such as taxes and custom duties. As a result, short-term inequalities that should ideally 
be addressed from the initial stages of a regional integration16 carry the risk of 
increasing, and becoming long-term problems that jeopardise the sustainability of 
regional integration.17 
																																																								
14 The need to tailor wide-ranging regional policies in redressing regional inequality applies to all deep 
regional integrations, including those formed among industrialised nations. As suggested by an OECD 
study, from an historical context, ‘regional policy has evolved and is evolving from a top-down, subsidy-
based group of interventions designed to reduce regional disparities into a much broader ‘family’ of 
policies designed to improve regional competitiveness (…)’ (emphasis added). (OECD, 2005), p. 22.   
15 Due to different factor endowments of member states of a regional integration, however, total 
elimination of regional inequalities may not be possible.  
16 In the short term the political tension accompanying direct re-distribution of wealth could also be 
tolerated by member states when the necessary steps for reducing the long-term inequalities are taken. 
17 International community can have a significant role to play in promoting the access of developing 
countries to global markets and strengthening their local economies (both at the domestic and regional 
levels). (Winters, Lim, Hanmer, & Augustin, 2010) examine how international community can support 
economic development in low-income countries. The authors suggest that international community, and 
G20 countries in particular, can contribute to economic growth in developing countries by taking action 
in various broad policy areas. They identify three pillars to support economic growth in low income 
countries: (a) for mitigating downturns international support might focus on macroeconomic stability, 
building international capital and financial safety nets, and promoting agricultural investment and food 
security; (b) for raising underlying growth support can be directed at policies on international trade, 
investment in skills, infrastructure, financial sector development, and human development; and (c) as 
overarching targets international support aim at strengthening institutions and governance in low income 
countries, and ensuring provision of high quality advice and opportunities for knowledge exchange.  
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What are the implications of increased regional inequality following a deep RTA to 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement?  As first shown in Chapter 3 above 
and re-confirmed in Chapter 4, success here depends on that of the relevant broader 
regional economic (and social) integration scheme. Regional competition policy is not 
among the core motives for sovereign jurisdictions’ signing up to a deep RTA. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, in the context of a deep RTA, regional competition policy 
has a complementary role of ensuring the fulfilment of broader economic and social 
integration objectives of regional integration. Increased regional inequality as a result of 
a deep RTA would reduce the trust of disadvantaged member states in the entire 
integration scheme, and may diminish their will to comply with regional arrangements 
or to undertake the required reforms for furthering regionalisation. In the case of 
developing countries, in particular, any loss of already scarce resources to better-off 
regional partners might be even less tolerable than welfare transfers in deep RTAs 
between developed countries that are better able to afford short-term losses for long-
term gains. From the perspective of advantaged member states, on the other hand, 
increased regional inequalities will translate into increased national wealth, and may 
therefore reduce the incentives of the respective national governments to agree on 
region-wide reforms intended to balance these inequalities. Although remedies against 
regional inequality would be to the benefit of all member states but only in the long 
term, political actors in advantaged member states may find it difficult to enlist the 
domestic electorate’s support for such regional reforms as the electorate might 
appreciate investment in policies which would have a more direct effect on his/her daily 
life more. The institution of a complex regional competition law regime might become 
less desirable to national governments of developing countries.18 This can be explained 
on at least three grounds. Firstly, despite the significant success of certain international 
platforms (such as the ICN and UNCTAD) in promoting competition policy in 
developing countries, awareness of the potential benefits of competition policy is still 
very low in some developing countries. Secondly, establishment of a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system, and harmonisation of laws and 
reorganisation of institutions, often require a lengthy and expensive process. In contrast 
																																																								
18 Once a regionally integrated competition enforcement system is established, however, depending on 
the workload of competition authorities, the cost of competition regulation and enforcement could be 
partly defrayed by fees and sanctions imposed on private firms. Therefore, once the establishment process 
of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system is completed, member states might like to 
keep the system running to reap the benefits of their investments in the regional competition law regime. 
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with the immediate costs of establishing a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system, benefits of such system would materialise only after the necessary 
legal and institutional arrangements are largely in place, when staff in competition 
authorities are given the necessary powers, and the same officials have developed the 
required skills and experience in enforcement. In other words, establishment of a 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system requires strong political 
backing from the national governments of member states especially at the early stages 
of regional integration. However, when trust in the broader integration scheme becomes 
weak, such political backing is likely to disappear. Thirdly, some developing countries 
might consider the competition policy a legitimate tool with which governments of 
liberal economies can legally interfere in free markets. For example, when neighbouring 
developing countries with similar factor endowments are competing with each other in 
order to attract or retain foreign investment by offering sector-specific advantages, tax 
relief, etc., they may not wish region-wide competition legislation (and in particular, 
workable state aid regulations) to restrict their internal competition. Likewise, national 
governments may like to support their infant industries and national champions at the 
expense of short-term economic efficiency and consumer welfare in order to gain 
international competitiveness.19 In such case, governments might find a stronger link 
between competition policy and national sovereignty, and may therefore show greater 
resistance to transferring some policy-making and/or legal enforcement power to 
regional bodies. Such resistance could be higher when national governments and/or 
influential business owners suspect the prospects of the broader regional integration 
scheme.20  
In the light of the above, increased regional inequalities and more generally disbelief of 
member states in the long-term success of a regional integration could prevent the 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system from being operational. This 
deterrent effect of increased inequality might be more pronounced at the early stages of 
regional integration (i.e. before member states experience the benefits of having a 
functioning regionally integrated competition law enforcement system). 
																																																								
19 Similarly, it is suggested that the US and EU member states have an increased tendency to protect their 
national economies by lax competition law enforcement at times of financial crisis. It is argued that this 
tendency comes into play in the form of flexible enforcement of merger laws, and state aid regulation 
(especially in the EU). See, (Moura e Silva, 2013), pp. 127-31. 
20 By contrast, however, in certain cases regional competition policy may help national governments to 
implement some politically challenging policies. For instance, national governments may blame regional 
policies and use regional integration as a scapegoat when implementing unpopular policy reforms. 
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To ensure political backing from the national governments of member states, and to 
avoid increased regional inequality, it may be advisable to include clear regional 
development targets into deep RTAs, as well as the secondary laws and regulations 
adopted at the regional level. Such regional development targets should ideally present a 
detailed plan of the region-wide reforms that are required to redress regional 
inequality. 21  Parties should acknowledge that the short-term gains of advantaged 
member states are the direct result of the sacrifices of their disadvantaged partners. 
Accordingly, in return, the duty of the former group of member states should be to 
subsidise reforms and infrastructure projects that are aimed at balancing regional 
inequalities. Such reforms may initially appear to favour the disadvantaged only. 
However, the present enquiry suggests that convergence is vital to the sustainability of a 
regional bloc, which would help to strengthen both the economic and political power of 
all member states on the global scene. In this regard, measures to improve convergence 
need to be implemented largely, if not fully outside the regional competition law 
regime. 
In sum, this section argued that convergence is essential to the sustainability of regional 
integration, and achieving it requires substantial investment in hard and soft 
infrastructure across the region. A major difficulty is that the cost of regionalisation is 
immediate, whereas most benefits can accrue only in the long-term.  Establishment of 
regional competition regimes may be obstructed also by resource constraints and 
corruption that could not be prevented by deep regional integration. The next section 
will review this problem. 
 
Section 5.2 Persistent Resource Constraints and Corruption 
Examination in Chapter 2 of the major problems developing countries face in 
competition law enforcement has shown that the real sources of most of the identified 
problems are the low level of economic development and political corruption. In 
addressing these problems Chapter 3 suggested that regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems might be more effective than other forms of 
regional/international competition arrangement. In support of this claim, it was 
demonstrated that a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in a deep 
																																																								
21 These should ideally include: detailed budget estimates, individual commitments of all member states, 
remedies against noncompliance and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
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RTA might significantly reduce the cost of enforcement as a result of the establishment 
of a common market, and might allow closer cooperation between member states.22It 
was further suggested that the establishment of a regional competition authority under a 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system might reduce the influence of 
national vested interest groups and big businesses over competition law enforcement. 
This would be the case when a regional competition authority is trusted to supervise the 
competition enforcement practices of the NCAs of member states, and/or is granted 
shared or exclusive legal enforcement authority. In either case political actors in 
member states as well as other vested interest groups might find it more difficult to 
influence the decision-making of the regional competition authority, as well as other 
negotiations that take place at the regional level. 
Despite the above-mentioned potential of regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems, as noted in Section 5.1, the respective benefits would accrue only 
after significant investment is made and the primary institutional and legal reforms are 
completed. Likewise, with respect to economic returns from deep RTAs, economic 
welfare within a regional bloc might increase only gradually, as production becomes 
more efficient and the region starts to receive net investments. Accordingly, executing a 
deep RTA will not immediately lead to better competition practice, nor an instant 
money flow into the region.  
As economic returns from regional integration can be achieved only gradually, at the 
early stages of regional integration developing countries may struggle to allocate the 
necessary resources for the establishment of a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system.23 This might be even more of a problem when member states have 
pressing development needs and little trust in the broader regional integration scheme. 
																																																								
22 In deep RTAs close regional cooperation on competition policy is often made subject to binding legal 
arrangements. 
23 UNCTAD refers to the lack of enforcement capacity, in terms both of staff and resources, as among the 
fundamental reasons why regional competition agreements between developing countries have not been 
implemented. Other reasons listed in the study are: lack of independent competition agencies; lack of 
clarity in the division of power between competition agencies and other government bodies; divergent 
and incompatible national laws; lack of mutual trust in legal systems and governance issues; lack of 
coherence and coordination between competition and other economic policies, marginal place of 
competition issues in integration agreements [see (UNCTAD, 2013e), p. 5]. Detailed examination of the 
influence of the above-mentioned factors, however, falls outside the scope of the study. Unlike the 
abovementioned UNCTAD study, this thesis explores the role of the regional competition policy in the 
context of the broader integration efforts under a deep RTA. Nevertheless, most of the factors identified 
in the abovementioned UNCTAD study are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The last point on the 
complementary role of competition policy in regional integration agreements will be elaborated in 
Section 5.4 below.   
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In this case international aid might be the only way of establishing a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system for developing countries. However, 
international aid could create adverse effects if it is not planned according to the local 
realities of recipient countries (e.g. the risk of losing the aid before it reaches the 
intended local recipient due to political corruption), and if the commitments of recipient 
states in return for the aid are not explicitly decided and observed.24  
Consisting of a group of small and micro economies, the regional integration between 
the CARICOM member states provides a good example of the significance of the 
obstacles posed by economic restraints and political corruption to regional competition 
regimes.  
The idea of regionalisation in the Caribbean Islands goes back to the colonial time of 
the late 1950s.25 After several attempts at regional integration, thirteen countries from 
the region eventually established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) with the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas signed in 1973.26 With the purpose of deepening their regional 
integration, the CARICOM member states signed the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
Establishing the Caribbean Community including the Single Market and Economy 
(the RTC) in 2001. The Revised Treaty came into force in 2006 together with an 
exemption for the Bahamas, which preferred to remain outside the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy while preserving its membership of the CARICOM.27 On the 
other hand, by August 2014 Haiti had not yet completed its full integration into the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy, as it needs to make few more reforms in order 
to meet the minimal requirements of membership of the single market.28  
At first sight CARICOM member states appear to provide a textbook example of ideal 
regional economic integration. They have small or micro economies, which mean that it 
																																																								
24 (Collier, 2007); (Moyo, 2009). 
25 An early regional integration effort in the Caribbean region was the formation of the British West 
Indies Federation, in 1958, which came into an end in 1962. 
26 The following states were the full members of CARICOM in 1973: Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Suriname and Haiti joined the 
CARICOM in 1995 and 2002, respectively. In addition, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands are associate members of the CARICOM. For more 
information, see, www.caricom.org (accessed on January 13, 2014). 
27 See, (CARICOM, 2013a). (Stewart, 2012) notes that the Bahamas’ choice is ‘understandable’ due to 
the paucity of trade between the Bahamas and the other CARICOM member states. In addition, the author 
notes the concern about the envisaged free movement of workers policy and its possible negative effects 
on the Bahamas, as the Bahamas is said to have the highest wages within the regional bloc. See, ibid., p. 
181. 
28 See, (CARICOM, 2014b).  
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is very hard for them to reach efficient production levels with domestic demand. The 
majority have a common colonial history – most were previously under the British 
reign. As a result they share legal and institutional traditions, and use English as their 
official language.29 Such similarities can make regional cooperation easier, and might 
facilitate and accelerate regional law-and-policy-making procedures. Moreover, their 
geographical closeness, similar economic interests, and joint history doubtless fostered 
the creation of a common identity across the region. On the downside, however, the 
similarities in their factor endowments make these economies compete with one 
another, rather more than they strengthen specialisation and ensure better allocation of 
resources across the region. In addition, due to the very small economies, even the 
regional economic integration might not be sufficient to allow the necessary demand for 
efficient production levels, and for gaining international competitiveness. Nevertheless, 
small economies oblige the CARICOM member states to regional integration. On the 
other hand, it means that they have to search for ways to engage with the global markets 
in parallel with regionalisation. Besides, regionalisation in CARICOM might be 
especially functional in organising, financing and undertaking the necessary legal and 
infrastructural reforms across the region, and in this way promoting member states’ 
closer integration into the global markets. 
Economic restraints and political corruption have always been the main obstacles to 
CARICOM integration. Taimoon Stewart explains30 the reasons for the struggle of the 
CARICOM member states in regionalisation mainly on four pillars: (i) first and 
foremost, their limited financial resources, (ii) due to the colonial history, the poor 
organisation of production in the respective economies, 31  (iii) bad governance, 
organised crime, and drug gangs which add to corruption and make legal enforcement 
difficult32, and (iv) the clashes between ethnic groups, the internal caste system, and 
																																																								
29 In this respect Suriname (a former Dutch colony), and Haiti (a former French colony) are the 
exceptions. In addition, some CARICOM member states might have influences deriving from previously 
being colonized by more than one imperial power (e.g. today’s Guyana was first under Dutch control, and 
then became a British colony); see, (R. T. Smith, 1962). 
30 (Stewart, 2004a, 2012). 
31 (Stewart, 2012) reports that in the colonial period production in the respective countries was designed 
to meet the needs of the controlling imperial powers. As a result even today production mainly targets 
exports while domestic consumption is heavily dependent on imports. The author, however, does not 
examine the availability of domestic resources for reorganizing domestic production to produce goods for 
domestic consumption. See, pp. 162-9. See also, (Stewart, 2004a), pp. 43-53. 
32 (Stewart, 2012) notes that the CARICOM member states have become a major trans-shipment route to 
the USA for Colombian drugs; pp. 168-9. See also, (Stewart, 2004a), p. 50. 
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accordingly, discrimination in access to finance and other services.33 In addition, 
Stewart emphasises that the extreme vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, the 
large informal sector, and the current incomplete legal and institutional reforms make 
regional cooperation even more difficult.34 
The abovementioned problems of the Caribbean nations are mutually deteriorating. The 
growing drug-trafficking and security concerns across the region are well documented.  
As the Caribbean Islands are geographically placed between the major drug producers35 
and consumers36, drug trafficking as well as consumption create formidable political 
and economic challenges for the region. In his insightful speech on drugs and crime in 
the Caribbean, Griffith suggests that drug trafficking should not be seen only as a 
military matter (i.e. a matter that requires delegation of police duties to the military), but 
considered from the nexus of geography, power and politics.37 One of the two case 
studies examined by Griffith to demonstrate the multidimensional influence of drugs 
and drug trafficking is the ‘Dudus Affair’ that took place in Jamaica in 2009.38 The case 
concerned the extradition of a drug baron called ‘Dudus’ to the US to stand trial for 
alleged distribution of guns and illegal drugs. Attempts to execute the extradition order 
met with local resistance and led to violent clashes between supporters of the drug 
baron (who received the support of the other drug barons in addition to that of people 
under his control) and security forces. The event led to the declaration of a state of 
emergency in the respective constituencies, and to the death of over 70 people.39 In the 
following two years, participation of some parliamentary members in the process 
caused a governmental crisis, and resulted in reshuffles in prime minister Golding’s 
cabinet, and eventually led to Golding’s withdrawal from the next elections inter alia 
for losing the trust of the people.40 The total monetary cost of this unrest is estimated to 
be around US$ 258.8 million, which represented about 2.1% of the 2009 GDP and 50% 
of tourism GDP in Jamaica.41    
																																																								
33(Stewart, 2012), pp. 163-4. 
34 Ibid., pp. 162-9, and (Stewart, 2004a), pp. 43-53. 
35 The Andean Region is reported to be the world’s only source of coca and cocaine. Opium poppy, 
heroin and cannabis are also produced in the Latin America region. See, (Seelke, Wyler, Beittel, & 
Sullivan, 2011), pp. 1-3.  
36 The region’s proximity to the U.S. makes it a natural route for drug trafficking; see, ibid. 
37 (Griffith, 2011), p. 4. 
38 Ibid, pp. 14-8. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 16. 
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As regional integration and abolition of internal barriers to intra-regional trade might 
only gradually and in the long term contribute to the solution of above-mentioned 
financial and social problems, the CARICOM member states needed to finance an 
important part of their regional integration process by raising aid from their 
international development partners.42 Despite this foreign aid, not all member states 
were able to comply with the requirements of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas on 
their own account. One example is Article 170(2) of the RTC which obliges each 
member state to establish and maintain its own NCA. Due to their smaller size, member 
states of the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (the OECS) decided to 
establish a single competition authority with exclusive legal enforcement power for this 
entire sub-region. It is expected that regional integration of the OECS member states 
will rationalise the provision of public services, help to eliminate duplication of the 
administrative structures, and will give the sub-region a better representation 
opportunity both on regional and international platforms.43  
The OECS is a sub-group of the CARICOM bloc, which is formed by less-developed 
CARICOM member states in accordance with the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981.44 In 
line with the core argument of this thesis, instead of cooperating in specific policy areas, 
such as the competition policy, on an independent basis, the OECS member states 
decided to enter into a separate, deeper regional integration agreement which would 
allow them to enjoy joint regional representation in the CARICOM, and an opportunity 
of joint legal enforcement in fulfilling the requirements of CARICOM legislation. This 
might be explained by the OECS member states’ intention to cooperate closely in 
numerous policy areas, and the potential influence of such cooperation on national 
politics and economies of the member states. It is likely that entering into a deep RTA 
has provided member states of the OECS with a better ground to cooperate, to 
harmonise their laws, and to facilitate law enforcement at the regional level. Currently 
having seven member states and two associate members, in some policy areas the 
																																																								
42 A recent press release from the CARICOM Secretariat reconfirmed that the CARICOM member states 
have a limited capacity to finance their self-development, and reemphasized the value of the international 
funding for the region. See, (CARICOM, 2013b). 
43 See (Schipke, Cebotari, & Thacker, 2013), pp. 4-5. 
44 For more information, see, www.oecs.org (accessed on January 13, 2014). 
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OECS has indeed achieved a deeper cooperation among its member states than has been 
evident under CARICOM integration.45  
The OECS Economic Union is one of the four regional currency unions in the world, 
using the Eastern Caribbean Dollar, which is pegged to the US dollar (with a fixed 
exchange rate).46 In 2010 the OECS member states signed the Revised Treaty of 
Basseterre, which established the OECS Economic Union, and increased the level of 
harmonisation envisaged for the region’s economic policies. Despite the treaties 
between the OECS member states requiring the formation of a customs union, this is yet 
to be accomplished.47 In addition, hampered by the recent global financial crisis and the 
tourism-dependency of the respective economies, the OECS bloc still experiences 
significant financial constraints, which slow economic growth48 and regionalisation.  
As a part of this broader integration effort in the OECS, the competition enforcement 
authority of the OECS is expected to become operational by 2014.49 So far the actual 
cooperation in competition law and policy between the CARICOM Competition 
Commission and the OECS has been limited to provision of technical assistance from 
the former to the latter.50 
CARICOM and OECS experience shows that the formation of a deep RTA on paper 
cannot offer instant relief from economic constraints and the problems of good 
governance. To address these problems developing countries need to enforce various 
policy reforms, invest in infrastructure and improve the legal and financial investment 
environment. With an awareness of this aspect, the goals of regional competition law 
enforcement in CARICOM are interpreted to include strengthening the broader regional 
integration process in the regional bloc.51 Undertaking a broad array of policy reforms, 
however, often requires full political support of all participating national governments, 
which is often not easy to obtain.  
																																																								
45 The current member states of the OECS are Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and 
British Virgin Islands are British Overseas Territories, and are associate members of the OECS (as well 
as the CARICOM). While Anguilla is a full member of the currency union and uses the Eastern 
Caribbean Dollar, the British Virgin Islands do not use the common currency. 
46  The other regional currency unions are the EU, the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union. See, (Schipke et al., 2013), pp. 3-4. 




51 See (Stewart, 2012), p. 177; (Beckford, 2010),  p. 187 and; (Menns & Eversley, 2011), pp. 12-5. See 
also Section 4.7 above. 
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The following section examines the concerns about national sovereignty which might 
constitute another significant obstacle to regionalisation.  
 
Section 5.3 Preference for Intergovernmentalism over Supranationalism  
Successful coordination of any governmental action across member states of a regional 
bloc is always a challenging task since it requires balancing divergent national interests 
as well as those of the regional bloc as a whole. Furthermore, different legal, political 
and institutional traditions of member states often constitutes a formidable obstacle to 
the coordination of governmental action since, when such differences exist, regional 
institutions and decision-making processes must be reconciled with all different 
traditions.52 Regional decision-making and cooperation will become more burdensome 
to member states the more their legal, political and institutional traditions are in conflict.  
In addition to the difficulties deriving from the coordination of regional law and policy 
enforcement, RTAs can be found to pose a threat to the autonomy of the national 
governments of member states by their very subject. As in any other international 
agreement, in RTAs member states agree to limit their external autonomy for the 
purposes of the realisation of the objectives of regional integration. For instance, 
agreeing to eliminate certain trade barriers, allowing free movement of factors within 
regional borders, and leaving the supervision of certain trade moves to supranational 
institutions are all significant limitations to an independent state’s power, which would 
traditionally be considered matters of national sovereignty.53 Moreover, independent 
states cooperating as a regional group often seek to adopt certain rules and principles 
aimed at establishing order in regional negotiation, and providing sustainability of 
regional decision-making and law enforcement procedure. These common principles 
regulating regional cooperation can present another strand of limitations to the national 
sovereignty of member states.  
The core question any country that is party to an RTA has to decide is the degree of 
sovereign power that it is willing to relinquish for the purposes of that RTA.54 A critical 
dilemma is that on the one hand states act with self-interest (the main motive and first 
																																																								
52 (Kassim, 2001), pp. 1-3. 
53 For a brief historical review of changes in the definition of ‘sovereignty’, see (Jennings, 2002); pp. 27-
30.     
54 From the international law perspective this is a well-known struggle. See, ibid. pp. 33-8. 
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duty of all states is to maximise the security and wellbeing of their own citizens and to 
this end protect the political influence of their own national governments),55 but on the 
other hand, today’s increased inter-dependencies, economic and other, oblige states to 
find joint solutions for their common problems of existence. States agree to regional (or 
international) political arrangements for peaceful co-operation and co-existence. 56 
Tailoring regional (or international) solutions to common problems of independent 
states, however, often involves a long process of acknowledgement of conflicting 
national interests, negotiation of conflicts, information asymmetries, compromise, and 
ultimately -if successful-, reconciliation.57  Independent states act both as creators and 
enforcers of regional and international law and policy. Therefore, nation-states are the 
main determinants of the success of any regional arrangement. While some deep 
regional integrations create technocratic institutions for observing compliance of 
member states with their political commitments, because such regional arrangements 
take their legitimacy through the consent of national governments, the authority of a 
regional technocratic institution to oblige a member state to act against its will is 
limited.58 This is a factor which may help to explain why today’s regional blocs are 
largely governed by intergovernmental mechanisms and reconciliation. Besides, there is 
also the security aspect of deep RTAs. As explained in Chapter 3 above, elimination of 
certain trade restrictions lies at the heart of all RTAs. From a political perspective, it 
was noted above that economic interdependency created by a deep RTA carries political 
implications for the national security of member states. In this respect:  
‘…trade can enhance or undermine the security of the state. The latter perspective leads 
to a desire to promote economic autarky in order to minimise dependence on foreign 
																																																								
55 (Brus, 2002), pp. 1-5. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) theory can give a realistic account of political dynamics of decision-
making in regional integrations. The LI theory is based on two basic political assumptions. Firstly, it 
assumes that states are political actors and that ‘states achieve their goals through intergovernmental 
negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political 
decisions.’ Secondly, the LI theory assumes that states are rational. Accordingly, states ‘calculate the 
utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under 
the circumstances.’ In the context of the above two assumptions, LI theory explains the decision-making 
process in regional blocs in a three-stage framework: States first decide on their national preferences 
according to their geopolitical ideas and individual interests. Secondly, international bargaining takes 
place, which is shaped by information asymmetries and asymmetrical interdependence. Lastly, credible 
commitments of member states are decided, and/or regional institutions are created or adjusted for 
technocratic management. See, (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009), pp. 67-73. 
58 This influence can be strengthened only when the regional institution is formed by direct representation 
of the people of the respective region. The limited representation of the people of Europe in the EU 
institutions is an important fact suggesting a democracy deficit in the EU; see, (Habermas, 2013). 
203 
 
powers. This reinforces the point that whilst it is necessary to yield some sovereignty in 
order to maintain the international regime as a public good, there would always be 
tensions regarding how much sovereignty to yield and therefore a presumption in 
favour of intergovernmentalism.’59  
The degree of mutual trust between member states, and the terms of their political and 
economic relationship are usually the key determinants of individual member states’ 
approach to regional integration, and their preference between intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism. When member states of a regional bloc have a long history of war 
and political dispute, then, in the absence of trust on the peace-promoting function of 
regionalisation, they might act too cautiously in adopting supranational policy 
measures, and more generally, in establishing strong commercial ties which might affect 
their economic independence. ASEAN is a commonly cited example of regional blocs 
in which the long history of war, ideological conflict and lack of trust between member 
states rendered stagnant the advancement of the regional integration.60   
The examples of regional blocs in which the tension between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism is present can be multiplied, and found in all continents. For example, 
the need to re-adjust the division of power between the EU institutions and EU member 
states has been subject to continuous debate since the early days of European 
integration. The current political debate on the subject might lead the UK to a 
referendum on its EU membership in 2017. No doubt this can be read as a clear sign of 
substantial disagreement concerning the optimal division of power between the EU 
institutions and EU member states.61  
As noted above, economic and political expectations of member states are decisive in 
the power national governments are willing to assign to supranational mechanisms.  
Getting the consent of national governments to significant power transfers under a deep 
RTA might not be a realistic expectation, at least until the supposed benefits of regional 
integration start to be enjoyed by member states. This suggests that, especially at the 
early stages of regional integration, inter-governmental cooperation might need to be 
developed on a voluntary basis with the consensus of all regional partners. For 
furtherance of a regional integration process, member states can be advised to be 
																																																								
59 (Draper, 2010), p. 12. See also, (Kelly, 2005). 
60 (Lin, 2010), p. 821-2. 
61 The EU referendum bill of the UK can be accessed at: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-
14/europeanunionreferendum.html (accessed on March 3, 2014). 
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extremely clear on the objectives of the regional integration that they wish to establish, 
and to assess the feasibility of any action plan that all member states agree to follow.                               
In his work focussing on Africa in general, and Southern Africa in particular, Draper 
(2010) challenges the aptness of a EU-style regional integration for Africa.62 Instead, he 
argues for very formal and limited economic cooperation between the African states. 
Such cooperation, he claims, should ideally be limited to trade facilitation and 
improvement of physical infrastructure, and regulated solely on an intergovernmental 
basis. 63  Draper objects that supranational institutions and substantial legal 
harmonisation in broad economic and non-economic policy areas would not ensure 
economic development and good governance in Africa. In order to justify his 
unorthodox claim, Draper relies on the literature on the internal dynamics of African 
states.64 He argues that African states do not share a common political ideology upon 
which regional integration can be built. By this, he means common values, which would 
guide and inform the terms of regional cooperation; such as the high place afforded to 
democracy and fundamental human rights in the European integration. Informed by the 
literature, Draper notes that the lack of a common ideology would lead to conflicts 
between African states when they form a regional integration.65 Secondly, he indicates 
that because of their unique history, many African states do not have strong 
governments that are capable of undertaking substantive policy reforms. In addition, he 
mentions the still very present problem of regulatory capture, cronyism and 
corruption.66 Given these characteristics, Draper argues that the European experience, 
that an established deep RTA will preserve peace, is unlikely to hold true for African 
states. On the other hand, Draper rightly notes that the main trading partners of African 
states are developed economies. Due to low level of trade within Africa, Draper stresses 
the risk of trade diversion and agglomeration.67 He therefore concludes that African 
states should rather aim to achieve better trade deals with the developed world and 
pursue only limited economic cooperation agreements with their neighbours in the 
continent.   
																																																								
62 (Draper, 2010).  
63 Ibid. pp. 21-3. 
64 Ibid. pp. 12-4.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid, pp. 16-20. 
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Some concerns reported by Draper about the political dynamics in African states are 
hard to disagree with. In this respect the enforceability of an RTA will inevitably be 
affected if the national government of one (or more) member state(s) does not have the 
power of legal enforcement within its own territory. Problems of political governance 
and ideology, however, need to be addressed by all African states, no matter within or 
outside a regional integration. Draper seems to underrate the transformative power of 
international dialogue in promoting democratic values and human rights.68 However, 
successful examples can be found in the European integration and the MERCOSUR, 
both of which require their member states to comply with a set of political conditions 
including embracing democracy. Nor are Draper’s economic conclusions irreversible. 
While it is true that regional integrations are likely to bring higher economic returns 
when signed by states with a high volume of intra-regional trade, in any agreement trade 
diversion can be avoided by keeping external trade barriers low (in other words, by 
allowing imports from non-members). In addition, trade diversion and agglomeration 
would still be viable economic risks for the region under more restricted trade 
agreements negotiated on purely intergovernmental grounds. Lastly, Draper’s 
recommendation to develop regional cooperation projects for improving physical 
infrastructure and encouraging good governance in a way resembles the emerging 
‘silent integration’ concept in Latin America.69 When the necessary funding can be 
found for such a project, depending on its scope and terms, it may help vitalisation of 
intra-African trade, reduce the risk of agglomeration, and therefore provide important 
benefits to African states.    
Finding a fine balance between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is decisive 
for the success of all regional (and international) arrangements, and in this, regional 
competition law and policy enforcement is no exception. Different political, legal and 
institutional traditions may constitute a serious obstacle to the formation of a regional 
competition policy and law. Moreover, even when common ground for a regional 
competition policy is reached, different development goals member states might like to 
pursue in competition policy might translate into inconsistencies in legal practice. In 
addition, member states might have an explicit desire to protect their core industries 
																																																								
68 Contrary to Draper, Gathii notes that ‘[t]here is indeed evidence showing that there are gains in non-
trade areas, such as security, arising from regional economic integration arrangements …[in Africa]’ 
[(Gathii, 2010), p 597 (emphasis added)]. 
69 See fn. 199 in Chapter 4 above. 
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and/or national champions from the discipline of competition. In this regard, too much 
tendency towards intergovernmentalism may risk the operation of regional competition 
authorities, where present. In the absence of a regional competition authority, on the 
other hand, such protectionist practices would be at greater risk of being unobserved.  
CARICOM can again be cited as an example to demonstrate the potential restrictions to 
regional competition law enforcement caused by a strong tendency towards 
intergovernmentalism. As mentioned in earlier chapters, although the CARICOM 
member states have established a regional competition authority in order to ensure 
uniform implementation of regional competition policy across the CARICOM region, 
the enforcement power of this regional body (i.e. CARICOM Competition Commission) 
is significantly restricted. According to Articles 175 and 176 of the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas, in investigation of alleged anti-competitive business conduct, the 
CARICOM Competition Commission is obliged to request the NCAs of the relevant 
CARICOM member states to investigate the alleged infringement at the preliminary 
stage. The Commission can initiate an own investigation only when it finds the outcome 
of the relevant NCA(s)’s investigation unsatisfactory. Even in the latter case, the RTC 
requires the Commission and the relevant NCAs to reach a consensus on the final 
outcome of such investigations, in the absence of which the case is referred to the 
CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), which is a 
political institution formed by political agents of CARICOM member states, for final 
decision.70 This dependency of the CARICOM Competition Commission on the NCAs 
of member states as well as on COTED not only opens the way for political influence, 
but may also risk spoliation of the evidence that would otherwise have been available. 
In addition, Articles 182 and 183 of the RTC authorise COTED to grant sector-wide or 
specific exceptions and exemptions from competition law enforcement when ‘public 
interest’ so requires.71 In this regard, political interference in the regional competition 
enforcement, if used extensively, might hinder the independence, and therefore the 
success of the CARICOM regional competition law regime. 
																																																								
70 See Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 in Chapter 3. COTED normally reaches a decision with a qualified 
majority, but issues which are ‘of critical importance to the well-being of a Member State’ require the 
affirmative vote of all CARICOM members. See, Article 29 of the RTC. 
71 (Beckford, 2010) confirms that CARICOM member states are allowed a degree of flexibility in 
pursuing regional as well as national development objectives in their application of competition law and 
policy. See also, (Menns & Eversley, 2011), pp. 12-5. 
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In light of the above, it may be concluded that the dynamics of the political and 
economic relationship between the member states of a deep regional integration will 
determine the opinion of member states on the optimum level of sovereign power that 
can be transferred to the supranational institutions for the purposes of the regional 
integration. In the absence of trust between regional partners, or in the regional 
integration process itself, independent states are more likely to prefer intergovernmental 
decision-making and enforcement. However, this may in return disrupt law and policy 
enforcement, in particular at the regional level. The effect of this vulnerability of 
regional enforcement holds not only competition policy, but also for the entire regional 
integration plan in general.  
The next section will discuss the complementary role of competition policy in deep 
RTAs. The section will attempt to explain why states enter into multiple RTAs with 
conflicting competition policy provisions, and why regional competition policy 
arrangements are not always implemented. 
 
 Section 5.4 The Lack of Enforcement, the Complementary Role of 
Competition Policy in RTAs, and Conflicting Competition Policy 
Commitments under Multiple RTAs 
A close look at the motives of the sovereign states in entering into deep RTAs in 
Chapter 4 above showed that economic development and promoting peace are the 
primary objectives of regional integration. Accordingly, it was concluded that in the 
context of deep RTAs competition policy plays only a complementary role of ensuring 
that the primary objectives of regional integration are not prevented by competition 
infringement by private or state enterprises.72  
Due to this complementary role of competition policy in deep regional integration, the 
weight given to regional competition law and policy is likely to be dependent on at least 
three factors: (i) political commitment of the parties to implementation of the broader 
regional integration arrangements as well as the regional competition law, (ii) success of 
the broader regional integration, and (iii) coherence of the competition policy with the 
objectives of the broader regional integration. With respect to the last point, the extent 
to which the parties find competition policy relevant to the primary objectives of 
broader integration gains significance. The national competition law enforcement 
																																																								
72 See Section 4.7 of Chapter 4 above.  
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practice of member states may inform the decision of respective national governments 
on the necessity of establishing a competition law and enforcement system at the 
regional level. With respect to the adaptation of the EU competition provisions in the 
Treaty of Rome, for instance, it is reported that both French and German delegations 
tried to transfer ‘the important elements of their national economic systems’ to the 
European Common Market structure.73 It is suggested that the German negotiators who 
were then imbued by ordoliberal thinking in their national legislation sought a strict 
form of competition law, whereas the French negotiators viewed competition law more 
as an administrative matter.74 The French tended to conceive competition law in 
political and policy terms, therefore preferring to base decisions on evaluation of the 
needs of the European Community and its Member States.75 The remaining EU member 
states ranged between the German and French approaches.76  
In practice it is possible for states to agree on competition policy commitments in deep 
RTAs without thoroughly assessing the separate arrangements that are required to fulfil 
those commitments. In many regional blocs formed by developing countries it can be 
observed that national governments are not always willing or able to undertake large-
scale investments required to establish a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system.77 In this context, the observation of Gathii (2010) about African 
RTAs is illustrative.78   
According to Gathii: 
‘…African RTAs are designed as flexible regimes. Flexibility here refers to the 
following defining features of African RTAs: First, these RTAs are regarded as 
establishing flexible regimes of cooperation as opposed to containing rules requiring 
scrupulous and rigorous adherence. Second, African RTAs incorporate as a central 
feature the principle of variable geometry, adopting steps for meeting timetabled and 
other commitments. Third, African RTAs adopt a broad array of social, economic and 
																																																								
73 (Gerber, 2001), pp. 343-4. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., p. 346. 
76 Ibid., p. 344. On her examination of the travaux préparatoires (preparatory works) of the competition 
rules of the EU, Akman challenges the common view that Article 102 TFEU is a product of 
‘ordoliberalism’. Rather the author suggests that increasing ‘efficiency’ was the main intention of the 
drafters of the EU competition laws. [(Akman, 2009), pp. 267-303.]  
77 With respect to regionalization, many developing countries struggle with setting realistic objectives and 
time plans for achievable targets. In relation to this problem, it is hard to disagree with the President of 
the African Development Bank, Donald Kaberuka who stated that ‘[t]he most dangerous thing is to 
confuse an action plan with action.’ See, (UNCTAD, 2013a), p. 60. 
78 (Gathii, 2010). 
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political objectives without giving salience to any set of objectives. Fourth, African 
RTAs demonstrate a particular preference for functionally specific objectives to 
undertake discrete projects and to serve as forums for the integrated development of 
common resources, such as river basins that cut across national boundaries. Fifth, 
African RTAs demonstrate a remarkable commitment to the equitable distribution of 
gains from trade and a corresponding weakness in the adoption of non-discrimination 
trade principles and the related objectives of trade liberalization. Sixth, African RTAs 
are characterized by multiple and overlapping memberships, exemplifying a classic case 
of the ― “spaghetti bowl”. [See, Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation 
with Free Trade Agreements’ in The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade 
Agreements, Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds.,1995. A “spaghetti bowl" is a 
metaphor used to describe a system in which crisscrossing strands of bilateral trade 
agreements create a tangled mess of restrictions and regulations, ultimately disrupting 
rather than promoting free trade.] Multiple RTA membership illustrates the flexibility 
of open-door membership that African RTAs offer.’79 
Gathii observes that African RTAs do not require strict adherence; and in line with the 
governing ‘variable geometry principle’, member states of an African RTA are allowed 
to opt-in to or out of certain regional policies, and to implement agreed regional policies 
at different speeds according to their national needs and preferences.80  
The main purpose of the variable geometry principle is to facilitate regional cooperation 
between a group of countries with different development levels and/or different political 
priorities. Countries which might not be fully convinced that a given regional policy is 
in their domestic interests, or which might be unsure about the budget that they can 
allocate to implement a regional policy in the   long-term, are allowed an extended time-
schedule for implementation, or temporarily or permanently to opt out of that regional 
arrangement, subject to the consent of remaining member states. This flexibility in 
regional cooperation also ensures that a sub-group of member states, which are willing 
and ready to cooperate, can proceed with further integration. The variable geometry 
																																																								
79 Ibid., p. 573. 
80 Ibid., p. 628-40, 609. The principle of variable geometry first appeared in the documents and treaties of 
the EU. Later on the term gained a widespread use in multiple platforms, in particular in the WTO 
negotiations. [(Lloyd, 2009), p. 52.] Scollay suggests that variable geometry may operate in two ways: 
‘[It] could involve a single agreement in which the members assume different ranges and levels of 
obligations, possibly on the basis of agreed criteria that might include levels of development. It could 
also involve overlapping agreements, where one agreement containing “core” provisions, to which all 
parties subscribe, coexists with separate agreements in which more advanced obligations are assumed by 
subsets of the members of the “core” agreement that are in a position to do so’ [(Scollay, 2007), pp. 128-
9 (emphasis added)]. 
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principle may facilitate regional integration among bigger groups of countries and speed 
regionalisation. Extensive use of the principle, however, may complicate the internal 
dynamics of regional blocs and make calculation of the effects of further regionalisation 
within a sub-group on the rest of the regional bloc harder. In addition, when combined 
with a lax attitude towards legal enforcement, such flexibility may increase legal 
uncertainties concerning the state of regionalisation in the respective regional blocs.  
As Gathii demonstrates, the flexibility of African RTAs motivates African states to 
become members of multiple RTAs, because such membership provides them with free 
access to a bigger geographical market, and helps them to benefit from specific projects 
undertaken under different RTAs -such as those concerning use of a shared water 
source, or improvement of a physical infrastructure- simultaneously.81 When a state has 
signed up to multiple RTAs and the terms of these agreements are in conflict with one 
another, Gathii notes that it may have the option to choose between the conflicting RTA 
provisions in accordance with its national interest in a particular situation.82 Because 
disobedience to regional laws is not prosecuted in general83, membership of multiple 
RTAs in the African context translates into widened trade options for sovereign states, 
with no necessary sanctions against noncompliance, or other political burdens. Yet, by 
being party to multiple RTAs, African states are required to observe the various 
interests under different regional arrangements instead of focussing on a single RTA. 
As a result, membership of multiple RTAs constitutes an obstacle to achieving deep 
regional integration.84 Furthermore, Gathii recognises that African states do not intend 
to establish strong supranational institutions that can exercise authority over member 
states to ensure their compliance with regional laws and policy arrangements.85 In 
essence, Gathii implies that regional integration efforts in Africa are mainly governed 
by inter-governmental decision-making. Despite the above concerns, however, Gathii is 
far from being pessimistic about the value of regional integrations in Africa. He 
emphasises, in particular, the importance of the improvements achieved by regional 
cooperation on specific infrastructural projects under African RTAs, and enhanced 
																																																								
81 (Gathii, 2010), pp. 648-53.  
82 Ibid., in particular, pp. 650-1. 
83 Ibid., p. 641. Likewise, Hartzenberg notes that most regional integrations in Africa lack a sanctioning 
mechanism against noncompliance, and even when such mechanisms exist, monitoring of compliance is 
either weak or completely absent. See, (Hartzenberg, 2011), pp. 18-9. See also, (UNCTAD, 2013a), pp. 
57-8. 
84 Ibid., pp. 664-5. For a similar conclusion, see, (Yang & Gupta, 2005), p. 15. 
85 (Gathii, 2010), pp. 574-5. 
211 
 
informal cooperation as a result of the links established through these regional 
integration arrangements.86  
Gathii’s observations on African RTAs provide an insight into possible reasons for the 
slow speed of regionalisation, as well as for the prominence of multiple RTA 
membership in Africa. Gathii’s generalisation that African RTAs do not contain rules 
requiring rigid compliance and the establishment of strong supranational bureaucracies, 
however, may not be fully representative of all RTAs in the region. For example, as will 
be examined in more detail in the following paragraphs, strong supranational 
institutions and binding regional laws are, at least on paper, among the features of 
regional integration in the WAEMU. The same can be said of the COMESA.87 
Likewise, it is not clear whether specific projects under African RTAs on the use of 
common resources or the improvement of physical infrastructure need to be undertaken 
in the context of a broader regional integration setting. On the other hand, when the 
speed of regionalisation under the RTAs formed by developing countries is considered, 
a degree of stagnation in the implementation of the regional policies is ubiquitous. 
Besides, the extensive use of the variable geometry principle by developing countries 
inevitably makes the outcomes of the respective RTAs unpredictable and inefficient.  
Similar concerns have been reported with respect to regional integrations in Latin 
America. Domínguez (2007) cites lax legal enforcement as one of the chief challenges 
to regionalisation in Latin America.88 He criticises Latin American governments and the 
US for negotiating and signing regional agreements/protocols that they do not intend to 
ratify in the first place (as a result of which the agreements/protocols never gain legal 
effect). According to Domínguez, the reason for these political moves is to manage the 
relationship with other states in the Americas, and to be ‘Inter-American team 
players’.89 Likewise, in an article specifically dealing with the legal character and force 
of the MERCOSUR laws, Vervaele (2005) demonstrates that in MERCOSUR the 
adoption of regional laws is heavily reliant on internal procedures and agenda of 
member states. 90  In this respect the two fundamental principles of the EU law, 
																																																								
86 Ibid., pp. 584-7. 
87 In the COMESA the regional competition enforcement body started its operations only on January 14, 
2013; and since then there have been significant amendments to the COMESA competition laws. See, 
http://www.comesacompetition.org (accessed on January 27, 2014). 
88 (Dominguez, 2007), pp. 94-7.  
89 Ibid. 
90 (Vervaele, 2005), pp. 392-4. 
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supremacy and direct effect, are not embraced; and there is no mechanism (that might 
be activated by member states, by MERCOSUR institutions, or by the citizens of 
member states) to force MERCOSUR member states to ratify and to duly incorporate 
the regional laws into their domestic law.91 As a result, Varvaele reports, ‘[o]nly 40 per 
cent of the always unanimous decisions have been effectively incorporated by all 
[MERCOSUR member states] and have therefore entered into force.’92 Presumably, the 
actual implementation rate of such unanimous decisions is even lower.   
As noted above, the presence of a sustained and strong political commitment to broader 
regional economic (and political) integration, as well as to regional competition policy, 
is vital to the establishment of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
system. The factors that distract countries from focussing on a single deep RTA can 
constitute significant obstacles to the progress of deeper regional integration. This 
problem might be more significant in the case of developing countries as membership 
of multiple RTAs inevitably means higher administrative costs and the division of 
already limited resources among the various interests of multiple regional integration 
arrangements.  
Concerning the political decision-making process behind regional competition law and 
policy Gerber (2012) differentiates between the formal regionalisation of competition 
law (in other words, establishment of a regional competition law regime), and the 
implementation of (formally recognised) regional competition laws.93 The author points 
out the involvement of different political actors, officials and private interest holders, 
and different political motives in these two political dimensions. 
‘On the one hand, decisional influences relating to the political authority tend to support 
formal regionalisation. There are many incentives formally to regionalise competition 
law, and the costs of formal regionalisation tend to be limited. On the other hand, 
however, political factors provide far less support for implementation of competition 
law at the regional level. There the costs are higher and political benefits more limited. 
(…) Officials, politicians and other decision makers have conflicting incentives that are 
likely to lead them to talk about regionalisation as a positive step, but act in ways that 
are inconsistent with significant enforcement. [This can be referred to] as bi-level 
conduct – one form of discourse and action that is directed towards global and regional 
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92 Ibid., p. 394.  
93 (Gerber, 2012).  
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communities, but decisions about enforcement that focus on local needs and political 
relationships.’94 
In his article Gerber examines the political influences on the establishment of a regional 
competition law regime, and on the enforcement of regional laws at three levels: 
national-level influences, regional-level influences, and extra-regional level influences. 
At these three levels, Gerber considers the following interest groups: states (in general), 
politicians, domestic institutions that are in charge of enforcing national competition 
law, domestic institutions that are in charge of other domestic policies but expected to 
have an interest in regional competition law enforcement (such as ministries of 
commerce and their interest in strengthening domestic market players), regional 
institutions that are in charge of enforcing regional competition law, regional 
institutions that are in charge of other regional policies but expected to have an interest 
in regional competition law enforcement (such as political institutions of regional blocs 
which are authorised to decide on the budget or enforcement priorities of the regional 
competition enforcement bodies), private businesses, domestic professional groups, and 
international organisations working on trade and competition policy matters. Gerber 
concludes that signing RTAs with competition provisions can be more desirable for 
developing countries than implementing these agreements. This might be explained by 
the relatively low cost of negotiating such RTAs. In addition, as Gerber points out, 
international and domestic interest groups might be more interested in getting such 
agreements signed than ensuring that they are implemented.95 When it comes to the 
implantation of regional competition law, however, national-interest focussed polities of 
member states are likely to create more concrete problems that are capable of 
obstructing legal enforcement. Such problems may concern, in particular, the division 
of competences between regional and national levels, and determination of competition 
enforcement priorities (‘who is enforcing, with which budget, against whom, for whose 
benefit?’).96 The author suggests that these various political dynamics need to be 
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95 From the perspective of external influences over regional competition law enforcement, Gerber 
indicates that international organisations, such as the UNCTAD and the ICN, often pay significantly more 
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unearthed and negotiated in each regional bloc, and adequate legal solutions tailored. In 
addition Gerber duly notes that regional integration is a ‘process - a set of interactions 
over time among an identifiable set of participants’ rather than a single political 
incidence.97 As the dynamics of the political relationship between the abovementioned 
influence groups changes over time and with the influence of national, regional, and 
international politics, regional competition law arrangements may develop slowly 
within the process of regionalisation.98 
Besides the enforcement problems deriving from the difficulty of cooperation between 
independent states at the regional level, as mentioned previously, conflicting 
commitments of developing countries under multiple RTAs often constitute a further 
obstacle to deep regional integration, and therefore to the establishment of a workable 
regional competition law enforcement system.  
Membership of multiple deep RTAs is common among developing countries and, in 
particular, African states. By 2013, out of 53 only 3 African states (i.e. Algeria, Cape 
Verde and Mozambique) were affiliated to only one African economic community.99 Of 
the remaining 50 African states, most have overlapping membership of three or more 
regional groupings.100 Although the majority of African RTAs envisage limited or no 
regional cooperation on competition policy, few deep RTAs, including the COMESA 
and the WAEMU, require their member states to establish fully fledged regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems with supranational institutions that are 
trusted with law enforcement authority.  
Some major problems of regionally integrated competition law enforcement, and the 
way these problems might become even more complex in a multiple RTAs setting will 
be explained below by drawing on regional competition law enforcement in the 
WAEMU, and its anticipated integration into the greater regional competition law 
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states (covered under ‘process factors and product factors’ titles under national-level influences). The 
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97 Ibid., p. 255. 
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enforcement arrangement under the ECOWAS – all WAEMU member states have an 
overlapping membership of the ECOWAS but not all ECOWAS member states are also 
members of the WAEMU. It is important to note, however, that each regional bloc has 
its unique set of political and economic dynamics, and in line with these, unique legal 
problems. Furthermore, it appears that the internal dynamics of regional blocs show 
dramatic disparities across different continents. The review below of regional 
competition enforcement in the WAEMU and ECOWAS is intended to give an 
impression of the types of problem that developing countries may face, rather than 
reach generally applicable conclusions for all regional blocs formed by developing 
countries.  
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, a.k.a. UEOMA - Union 
Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine) is formed of eight countries from West 
Africa, namely, Bénin, Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Sénégal and Togo, in 
1994. Guinée Bissau joined the union in 1997. The purpose of the regional integration 
in WAEMU is to promote economic integration among the countries that share a 
common currency [i.e. the CFA (Colonies Francaises d’Afrique) franc], common 
language,101 and common legal traditions.102 According to Article 4 of the Treaty on the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (the WAEMU Treaty)103, the ultimate 
objective is to establish a common market with free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and persons, and the freedom of establishment. The WAEMU Commission is 
the executive authority of the Union, which is located in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso, 
and is financed by a one percent levy on all imports by WAEMU.104 The Commission’s 
executive powers include the authority to refer cases to the WAEMU Court of Justice, 
or to propose legislative initiatives to the political bodies of the Union – the Council of 
Ministers and the Conference of Heads of State.105 Article 6 of the WAEMU Treaty 
rules that WAEMU law has supremacy and direct effect over the national laws of 
WAEMU member states.106  
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102 (Bakhoum, 2006), p. 654. 
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104 (Meyer, Fenyes, Breitenbach, & Idsardi, 2010), p. 31. 
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Articles 88-90 of the WAEMU Treaty set out the primary competition legislation of the 
Union, which prohibits unilateral restriction to competition, abuse of dominance and 
state aid.107 Although in the early days of WAEMU integration there was ambiguity in 
the allocation of competences between the regional institutions and the NCAs of 
WAEMU member states, in 2000 the opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/UEMOA of the 
WAEMU Court of Justice clarified the law, ruling that the WAEMU Commission has 
exclusive authority to decide all matters of competition law within the Union.108 
Accordingly, unlike the shared competence (between national and regional institutions) 
principle embraced by the EU competition regime, the Court ruled that the WAEMU 
Commission would decide all competition cases regardless of the presence of any cross-
border element, or any effect on trade between member states. Consequently the court’s 
ruling significantly reduced the competence of the NCAs of WAEMU member states 
(yet the NCAs, when present, were and still are obliged to assist the WAEMU 
Commission)109, and restricted the legislation and enforcement authority of member 
states to areas remaining outside WAEMU jurisdiction, such as the criminal aspect of 
the competition infringement.110  
Although centralization of competition law enforcement under a regional institution can 
prevent inconsistent implementation of regional law by the national institutions of 
member states, and can thereby contribute to legal certainty, in the case of WAEMU, 
regional competition law enforcement so far could not succeed in effectively dealing 
with all competition issues in the region. The reasons suggested for the poor 
performance of WAEMU competition regime are multiple. Firstly, the WAEMU 
member states, and in particular Senegal, which adopted its national competition law as 
early as 1994, challenged the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the WAEMU Treaty on 
division of competence on competition law enforcement between national and regional 
institutions. It is suggested that this might have triggered unwillingness on the part of 
the member states to submit purely national cases for review by the WAEMU 
Commission, and thereby restricted the number of cases brought for competition law 
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allowed to request negative clearance from the WAEMU Commission. See (Matthieu, 2011), p. 2.  
108 See (WAEMU, 2004), p. 5. On the abovementioned opinion of the WAEMU Court of Justice, see 
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adjudication at the regional level.111 Secondly, a general criticism of the centralized 
enforcement is that it creates a distance between the victims of anticompetitive 
behaviour in member states and the regional institutions that are charged with deciding 
competition law cases.112 As the centralized system in WAEMU does not require the 
authorization of a local institution (such as NCAs) in all member states to help in 
investigating or receiving direct complaints,113 the system is likely to make filing of 
competition complaints more challenging for most (real and legal) persons, and make 
the raising of competition awareness more difficult, especially at the peripheries of the 
region. Authorization of local institutions, on the other hand, would mean higher costs, 
which might not be affordable in the case of regional blocs formed by less developed 
countries (e.g. OECS). Thirdly, there have been problems in allocating the necessary 
resources to the WAEMU Commission. Due to human, and more importantly, financial 
resource constraints, the WAEMU Commission can only initiate and determine a 
limited number of investigations.114 In other words the current enforcement capacity of 
the WAEMU Commission has proved to be insufficient to reviewing all complaints of 
competition law infringement across the WAEMU region. Lastly, although WAEMU 
law do not seem to oblige member states to adopt domestic competition law and to 
establish NCAs, the extensive supportive function foreseen for already existing NCAs 
under Directive No. 02/2002/UEMOA, combined with the resource constraints of the 
WAEMU Commission, give the impression that effective competition law enforcement 
could only be achieved by ensuring cooperation between national institutions of 
WAEMU member states and the WAEMU Commission. However, not all WAEMU 
member states have an NCA, and those that have domestic competition law are yet to 
incorporate the regional competition rules into their national systems.115 
Competition law administration, adjudication and enforcement experience of the 
WAEMU demonstrates the various challenges of establishing a workable regional 
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competition regime, especially when resources are tight. In the specific case of the 
WAEMU, institutional structure (and in line with this, the division of competences 
between regional and the national levels), resource constraints, and delay in the 
incorporation of regional competition law into the domestic law of member states seem 
to create the biggest problems for the regional competition law regime. In order to 
address these problems the WAEMU Commission is currently working on a substantial 
reform plan which also aims at restructuring the current institutional design of the 
competition authorities and the division of competences between national and regional 
institutions.116 
As mentioned earlier, a development parallel with the efforts towards reforming the 
competition law regime in the WAEMU is the establishment of a regional competition 
law regime in the ECOWAS – the Economic Community of the West African States. 
As all WAEMU member states have overlapping membership of the ECOWAS,117 the 
latter’s competition law regime will also be applicable to the WAEMU. In accordance 
with this, the WAEMU Treaty recalls the objectives of the ECOWAS integration in its 
Preamble.118 
ECOWAS is a regional bloc formed by fifteen West African states119 in 1975 with the 
objective of promoting regional integration ‘in all fields of economic activity, 
particularly, industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions,  [as well as] social and 
cultural matters.’120 As does the WAEMU Treaty, Article 3 of the Revised Treaty 
Establishing the Economic Community of West African States (the ‘Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty’) 121  provides that economic integration objectives of the union 
include the formation of a common market in which goods, services, capital and persons 
have free movement, and real and legal persons have the right of establishment. 
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Currently the regional bloc is in the process of establishing a customs union122, and 
presumably the purpose of forming a full economic union can be met, if successful, in 
no near future. According to the above-mentioned provision of the Revised ECOWAS 
Treaty, and similarly to the EU, the goals of the ECOWAS include broader social 
policies, such as raising the living standards of its people, harmonization and 
coordination of policies for the promotion of culture, education, health, legal matters, 
etc. The executive body of ECOWAS is the ECOWAS Commission, established in the 
year the union was founded123, and sits in Abuja, Nigeria. Regional institutions of the 
union include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of 
Ministers, the Community Parliament, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Community Court of Justice, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and 
Development.124  
There appears to be uncertainty about the direct effect and supremacy of ECOWAS law. 
Mathis and Dawar (2008) suggested that it has ‘superiority’ over the national laws of 
ECOWAS member states, and that superiority will in effect oblige the courts and 
agencies of member states to apply this regional law when they deal with a claim based 
on this regional law.125 The authors cite the Revised ECOWAS Treaty as establishing 
the superiority or priority of this corpus of law, but without indicating a specific 
provision.  Yet neither the Revised ECOWAS Treaty nor the secondary law includes 
any explicit provision on the applicability of the supremacy and direct effect principles 
in the ECOWAS context.126  
While Oppong (2011) acknowledges the absence of any explicit recognition of the 
above-mentioned principles in the ECOWAS legislation, 127  he indicates that two 
decisions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice might be interpreted as confirming the 
supremacy of ECOWAS law. The author cites Frank Ukor v. Alinnor128 in which the 
court ruled that the ECOWAS Treaty is ‘the supreme law of the ECOWAS, and it may 
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(ECOWAS, 2013). 
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128 ECW/CCJ/APP/01/04, ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005. 
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be called its Constitution.’129 Secondly, the author refers to Jerry Ugokwe v Nigeria130 
in which the court held that ‘the distinctive feature of the community legal order of 
ECOWAS is that it sets forth a judicial monism of first and last resort in community 
law.’131 These judgments, however, do not exclude the need to give legal effect to 
regional law by recognizing this in the domestic legal systems of member states. 
A more detailed review of the legal effect of ECOWAS law can be found in Nwauche 
(2011), which suggests that the direct effect of the regional law is ultimately dependent 
on the domestic law of each member state.132 The author cites Article 5(2) of the 
ECOWAS Treaty, which requires member states to make the required legal 
arrangements in accordance with their national constitutions in order to give effect to 
the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty. The author notes that this requirement should 
also apply to the secondary laws of the region, and therefore the direct effect of 
ECOWAS law should be dependent on the constitutional principles applicable in each 
member state.133 Accordingly, Nwauche differentiates between member states that 
embrace monism in their constitutions (i.e. French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking 
member states) and those that embrace dualism in their constitutions (i.e. English-
speaking member states). The author indicates that while dualist countries require 
international law (including ECOWAS law) to be promulgated in national legislation 
before gaining legal effect in their national courts, in monist countries, international law 
(including ECOWAS law) automatically becomes part of the domestic legal system 
upon their ratification, subject to reciprocal enforcement of the respective law by other 
parties.134 Similar to Article 55 of the French Constitution, in these monist states, 
international treaties or agreements that are duly ratified and approved shall, upon their 
publication, have authority superior to that of domestic legislation, subject to reciprocal 
implementation by other parties.135 Nwauche, however, notes that in practice ECOWAS 
law seems to lack direct applicability even in the monist states, due to the principle of 
reciprocal application. In addition, the author indicates that in some cases delay might 
occur in ratification of regional law when regional law conflicts with the national 
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constitution.136 As a result, he concludes, ECOWAS law, ‘perhaps with few exceptions’, 
does not have direct effect and direct applicability.137 
Despite the above uncertainties about the legal effect of ECOWAS law and the 
slowness of the regionalization, ECOWAS member states intend to deepen their 
regional cooperation, and to establish a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system.138 For these purposes the ECOWAS Commission in cooperation 
with the WAEMU Commission prepared a framework on ECOWAS competition policy 
in 2007.139 In addition, in December 2008, the ECOWAS member states adopted the 
ECOWAS competition laws (i.e. the Supplementary Act No. A/SA.1/06/08), and agreed 
on the laws establishing the ‘Regional Competition Authority for ECOWAS’, and 
regulating the terms of its operation (through the Supplementary Act No. 
A/SA.2/06/08).140 ECOWAS competition regime aims to deal with four major types of 
anticompetitive action: unilateral restrictions to competition, abuse of dominance, 
mergers and acquisitions, and state aid.141 The jurisdiction of the ECOWAS competition 
authority is limited to anticompetitive agreements and practices that affect trade 
between the ECOWAS member states. 142  Unlike the WAEMU laws, ECOWAS 
competition laws anticipate shared competence of the regional competition authority 
and the NCAs of ECOWAS member states in competition law enforcement.143 In 
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addition, appeal against decisions of the ECOWAS competition authority lies to the 
ECOWAS Court of Justice, and the decisions of the latter shall be final.144 
Although it has been over five years since the adoption of the abovementioned two 
laws, ECOWAS competition rules are not yet enforceable, and the ECOWAS 
competition authority is not yet active. This stagnation might be explained by the 
complexity of the regional cooperation between the ECOWAS countries, which have a 
diverse palette of political identities, legal traditions and economic interests. With 
respect to competition policy, however, the first and most obvious problem of the 
ECOWAS is ensuring coherent enforcement of the regional competition law by member 
states. The coexistence of the competition enforcement systems of the WAEMU and 
ECOWAS may bring about a number of difficulties. Mathis and Dawar (2011) suggest 
that the ‘for competition law, the WAEMU has all the characteristics of a single 
national territory, with its own high court providing superior application of the 
regional law in respect of its own members and applicable across the entire WAEMU 
regional territory. (…) [Therefore,] the WAEMU should be treated as a single state 
(customs territory) entity in respect of a created ECOWAS regional law.’145 Likewise, 
Ngom (2012) indicates that the drafters of the ECOWAS competition law proposed 
considering the WAEMU region as a single state for purposes of competition law 
enforcement at the ECOWAS level.146 Arguably, one might be able to find traces of this 
approach in the regional competition law of the ECOWAS.147 Considering the internal 
organizational and legal enforcement problems of the WAEMU, however, persuading 
all WAEMU member states to be represented by a single unit run by the WAEMU 
Competition Commission might not be easily achievable. Current competition 
enforcement practice in the WAEMU, although very limited, is far from being 
homogeneous as would be expected from legal enforcement of a single national 
territory. Even when this formidable hurdle is overcome, there need to be clear legal 
arrangements in place to give citizens of WAEMU member states the right of direct 
representation before the ECOWAS Commission and the ECOWAS Court of Justice in 
competition matters. An additional legal problem might arise when the ECOWAS 
																																																								
144 Article 7 of the Supplementary Act No. A/SA.2/06/08. 
145 (Mathis & Dawar, 2008), p. 394 (emphasis added). 
146 (Ngom, 2012), p. 127. 
147 Article 13(3) of the Supplementary Act No. A/SA.1/06/08 provides that ‘[i]n the implementation of the 
Community Competition Rules, the Regional Authority shall collaborate with other existing competition 
agencies. (UEMOA).’ The reference to the WAEMU/UEMOA in brackets might be interpreted as its 
being considered to be an NCA. Yet the provision remains ambiguous.  
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competition authority finds one (or more) WAEMU member state(s) individually to 
have infringed ECOWAS competition law. In this case there should be a possibility of 
individual representation of WAEMU member state governments/public institutions 
before the ECOWAS institutions, and of sanctioning those individual member states 
rather than the entire WAEMU region. 
The second clear challenge to the enforcement of the ECOWAS competition law is the 
uncertain legal effect of the entire ECOWAS corpus of legislation before the national 
courts of ECOWAS member states. A clear regulation on the supremacy and direct 
effect of ECOWAS law could facilitate regional cooperation and accelerate the 
integration process. Nevertheless, even in the absence of supremacy and direct effect of 
ECOWAS law, regional competition enforcement can take place if ECOWAS member 
states will adopt legal mechanisms to put pressure on non-compliant member states, and 
to remedy their dilatory action (or inaction) that obstructs the effectiveness of the 
regional law and its enforcement.  
Lastly, ECOWAS competition law could be implemented efficiently only when the 
domestic competition laws of all ECOWAS member states are sufficiently harmonized. 
Member states need to make the necessary reforms in their domestic legislation in order 
to ensure such compliance. As an example of the current inconsistencies, Ngom (2012) 
highlights the different definitions of abuse of dominance under WAEMU and 
ECOWAS competition laws.148 In the absence of the necessary legal mechanisms to 
force member states to take legal action to give effect to regional arrangements, the 
feasibility of such reforms would be at the sole discretion of the national governments 
of ECOWAS member states.  
It may be concluded that a number of legal reforms need to be instituted both at the 
regional level and in the national legislation of member states in order to establish a 
workable regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in the 
ECOWAS.149 Moreover, the internal political and economic problems of the WAEMU 
																																																								
148 (Ngom, 2012), p. 129. 
149 The regional competition law enforcement systems in the OECS and the CARICOM show certain 
similarities to regional competition law enforcement systems in the WAEMU and the ECOWAS. As 
mentioned earlier, the OECS member states have overlapping membership of the CARICOM, and 
compared with the CARICOM, they have achieved a deeper integration among themselves. (See Section 
5.2 above.) The regional competition authority of the OECS will act as the national NCA of all OECS 
member states, also within the context of the competition law enforcement system at the CARICOM 
level. The main reason for this arrangement is the resource constraints of the OECS member states. 
Because the OECS bloc consists of nine microstates that share legal traditions and a common language, 
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in relation to competition law enforcement are likely to constitute a formidable 
challenge the success of the regional competition law regime in the ECOWAS region. 
The political commitment of the West African states to regional integrations in general, 
and to the regional competition law enforcement systems thereunder in particular, is 
likely to be the main determinant of the future efficacy of the respective regional 
arrangements.  
The next section will discuss certain factors that are external to the broader integration 
under a deep RTA yet may adversely influence regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement. 
 
Section 5.5 Other Relevant Factors and Limitations of the Work  
The poor performance and/or stagnant progress of a regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement system under a deep RTA concluded between developing countries 
might also be related to factors that are external to the respective RTA. For instance, the 
dynamics of the domestic economies of member states might create political obstacles 
to the establishment of a competition law regime at the regional level. For instance, 
strong state presence in the domestic economies of member states or close personal ties 
between business elites and politicians might influence the political commitment of 
member states to a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system.  
Secondly, as the discussion on the West African regional blocs in Section 5.4 above 
shows, institutional arrangements both at national and regional levels may create 
formidable obstacles to the workability of a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system.  
																																																																																																																																																																		
regional integration between the OECS states can develop more easily. In addition, as the OECS member 
states have already harmonized their laws and institutional structures in various policy areas, their joint 
action in the CARICOM competition law enforcement system might be smoother than the WAEMU’s 
representation in the ECOWAS. On the other hand, CARICOM integration also suffers from slow 
regionalization and conflicting commitments under multiple RTAs. For instance, the Bahamas are a 
member of both the CARICOM and the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); 
however, it preferred to remain outside of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (by not signing 
the RTC). Because the Bahamas are not a member of the CARICOM single market, the CARICOM’s 
regional competition law enforcement rules are not applicable to the Bahamas. By contrast, however, the 
CARICOM Competition Authority is the only recognized authority in the CARICOM-EU EPA. See 




Thirdly, differences in the legal systems, political history and cultural traditions of 
member states might further complicate regional cooperation, as shown by the 
ECOWAS experience examined above.  
Fourthly, ambiguous laws and competition policy objectives may stimulate political 
conflict and obstruct the institution of a regional competition law regime. Although 
provisions defining core anti-competitive conduct show great similarities across all 
jurisdictions, the interpretation of these provisions in the light of the goals attributed to 
competition policy, and in line with this, the scope of exceptions and exemptions from 
competition law enforcement tend to be very diverse, particularly among developing 
countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no consensus on the optimal 
goals of competition policy. In the specific case of developing countries, however, 
many competition experts argue that pursuance of broader policy goals is justifiable.150 
After all, as noted by McMahon (2013), ‘[in developing countries] short-term social 
costs, including unemployment or more volatile pricing might not be easily justified by 
the possibility of more sustained consumer welfare in the longer term.’151 Transition to 
a free market economy accompanied by strictly economic efficiency-focussed 
competition law enforcement may create such ‘unaffordable risks’ for developing 
countries. Furthermore, as noted by Hyman and Kovacic (2013), in many countries the 
presence of non-efficiency objectives is a precondition of a coalition that will support 
the enactment of competition provisions in the first place.152 In this respect, while on the 
one hand non-economic goals and sector-specific arrangements might avoid socio-
political tensions, implementing overly broad exceptions would shrink the area that the 
competition policy regulates and thereby reduce the promised benefits of 
competition.153  
Lastly, the sequence of the regional competition law enforcement154, the policies 
adopted for raising public awareness of competition, and the checks and balances on 
competition agencies as well as on national governments that might have a possibility to 
																																																								
150 Among others, (Eleanor M Fox, 2007, 2012); (Bakhoum, 2011) and; (Gal, 2004), p. 28. 
151 (McMahon, 2013), p. 222. 
152 (Hyman & Kovacic, 2013b), p. 2167. 
153 (Eleanor M Fox, 2007), pp. 121-2. 
154 Stewart emphasises the need for small economies ‘to introduce competition law on a phased basis, to 
make administering and implementation manageable, and to make the law compatible with the level of 
development.’ (Stewart, 2000), p. 54. For a proposal on developing a competition law regime in two main 
phases, see (Kovacic, 1997), pp. 429-46.  
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interfere in legal enforcement155 are among the factors that are likely to affect the 
efficacy of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system. 
As this chapter’s objective has been to examine the link between deep RTAs and 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems thereunder, a detailed 
examination of the problems that may derive from the design of regional competition 
policy and institutions as well as national economic systems will not be taken further.156 
Moreover, since most of the subjects examined in this section closely relate to the 
internal dynamics of regional blocs, making a sound suggestion on adequate legal 
design would inevitably require an understanding of the historical, political, economic 
and cultural traditions of all member states of a given regional bloc. Although such deep 
analysis on the basis of individual regional blocs remains beyond the scope of this 
thesis, future research in this area would be useful. 
 
Section 5.6 Conclusions 
This thesis argues that the success of a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system established under a deep RTA is conditional on the success of the 
broader regional economic (and social) integration scheme under the same deep RTA. 
In line with this proposition, the present chapter has explored the disadvantages of this 
conditionality. Accordingly, the chapter examined the major disadvantages of 
developing a regional competition law enforcement system within the broader context 
of a deep RTA under four headings: (i) the risk of increased regional inequalities as a 
result of a deep RTA; (ii) persistent resource constraints and corruption; (iii) preference 
for intergovernmentalism over supranationalism; and (iv) lack of enforcement, the 
secondary role of regional competition policy, and conflicting competition policy 
commitments under multiple RTAs. The chapter also acknowledged that other factors 
concerning domestic economy as well as political, legal and institutional endowments 
of member states of a deep RTA might also have negative implications for the efficacy 
of regionally integrated competition law enforcement system.  
																																																								
155 On the role of politics and the potential influence of governments on competition enforcement in 
developing countries, see (Dabbah, 2010), pp. 463-5.    
156 Although some of these issues are examined under Chapter 3 to the extent that they are relevant to the 
potential benefits and costs of regional competition agreements. 
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The next chapter will evaluate the findings of the first five chapters. Conclusions will 
then be drawn. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The core research question of this thesis is whether regionally integrated competition 
law enforcement systems in deep RTAs can help to address competition law 
enforcement problems of developing countries. This thesis has found that a well-
working regionally integrated competition law enforcement system would help to deal 
with at least four fundamental problems faced by developing countries. A regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system may (i) significantly reduce the cost of 
legal enforcement, (ii) limit the influence of vested interest groups on law-making and 
enforcement, (iii) improve the ability of competition authorities to sanction 
anticompetitive firms (by imposing large fines or other deterrent measures), and (iv) 
increase the bargaining power of parties in international negotiation. It is therefore 
concluded that regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems are, at least 
in theory, desirable from the perspective of developing countries. 
Further research on the dynamics of regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems and their connection to deep RTAs, however, has revealed that the 
establishment of a regional competition law regime as a part of a broader regional 
economic (and social) integration agreement might face various problems concerning 
enforcement. It is fair to conclude that drawing general conclusions about the usefulness 
of regional competition law enforcement systems to developing countries is not 
possible. Instead, the subject obliges assessment of this question separately for each 
individual regional bloc, ideally with an understanding of the political, historical, 
economic, and cultural backgrounds of all national jurisdictions involved. Analysis of a 
regional bloc, however, inevitably requires a good knowledge of the general economic 
and political climate in which it operates. This thesis, therefore, examines the subject 
from an interdisciplinary perspective in the hope that this will improve current 
knowledge of the role of competition policy in deep regional integrations, and help to 
develop better informed and achievable competition policy solutions for the problems of 
existing regional competition law regimes established under RTAs between developing 




• The first and main finding of this thesis is that the success of a regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement system is conditional on the success 
of the relevant deep RTA. There are at least two justifications for this 
conclusion. Firstly, as a matter of fact all existing regionally integrated 
competition law enforcement systems are found in the context of a deep 
RTA.  Revision of the objectives of the existing deep RTAs entered into by 
developing countries demonstrates that regional competition law and policy 
is sought to complement economic (and social) integration rather than 
constituting a goal of the respective deep RTAs in its own right. In line with 
this, national governments seem to have no political will to establish a 
regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in a stand-alone 
competition agreement. Secondly, the absence of the requisite political drive 
and determination to establish a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system independent of a deep RTA can be explained by the 
strategic importance of competition policy in today’s liberalised economies. 
As competition law regulates the parameters of competitive conduct in 
markets1, it is capable of having a direct influence on the operations of the 
markets and market players. In this regard, when competition enforcement is 
transferred to the regional level, regional institutions will gain the authority 
to oversee, and at times to interfere in the national markets of participating 
jurisdictions. This could be interpreted as a loss of control over a state’s own 
markets.2 Moreover, in the absence of a ‘common market’, joint competition 
enforcement at the regional level may lead to more conflicts between the 
national economic interests of participating countries. As a result, regionally 
integrated competition law enforcement systems appear to be unfavourable 
when parties are not engaged in a deep regional economic integration, and 
when they do not share sufficiently common economic interests. If true, then 
a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system is unlikely to 
become operational and effective before the relevant regional economic (and 
social) integration brings about sufficient (economic and other) returns to the 
participating jurisdictions.     
																																																								




• Examination of the economic and political dynamics of deep RTAs 
demonstrates that economic gains from a regional integration are often far 
from being definite. In the context of deep RTAs formed by developing 
countries, in particular, economic returns to some member states might be 
negligible or even negative. This economic outcome might be due, among 
other things, to low intra-regional trade, trade diversion, similar factor 
endowments of member states, and agglomeration. Moreover, geographical 
disadvantages of some member states (e.g. being landlocked) or political 
instabilities in one part of a regional bloc may further reduce the potential 
economic returns from regional integration. In this context, addressing 
inequalities between member states needs to be one of the primary 
objectives, if not the primary objective, of any deep RTA.  
• In addressing regional inequalities most deep RTAs formed by developing 
countries employ direct compensation mechanisms. Although direct 
compensation might be a good immediate way of facilitating regional 
cooperation, in the long-term it is likely to lead to political tension on the 
side of both the compensator and compensated member states. Therefore 
long-term solutions to regional inequality should target disseminating 
economic activity across the region. In the special case of developing 
countries investment in soft and hard infrastructure and the abolition of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to regional trade are critical. Efforts to redress 
regional inequalities are likely to have more significance for deep regional 
integration than the formation of a regional competition law regime at the 
initial stage. This is also consistent with the abovementioned observation 
that the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
system is dependent on the success of the broader integration in the relevant 
deep RTA. Accordingly, in the absence of sufficiently common economic 
interests, member states of a deep RTA are unlikely consent to the formation 
of (or support the operations of) a regional competition authority with 
supranational (law enforcement) power. 
• Lax attitude towards the implementation of regional laws is a common 
problem of the regional blocs formed by developing countries. This problem 
also leads to overlapping RTA membership, and conflicting commitments of 
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states under different RTAs. The latter two issues can be interpreted as a 
lack of confidence in the cause of deep regional integration, and the desire to 
preserve control over national economic policy. Although a lax attitude 
towards regional integration might be helpful in promoting formal and 
informal communication between member states and enable them to 
undertake various infrastructural projects, it hinders progress towards ‘deep 
regionalisation’, and increases uncertainty surrounding legal enforcement.  
• The extensive use of the ‘variable geometry principle’ is another common 
feature of many regional blocs formed by developing countries. While it is 
certainly true that variable geometry enables member states of a regional 
bloc to proceed with regionalisation at different speeds and at different 
depths, the offered flexibility is not always free from adverse economic and 
political implications. In economic terms the main idea of ‘deep 
regionalisation’ is the combining of all resources of a group of sovereign 
states in order for them to receive higher economic returns primarily as a 
result of better allocation of resources and scale economies. If a sub-group of 
member states agrees to implement an economic policy that will change the 
parameters and extent of economic activity in their national markets, this 
will inevitably influence the economic performance of the entire regional 
bloc. Depending on the level of regionalisation across a regional bloc, 
further economic integration of a sub-group of member states may have a 
favourable or adverse economic effect on the economies of the remaining 
member states and may therefore raise political tension.3 (The EU’s common 
monetary policy is a good example.) Moreover, from the perspective of 
regional blocs formed by developing countries, different speeds of 
regionalisation within a regional bloc together with a lax attitude towards 
legal enforcement and membership of multiple RTAs might contribute to the 
aggravation of the problems concerning transparency and legal certainty.  
																																																								
3 Consequently, it might be advisable not to engage in further economic integration by applying the 
variable geometry principle if some member states do not intend to catch up with this deeper level of 
integration in the longer term. In some cases, however, objecting to the further integration of other 
member states might not be politically feasible for all member states, depending on their strategic 
importance to the entire regional bloc. 
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• Due to uncertainties about the feasibility of achieving the projected 
economic and political gains from regionalisation most deep RTAs between 
developing countries suffer from the lack of implementation.  
• In the absence of reliable prospects of positive economic returns from 
regional integration, member states will be unlikely to surrender their 
sovereign powers to a regional authority. Parties may refrain from the 
establishment of regional institutions with adequate (supranational) powers. 
With respect to regional competition law enforcement, until the necessary 
powers and resources are provided to the regional competition authority, the 
political benefits expected from the regionalisation of competition law 
enforcement, such as limiting the adverse effect of corruption and the 
pressure of vested interest groups, will not be realised. 
• A disadvantage of regionally integrated competition law enforcement 
systems is that while they require considerable investment in legal 
harmonisation and institution-building at the initial stage, they bring about 
their benefits only in the longer term - after workable legal, financial and 
institutional arrangements are in place. As a result, establishment of a fully 
functioning regionally integrated competition law enforcement system 
requires the long-term political commitment of member states. 
• Due to the dependency of the success of a regional competition law regime 
on the success of broader economic (and social) integration, ensuring the 
coherence of the regional competition policy with the objectives of the 
broader regional integration scheme is critical. As regards regional blocs 
consisting of developing countries, policy coherence might be possible only 
when the regional competition laws take the necessary measures ensuring 
special treatment of certain groups, such as small businesses, strategic 
industries or historically disadvantaged persons.  
• The dependency of the success of a regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement system on the success of the relevant regional economic (and 
social) integration also justifies the pursuance of the so-called ‘single market 
objective’ in regional competition law enforcement. As a desirable side 
effect, the single market objective might increase political support of the 
233 
 
national governments of member states of a deep RTA for the relevant 
regional competition law enforcement system. However, this positive 
influence may occur only after the regional competition law enforcement 
system becomes operational. 
• Even when a regional competition policy under a deep RTA respects the 
political sensitivities of all member states, developing country governments 
might not have enough resources and/or political will to implement the 
regional competition legislation. Accordingly, depending on the internal 
dynamics of a regional integration, harmonisation of national competition 
law and practice might be delayed, and the budget for regional institutions 
might not be provided. In this regard, one can expect only gradual 
development in regional competition law regimes. Accordingly, regional 
competition authorities, if present, can be advised to prioritise their activities 
by refraining from adjudicating cases that may raise political or economic 
disputes among member states. Potential conflicts should be avoided 
especially at the early years of practice of a regional competition authority.4 
It is equally important for a regional competition authority to prioritise 
public awareness campaigns advertising the benefits of competition in order 
for it to receive political support for legal enforcement.     
In light of the above it is submitted that having common economic interests is vital to 
active cooperation in trade-related policy areas, including competition policy, at the 
regional level. A regionally integrated competition law enforcement system is more 
likely to succeed when the relevant RTA achieves a degree of interdependency between 
the economies of member states, and thereby broadens the scope of common economic 
interests of the parties. With respect to regional blocs consisting of developing 
countries, in particular, it is believed that only then would there be enough political 
dedication to proceed with deep regional integration. In order to achieve a workable 
regional competition policy, parties to a deep RTA might need to adopt unconventional 
policy objectives while observing the political sensitivities of one another. Even then, 
however, issues of resource constraint and good governance would need to be tackled in 
or independently of regional integration agreements.  
																																																								
4  ‘As noted by Kovacic ‘[n]ew competition bodies continually must ask whether the exercise of nominally 
significant powers will arouse debilitating political opposition’ [(Kovacic, 2001), pp. 305]. 
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In sum, this thesis suggests that the following four factors are the main determinants of 
the success of a regionally integrated competition law enforcement system in a deep 
RTA concluded by and between developing countries: 
i. the success of the deep economic (as well as social) integration between 
member states; 
ii. coherence of regional competition policy with the broader objectives of 
the respective regional integration;  
iii. long-term political backing of all member states; and 
iv. presence of adequate institutions (with sufficient autonomy and 
resources) both at regional and national levels. 
The findings of this thesis might also be useful to discussion on how best to promote 
existing regionally integrated competition law enforcement systems under deep RTAs 
concluded between developing countries. In the light of the above, strengthening the 
overall design of deep RTAs with an awareness that a sustainable regional solution 
could only be reached when regional integration is to the benefit of all member states in 
a reasonable future timespan is critical. It is advisable to adopt precise and achievable 
regional development targets and to aim at reducing regional inequalities. Likewise, 
reaching to a clear understanding on the fundamental principles of a regional integration 
would inform further legislation, and guide the legal enforcement activities of the 
judiciary.  
The above factors, however, are likely to require developing countries to make a 
conscious choice about which regional bloc they would like to be engaged with in the 
future. As made clear in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 above, overlapping membership of 
multiple deep RTAs is a formidable obstacle to furthering regionalisation. If Gathii 
(2010) is right in his observation that a key factor for African states in favouring 
multiple RTA membership is the expectation of benefit from specific infrastructural or 
water-related projects, then it might be an option to reduce the subject of such 
agreements to attainment of the objectives of the respective projects.5 More generally, 
however, the intention to have a choice between multiple custom duties under multiple 
RTAs constitutes a great risk to legal certainty, and to building trust between parties to 
respective regional integrations. It appears to be crucial for developing countries to 
																																																								
5 (Gathii, 2010), pp. 584-7. 
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affiliate themselves primarily with one regional bloc at the expense of certain 
advantages other regional blocs would offer if they wish to reap the benefits of deep 
regional integration.  
In order to observe the national interests of all member states, besides eliminating 
barriers to trade, regional blocs should ideally focus on developing soft and hard 
infrastructure in parallel with instituting the necessary legal reforms for good 
governance and establishing the so-called four freedoms (i.e. free movement of goods, 
services and workers, and the right of establishment).  
Before the necessary substantial reforms for deep regionalisation are made, competition 
law enforcement at the regional level is highly likely to take a back seat in regional 
policy making. Although it is true that in the EU experience competition policy was one 
of the main drivers of deep regionalisation, in the context of the current political 
dynamics governing regional cooperation between developing countries, this is unlikely 
to be the case at least in the initial years of cooperation. This difference might be 
explained by (a) extensive resource constraints and far less encouraging economic 
prospects of most developing countries than those of EU member states in the early 
years of European integration, (b) the lack of suitable institutional or legal structures, 
and (c) (compared with the early years of the EU) more readily available knowledge on 
the way competition law operates across the liberal economies of the world. Once the 
necessary resources are found and legal arrangements made for the establishment of a 
regional competition law enforcement system, however, communication between public 
and private sectors and competition authorities might help furthering regionalisation.6 
Depending on their level of autonomy, regional competition authorities can help 
developing a competition culture by communicating their opinion on potential 
anticompetitive effects of certain government measures, or by seeking the opinion of 
consumer groups and private businesses on the likely effects of a competition case 
under investigation. Such awareness of competition would help to the healthy 
																																																								
6 Given his previous work with NCAs of numerous transition economies, Kovacic identifies five key 
tasks for the initial phase of building a new competition law regime: ‘establishing the competition policy 
agency, carrying out an education and publicity programme for the new competition policy system, 
formulating a substantive research agenda, initiating a competition agency programme, and enhancing 
the capability of collateral institutions that are important to implementing substantive legal commands.’ 
To achieve publicity, the author emphasises, inter alia, the importance of educating consumers, business 
leaders and government officials, developing ties with media organisations, and designing guidelines and 
protocols in order to create an awareness on how the substantive law will be applied in practice. 
(Kovacic, 1997), pp. 430-41.  
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functioning of free market, and regionalisation. To integrating regional competition 
policy in the broader regional integration anticipated under a deep RTA, having the full 
political support of some strategically strong, if not all, member states is crucial. 
Political support can be gained by engaging in public awareness campaigns, lobbying, 
and more importantly by avoiding controversial decisions at the early stages of regional 
enforcement activities. In addition, in order to limit the adverse effects of competition 
law enforcement on the poorest, and thereby to receive presumably wider political 
support, competition authorities, regional or national, might be advised to focus on 
sectors that would positively influence the poor and small businesses the most.7  
Another at least equally important matter is the coherence of regional competition 
policy with the broader objectives of the relevant regional integration. Although 
determination of the optimal goals for competition law in general, and regional 
competition law in particular, is a highly controversial subject, strengthening regional 
integration, dynamic efficiency, significant employment opportunities, and 
environmental interests might be among the subjects that could be considered in 
competition law policy. While broadly defined goals might increase the political 
significance of competition policy and thereby receive political support, they would 
complicate competition law assessment, put legal certainty at risk, and make 
competition enforcement institutions more vulnerable to political pressure. The right 
balance between the pros and cons of broader competition policy objectives is to be 
decided by the parties to a regional integration.  
The above suggestions might be helpful in understanding and addressing the problem of 
stagnation and lack of implementation of regionally integrated competition law 
enforcement systems established under deep RTAs formed by developing countries. 
However, as mentioned above, the optimal regional competition policy design under 
such deep RTAs would require individual tailoring for each regional bloc by taking into 
account the particular economic, social and political traditions of all respective national 
jurisdictions. 
																																																								
7 ‘[I]f competition [policy] want[s] to reduce poverty, [it is] likely to have the greatest effect when 
focusing on markets in which poor people spend most of their income (essential goods and services), on 
markets that facilitate small entrepreneurs’ success (banking and communications services), and on 






APPENDIX 1 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
 
The sections below will first define the key concepts used in this thesis and then explain 
different levels of regional economic integration under RTAs. 
 
Section 1 Definition of ‘Competition Policy’ and ‘Competition Law’ 
‘Competition policy’, in the broadest sense, can be defined as ‘all policies that affect 
competition, or contestability (potential competition) in a market, including trade and 
regulatory policies as well as competition or antitrust law.’1 ‘Competition law’, on the 
other hand, is one sub-set of the competition policy which can be defined as ‘the set of 
laws and policies adopted by a country to prevent or remedy restrictive business 
practices by enterprises, whether private or public.’2 Conventionally, competition law 
concerns unilateral and collusive conduct that is directed at restricting competition, and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  
In this thesis the terms ‘competition policy’ and ‘competition law’ will carry the above-
stated meanings unless the text explicitly states otherwise.  
 
Section 2  Definitions of ‘Developing Countries’ 
There is no universally applied method for the designation of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries.3 Development level of a country, however, is always assessed 
relative to other countries. Because ‘development’ can be obtained in numerous 
economic, social and political spheres, depending on the purpose of each comparative 
study, the set of indicators considered for designating country groups can vary 
significantly. In this context, indicators such as national gross income, 
acknowledgement of human rights, the state of education, healthcare, gender equality, 
																																																								
1 The definition is barrowed from the World Bank’s official website, available at:  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTT
RADERESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21072429~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:544849,0
0.html (accessed on June 16, 2014) 
2 Ibid. 
3 The UN also acknowledges the absence of a universal system for the designation of developed and 
developing countries. See footnote (c) at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
(accessed on June 16, 2014). 
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infrastructure, governance system, and disaster preparedness are often taken into 
account in determining the development level of countries or regions.  
Categorising countries based on their per capita GDP is a commonly applied method of 
economic analysis.4 The latest figures published by the UNCTAD divide developing 
countries into three sub-groups according to their average per capita GDP as follows: 
high-income (above $4 500), middle-income (between $1 000 and $4 500) and low-
income (below $1 000).5  
From a broader perspective, which considers certain social and geographical indicators 
in addition to per capita GDP, the UNCTAD studies socio-economic performance of 
developing countries under different sub-categories. The following country groups, in 
particular, are widely used in academic studies:   
(i) Least developed countries (LDCs): Countries in this category are considered 
to be severely disadvantaged in obtaining development, and are highly 
vulnerable to poverty. Three criteria are used to determine LDC status: (a) 
per capita income, (b) human assets (indicators of nutrition, health, school 
enrolment and literacy), and (c) economic vulnerability (indicators of natural 
or trade-related shocks, physical and economic exposure to shocks, and 
smallness and remoteness).6  
(ii) Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs): Countries in this category face 
significant obstacles to obtaining development due to direct or indirect 
effects of their geographical position, e.g. lack of access to the sea and 
																																																								
4 Classifications based on per capita GDP merely aim at statistical convenience in economic analysis; 
thus per capita GDP indicator alone is not capable of reflecting the overall development level of a 
country.   
5 (UNCTAD, 2013b), p. xi (the full list of country classifications according to the geographical regions 
and development status is available between p. xii-xx). 
6 ‘The latter two are measured by two indices of structural impediments, namely the human assets index 
and the economic vulnerability index: 
• Low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of GNI per capita, based on the 
World Bank Atlas method (under $992 for inclusion, above $ 1,190 for graduation as applied in 
the 2012 triennial review). 
• Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition: percentage of population 
undernourished; (b) health: mortality rate for children aged five years or under; (c) education: the 
gross secondary school enrolment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate. 
• Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; 
(c) merchandise export concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross 
domestic product; (e) share of population living in low elevated coastal zones; (f) instability of 
exports of goods and services; (g) victims of natural disasters; and (h) instability of agricultural 
production.’ 
See, http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/ (accessed on June 16, 2014). 
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remoteness from world markets. This may hinder development by leading to 
high transport costs, reduced international competitiveness, and dependency 
on transit via other countries.7   
(iii) Small island developing countries (SIDCs): This group was first recognised 
as a distinctive sub-category of developing countries facing specific social, 
economic and environmental vulnerabilities only in June 1992.8 SIDCs, are 
confronted by major disadvantages deriving from the small size of the 
economy (which prevents domestic firms from enjoying the benefits of 
economies of scale), remoteness from world markets, and fragile natural 
environment. Three geographical regions are identified as the location of 
SIDCs: (a) the Caribbean, (b) the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean, and (c) the 
Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea.9  
(iv) Transition countries: These are in transition from centrally planned to 
market economies.10  
Although the term ‘developing countries’ and its above-mentioned sub-categories are 
widely used in many studies, and by various multinational organisations, different 
indicators and/or thresholds can be applied for the determination of the country group in 
a particular study. Respective country groups may also be designated by flexible 
methods. For example, the 2014 IMF World Economic Outlook divides countries 
primarily into two major categories: (i) advanced economies, and (ii) emerging and 
developing economies. This classification, the IMF notes, ‘is not based on strict 
criteria, economic or otherwise, but instead has evolved over time with the objective of 
facilitating analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful organization of the data.’11 
																																																								
7 Currently 31 countries belong to the group of LLDCs: 15 are in Africa, 12 in Asia, 2 in Latin America 
and 2 in Central and Eastern Europe. Of these 31 countries, 16 are classified as LDCs. For more 
information, see: http://unohrlls.org/about-lldcs/ (accessed on June 16, 2014). 
8 SIDC status was recognised as a distinct category at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro on 3-14 June 1992. For further detail, please see 
http://unohrlls.org/about-sids/  (accessed on June 16, 2014). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Assessment under UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2013 is based on three main categories:  
• Developed or Industrial(ised) Countries: members of the OECD (other than Chile, Mexico, the 
Republic of Korea, and Turkey) plus all other EU member states; 
• Transition Economies: South-East Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
Georgia; 
• Developing Countries: all countries, territories or areas not specified above.  
See (UNCTAD, 2013d), p. xi. 
11 (IMF, 2014), Statistical Appendix, p. 157. 
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The purposes of this study do not require a clear list of developing countries, or 
indicators that should be considered for such categorisation. It would be sufficient for 
the reader to relate developing country status to low per capita GDP, low trade, limited 
infrastructure, limited finance, and comparatively low advancement in education, health 
services and other social areas. The findings of this thesis are likely to be applicable to 
countries with poor performance in all or most of these areas. Moreover, the main 
criteria used by UNCTAD for determination of the above-mentioned sub-categories of 
developing countries (LDCs, LLDCs, etc.) are representative for the use of the 
respective terms throughout this thesis.  
In addition, the terms ‘advanced economies’, ‘industrialised countries’ and ‘developed 
economies’ are used interchangeably to refer to countries that are not considered 
developing countries. Likewise, the term ‘economy’ may be used to describe a 
‘country’.  
 
Section 3 Definition of ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ and Different 
Levels of Regional Economic Integration  
Despite adopting the term ‘regional’ in its title, an RTA does not need to be concluded 
between countries belonging to the same geographical region. In broad terms, an RTA 
is a reciprocal agreement, between two or more jurisdictions, that aim at increasing 
trade between its signatories. For this purpose an RTA includes at least two sets of 
rules: (a) provisions for the elimination of national measures that restrict intra-regional 
trade, and (b) provisions for increasing policy coordination across the region. In this 
context, increased trade between independent jurisdictions, in the long term, may 
prepare the ground for regional economic integration. Depending on economic, 
historical and cultural ties between the signatory jurisdictions, an RTA may be designed 
to achieve different levels of economic integration.  
As a general concept, agreements establishing preferential treatment in cross-border 
trade among signatory countries are called ‘preferential trade agreements’ (PTAs). 
Reduction of barriers to cross-border trade under preferential trade agreements mainly 
occur via application of lower (but not necessarily zero) tariffs to the internal trade of a 
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defined list of goods and/or services.12 Some sources, however, use the term PTA as an 
umbrella term for all bilateral or multilateral agreements providing the parties 
preferential access to one another’s market (including agreements promoting deeper 
regional economic integration). 
Different stages of economic integration are usually examined in four groups13: (a) free 
trade area, (b) custom union, (c) common market, and (d) economic union. A step 
																																																								
12  The geographical area formed by signatory states of a preferential trade agreement is called 
‘preferential trade bloc’ (also preferential trade area). The same applies to other levels of regional 
economic integration agreement. 
13 The taxonomy used by the WTO distinguishes between RTAs that concern trade in goods and those 
that concern to trade in services. However, in this and many other studies this distinction is ignored and 
the terms FTA, CU, CM and economic union are used to include trade in both goods and services. [For 
acknowledgment of this divergence from the WTO’s taxonomy, see (J. Gerber, 2010).] 
According to the WTO taxonomy, there are four types of RTA that should be notified to the WTO by its 
members: (i) free trade agreements, (ii) customs union agreements, (iii) economic integration agreements, 
(iv) partial scope agreements. The terms ‘customs union’ and ‘free trade area’ (FTAs) are defined in 
Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). 
Respective provision rules are as follows:  
‘8. For the purposes of this Agreement:  
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory13 for two or more customs territories, so that  
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, 
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated 
with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of 
the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products 
originating in such territories, and,  
(ii)  subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the 
union to the trade of territories not included in the union;  
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more custom territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated 
on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories.’13 (Emphasis added.) 
Pursuant to the above definitions, both CUs and FTAs concern elimination of restrictions to intra-region 
trading of goods (i.e. reduction of tariff duties to zero and removal of non-tariff trade restrictions). Unlike 
free trade agreements, custom union agreements oblige their member states to establish and comply with 
common external tariffs and trade policies against third states.  
Economic integration agreements (EIAs) are defined in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Pursuant to the respective provision, an EIA concerns ‘liberalising trade in services’ 
between or among the participant states, ‘provided that such an agreement:    
a) has substantial sectoral coverage, and  
b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of 
Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a), 
through: 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except for 
measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.’ (Emphasis added.) 
Partial scope agreements are not defined or explicitly referred to in any of the WTO agreements. That 
said, pursuant to the explanations in the official website of the WTO, ‘partial scope’ indicates that “the 
agreement covers only certain products” [see, 




further than economic union is considered to be political union. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the five stages of regional integration are considered to have the following 
meanings: 
 
Levels of Regional Integration 
 
Source: Replicated from Rodrigue et al. (2013)14  
 
Free trade agreements aim at forming a regional bloc in which tariffs and other duties 
on trade between member states are significantly reduced or abolished. These 
agreements are intended mainly to promote efficiency gains in production, and do not 
affect external tariffs imposed by the parties (i.e. national tariffs imposed by member 
states on third countries).  
In regional blocs formed by a customs union agreement, member states eliminate or 
significantly reduce tariffs and other duties on intra-regional trade, and implement a 
common tariff for trade with third countries.  
In common markets member states not only significantly reduce or eliminate tariffs 
and other duties on intra-regional trade and implement common external tax, but also 
ensure free movement of capital and people between member states. 
																																																								




The highest level of economic integration, (full) economic union, occurs where the 
member states forming a common market harmonise their broader economic policies on 
macro-economic and regulatory levels. The level of economic integration in economic 
unions often involves the use of common currency, common monetary and fiscal 
policies, and harmonised tax rates. The EU is currently the most prominent regional 
bloc that is moving towards a full economic union.  
A step further from full economic integration is the integration of social policies and 
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